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INTRODUCTION

Gradually, and one by one, states are reasserting their historic role in the
formulation and enforcement of antitrust doctrine.' In recent years, ten states
have promulgated new antitrust legislation;? three within the past several
months. 3 Other states have new statutes under consideration, 4 or are reforming
existing laws. 5 There has been a concomitant resurgence of enforcement effort,6 and the prospects for further state action appear assured. Following a

1. "Antitrust" is here used to connote laws and principles designed to promote competition by condemning monopolistic and restrictive trade practices. Excluded are laws and
principles intended to regulate the intensity and "fairness" of economic behavior. See, e.g.,
J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE: ANTITRUST REGULATION 65-66 (1964); Barron, California
Antitrust -Legislative Schizophrenia, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 393, 396-99 (1962); Rahl, Toward a
Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 753 (1961). Cf. Limbaugh, Historic
Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 18 U. Mo. L. REV. 215 n.1 (1953). Examples of federal laws
in the former category are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 3§l-ll (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§12, 14-33 (1970); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§41-48 (1970). Federal statutes
illustrative of the latter policy include the Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970); RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§13a-c, 21a (1970); McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. §§45(a)(2)-(5) (1970). See
generally McDermott, History and Identity of the Relevant Antitrust Statutes, 5 TULSA L.J.
265 (1968); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Micrt. L. REV. 1139 (1952).
2. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§44-1411 et seq. (4 TRADE REG. REP. ff30,402 (May 6, 1974));
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§55-4-I et seq. (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§35-24 et seq. (Cum.
Supp. 1973); HAWAII RE,'. STAT. §§480-1 et seq. (1968), as amended (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§60-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1973-1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§§36 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§325.8011 et seq. (Cur. Supp. 1973);
Mo. REV. STAT. §§416.011 et seq. (4 TRADE REG. REP. 11112,801 et seq. (June 17, 1974)); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§9-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§59.1-9.1 et seq. (4 TRADE
REG. REP. D15,102 (May 28, 1974)); WASH. REX'. CODE ANN. §§86.010 et seq. (1972). Additionally, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enacted a comprehensive statute in 1964. P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§257 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973). The Colorado act, passed in 1957, is apparently a reenactment of an antecedent law.
3. Arizona, Missouri, and Virginia.
4. An antitrust bill has been introduced twice in the Florida Legislature. See Fla. H.R.
1697 (introduced by Rep. M. Dubbin, Reg. Sess. 1973, reintroduced by Rep. W. Andrews,
Reg. Sess. 1974). Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Oregon have also considered
enacting new state laws. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 599, at A-15 (Feb. 6, 1973);
B. BuRRus, INVESTIGATION AND DiscovERY IN STATE ANTITRUST, app. E at 89, 92 (1967); Minutes
of the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on Antitrust, Arlington, Va., Nov. 13, 1972, at 11-12.
5. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CODE §§16700 et seq. (West 1964), as amended (West Cum.
Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§50-101 et seq. (1964), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1974); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§51:121 et seq. (1965), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§59-801 et seq. (1968), as amended (4 TRADE REG. REP. 11133,002.01 et seq. (April 24, 1974));
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§1 et seq. (1966), as amended (4 TRADE REG. REP. 11133,202.02 et seq.
(1968)); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§340 et seq. (McKinney 1968), as amended (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1973-1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§76.1 et seq. (1965), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1973); TEax.
CODE Bus. & COM. ANN. §§15.01 et seq. (1968), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1974); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§131.01 et seq. (1957), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1973).
6. For example, Ohio Attorney General William Brown, in announcing the commencement of the second enforcement action brought under Ohio's Valentine Act in the past 50
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decade of intermittent deliberation, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform State Antitrust Act in August

1973.7 Major studies and reports,8 and periodic conferences,9 have been united
in urging expansion of state measures to promote the precept of free enterprise.
In addition, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, in this century the dominant repositories of antitrust policy and implementation, have strongly supported the renascent inter-

est in state enforcement.1o Fired by the current rampant inflation, the broad

years, recently declared: "I said several weeks ago that antitrust enforcement would be my
next area of concentration. I believe it is time to vigorously enforce the Valentine Act to
preserve competition and to protect Ohio consumers by giving them the benefits of a free,
competitive market and lower prices. Today, the average consumer is being eaten alive by
higher and higher prices. I intend to do everything within my power to stem the rise of
higher prices. This is merely my first step in that direction." TRADE REG. REP. Weekly Rep.
No. 92., at 8 (Oct. 1, 1973). See also Lefkowitz, The Attorney General's Office: The Year
Past and the Year Ahead, in N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N, ANrrrrsusr LAiw SyMPosium 27 (1971); Granger,
A Glimpse at Plaintiff's Remedies Under Kansas' Antitrust Laws, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2
(1969); Soma, Enforcement Under the Illinois Antitrust Act, 5 LOYOLA U.L.J. (CHICAGO) 25
(1974); Comment, First Criminal Conviction Under Illinois Antitrust Statute Returned for
Price-Fixing,BNA ATrsTRsr & TRADE REG. REP. No. 666, at A-28 (June 6, 1974). Annual
surveys of state court decisions appear in Bodner & Bruce, Developments in State Antitrust
During the Past Year, 38 A.B.A. ANTrRUST L.J. 555 (1969); 39 A.B.A. ANTrrusT L.J. 755
(1970); 40 A.B.A. ATITrRusr L.J. 735 (1971); 41 A.B.A. Axrrrswsr L.J. 938 (1972).
7. The Uniform Act is reproduced in 4 TRADE REG. REP. ff30,101 (Feb. 11, 1974). It received the support of the American Bar Association House of Delegates in February 1974. Id.
The initial draft was prepared by the Legislative Research Center of the University Michigan
Law School in 1963 and is discussed in Arnold & Ford, Uniform State Antitrust Act: Toward
Creation of a National Antitrust Policy, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 102 (1963).
8. The pioneer work is N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N SECTION ON ANcrrRusr LAw, REPORT OF Thm
SPECIAL Comm.To STUDY THE NEW YoR ANTrrRusr LAws (1957) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.
ANrrrisr REP.]. More recent major studies, completed under the auspices of the Legislative
Research Center, University of Michigan Law School, are: B. BUrutus, supra note 4; J. FLYNN,
supra note 1. In preparation for fall 1974 publication is a compilation and analysis of state
legislation by the A.B.A. Antitrust Law Section, Committee on State Antitrust Laws.
9. The National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on Antitrust, meets annually, as does the Federal-State Conference on Antitrust, sponsored by the United States
Department of Justice. Several antitrust committees of state bar associations also conduct
meetings. See, e.g., N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N, ANTrrRusr LAw Symposium, published annually.
10. See Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUm. L. REv.
1469, 1472-73 (1961). The Antitrust Division has long emphasized federal-state cooperation in
antitrust matters. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JusT cE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSUMER AND INVESTOR PROTECTION, STATE ANTrrRusT LAw REFERENCE HANDBOOK

(1960); Bicks, Appropriate

Role Under Our Federal System for a State Antitrust Enforcement Program, 5 ANrrriusr
BULL. 503 (1960); Kennedy, The Antitrust Aims of the Justice Department, 9 N.Y.L.F. 1, 3
(1963); Federalism and Antitrust -Improved Enforcement Techniques, address by Richard
W. McLaren, Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, before Federal-State
Conference on Antitrust, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1971; Developing a Local Enforcement
Program, address by William E. Swope, Chief, Atlanta Field Office, Antitrust Div., Dep't of
Justice, before Federal-State Conference on Antitrust, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1973. The
Federal Trade Commission established an Office of Federal-State Cooperation in 1966, and
has been equally active in promoting state enforcement. See, e.g., The Bureau of Competition
and Antitrust Assistance to the States, remarks by David L. Roll, Ass't Director, Bureau of
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thrust of this thinking regards strengthened state antitrust programs as vital
to the restoration of competitive structures and pricing practices at all levels
of the marketplace.
Substantial problems remain. The near unanimity of view that state law
enforcement is an important, even essential, counterpart of national antitrust
policy contrasts sharply with the discord regarding the proper function and degree of state participation." State legislatures, at the center of current efforts
to secure more meaningful laws and appropriations, continue to progress
slowly, if at all. Workable enforcement machinery and funding persist as
major and common problems. Accordingly, in the majority of states today,
lawyers still confront the moral dilemma of distinguishing for antitrust clients
12
between what is lawful and what is safe.
It is customary to assume such problems affect all states equally, and the
several reform proposals advanced stress the desirability of a uniform statutory
14
solution." Much will be gained, in fact, by some measure of state uniformity.
The present emphasis on the common features of state antitrust policy, however, cannot erase the fundamental differences in state economic circumstance
and enforcement commitment that also exist. Such differences have received
minor attention in the campaign for a uniform law. Yet, for the states to
adopt uniform or model statutes without giving careful forethought to the
merit of such legislation and its compatibility with their individual requirements and goals may serve only to initiate a new era of ill-conceived and unenforced state laws similar to that begun at the turn of the century.
Certainly some states will fail to evaluate adequately the ramifications of
recommended legislation. The Florida Legislature, for one, has before it an
antitrust bill- loosely patterned upon a 1971 Minnesota enactment, 6 which

Competition, Federal Trade Comm'n, before the National Ass'n of Attorneys General, Comm.
on Antitrust, Arlington, Va., Nov. 13, 1972.
11. Compare R. Savarese, Uniform State Antitrust Act: A Reevaluation and Revision of
the Legislative Research Center's Tentative Draft 61-71 (unpublished, U. of Mich. L. School
Legislative Research Center 1965), and Hanson & von Kalinowski, The Status of State Anti-

trust Laws with Federal Analysis, 15 W. RFs. L. REv. 9, 33-34 (1963), and Rahl, supra note I,
at 771-81 (recommending a limited scope for state legislation), with Arnold & Ford, supra
note 7, at 108-10, and Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary
on a Draft Statute, 39 TEXAs L. REV. 717 (1961), and The Proposed Uniform State Antitrust
Law, address by Joe Sims, Att'y, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, before the Federal-State
Conference on Antitrust, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1973 (recommending state legislation
comparable in scope to the federal Sherman and Clayton Acts).
12. The observation was made in 1962 by Stanley Mosk, then attorney general of California. Mosk, State Antitrust Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 358 (1962), quoted in Note, The Present Revival and Future Course
of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 575 n.1 (1963); and French, The Minnesota
Antitrust Law, 50 MINN. L. REV. 59, 83 & n.110 (1965). See also Rahl, supra note 1.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. See text accompanying notes 502-519 infra.
15. Fla. H.R. 1697 (introduced by Rep. M. Dubbin, Reg. Sess. 1973, reintroduced by
Rep. W. Andrews, Reg. Sess. 1974).
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§325.8011 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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was in turn derived from a tentative draft uniform state act.17 No investigation
of state economic conditions nor prevailing business practices preceded the
Florida bill.18 No public hearings have been conducted, 19 nor has any effort
been made to articulate state antitrust policy and goals, in order to assist the
legislators who must enact the bill and the judges who must construe the law.
Although important basic reform remains possible under such legislative procedures, it is hardly encouraged.
The necessity of accommodating common elements and individual concerns of state antitrust reform is the premise of this article. Consideration is
first given to the general context of contemporary state enforcement. The past
and present problems confronting the states, the reasons for renewed state
interest, and the present status of state activitity will be evaluated in order. An
assessment of recent state antitrust enactments and uniform act proposals will
next be addressed. Lastly, analysis of the method, content, and importance of
individual state reform will be undertaken, with Florida serving as an illustration in point.
I. THE HISTORIC CONTEXT OF STATE ANTITRUST REFORM
Few states undertaking statutory reform today do so on a dean tablet. In
1965, a leading authority calculated that 153 separate state statutes were "antitrust in nature."20 In fact, the first legislation spawned by the national antitrust movement of the late nineteenth century occurred at the state level. 21 At
least thirteen states, a majority of them Western and Southern, legislated
against trusts, monopolies, and combinations in restraint of trade prior to
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.22 Most of the remaining states adopted

17. The Minnesota law conforms to an earlier draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act.
See note 7 supra; note 362 infra.
18. See Rahl, supra note 1, at 767-68. Such a study has just been announced by the
Tennessee Legislature, 5 TRE REG. REP. 1U0,208 (April 29, 1974). A comprehensive study
did precede enactment of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT.
§§501.201-.213 (1973). See CONSUMER ADVISOR TO THE GOvERNOR, CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN FLORmA:

A REPORT TO GOvm.'oR REUBIN O'D. ASIRW (1973). This report does not, however, address
state antitrust regulation.
19. Consistent with uniform act practices the Florida bill lacks even a preamble setting
forth legislative purpose and public policy. See Arnold & Ford, supra note 7, at 107 n.52.
20. von Kalinowski, Symposium on State Antitrust Laws: Introductory Remarks, 29 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST LJ.255, 256 (1965). A compendium of state trade regulation laws and constitutional provisions is set forth in 4 TRADE R. REP. ffff30,000 et seq.
21. The history of the movement has been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g.,
M. FoRKOscH, ANTITRUST AND THE CoNsUrMER 221-64 (1956); W. LuTWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC
POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST AcT 54-85 (1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGIN OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 155-57 (1955);

Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 U. Mo. L. REv. 214, 230-48 (1953);
Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.AJ. 160 (1961).
22. H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 155 n.195. The states named are Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Several sources put the number of states with pre-1890
lams at 21. N.Y. ANTIrRusT REP., supra note 8, at 6a; Mosk, supra note 12, at 363; Note, supra
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antitrust laws before the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts were
passed in 1914.23 So extensive was the turn of the century state legislative
movement that only seven states-Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky, Nevada,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island - are presently without a statute of
general application prohibiting either monopolies or restraints of trade, or
24
both.
Since the 1887 Kansas law forbidding monopolies in grain, 25 state antitrust
statutes have differed significantly in form and content. 26 It has been common,
however, for many states to adopt provisions enacted elsewhere, and today
three basic legislative patterns may be discerned. 27 Many state acts are modeled
upon the broad provisions of the Sherman Act. 28 Other laws specifically pronote 10. Fourteen states also had constitutional prohibitions against trusts and monopolies.
H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 155; Wilson, supra note 21, at 161. Cf. Sieker, The Role of
the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 878 (1961); Legislation, A
Collection and Survey of State Antitrust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 348-51 (1932). Presently, 24 states have such constitutional provisions. The involved states are listed in note
183 infra.
23. Wilson, supra note 21, at 161; Note, supra note 10.
24. There is uncertainty regarding the existence of antitrust laws in some states. Both
Rahl, supra note 1, and Legislation, supra note 22, exclude Kentucky from this listing. But
see B. BURRUS, supra note 4, at 89; 1 TRADE REG. REP. 1860 (Sept. 11, 1972). One commentator lists Alaska as having a general antitrust law. Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under
State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1301, app. B at 1343 (1967). Of the
seven states listed, several have statutes prohibiting price discrimination and sales below
cost. Moreover, these states have common law doctrines reaching antitrust practices in certain circumstances. For example, a recent Pennsylvania supreme court decision ruled that in
the absence of a state antitrust law, Sherman Act principles apply as the embodiment of
common law restraint of trade doctrine in that state. Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors,
Pa.
, 304 A.2d 493, 496 (1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 291 (1974). Although Georgia
has an antitrust provision, it lacks effective enforcement sanctions. GA. CODE ANN. §20-504
(Gum. Supp. 1973). The West Virginia act is limited to "food stuffs, fuel or any article or
articles pertaining to necessities of life." W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-10-19 (1966), Vermont was
recently listed as having repealed its statute. See 4 TRADE REG. REP. ff34,931 (Feb. 25, 1974).
25. See Granger, supra note 6, at 3. In March 1889, Kansas became the first state to
adopt a general state antitrust statute. Wilson, supra note 21, at 161.
26. 1 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY: STATE ANTITRUST LAWS XLVII-LXIII (1940); Bicks, supra
note 10, at 515-20. Part of the "variety" may be attributed to imprecise definition. See note I
supra.
27. See generally F. ELKOURT, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 16-18 (1957).
28. The North Carolina and Wisconsin antitrust acts are representative of this group.
See Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North Carolina-Federal Law
Compared, 50 N.C.L. REv. 199, 206, 256 (1972); Comment, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee
Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1237, 1240; Comment, Anti-trust Law
in Wisconsin, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 657, 663. The Wisconsin statute provides in material part:
"Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce is hereby declared illegal. . . . Every person, corporation, copartnership, trustee
or association who shall either as principal or agent become a party to any contract, combination, conspiracy, trust, pool or agreement herein declared unlawful or declared to be in restraint of trade, or who shall combine or conspire with any other person, corporation, copartnership, association or trustee to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce in this state shall forfeit for each offense no less than $100 nor more
than $5000 ..
" Wis. STAT. ANN. §133.01 (1957), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1973). States with
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hibit trusts or combinations to fix prices or to limit the quantity of articles.29
Finally, a major cluster of states has legislation comparable to that adopted by
Texas in 1889, which outlaws defined irtist practices.30

comparable provisions include Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Virginia, and
Washington.
29. The Montana and Utah laws are typical of such state- statutes. See Comment, Montana's Law Regarding Contracts in Restraint of, Trade, 30 MONT. L. REv. 185 (1969); Note,
Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation in Utah, 8 UTAH L. IEv. 339, 340 (1964).
The Montana antitrust law affects: "Every person, corporation, stock company, or association
of persofi§ in this state, who, directly' 6r indirectly, combine or form what is known as a
trust, or make any contract ... for the purpose of fixing the price or regulating: the -production of any article of commerce . . . or of the product of the soil for consumption by the
people, or to create or carry out any restriction in trade, to limit productions, or increase or
reduce the price of merchandise or commodities, or to prevent competition in merchandise
or commodities, or to fix a standard or figure whereby the price of any article of merchandise,
commerce, or product intended for sale, use, or consumption, will be in any way controlled,
or to agree, directly or indirectly, to add to 'a bid for any contract an amount, fixed by percentage or otherwise, for the purpose of making a refund or sharing costs of bidding with
any other bidder, or to return a part of any amount added to a bid by collusive agreement
among bidders to any person, association, organization or corporation, or to create a monopoly in the manufacture, sale, or transportation of any such article, or to enter into an obligation by which they shall bind others or themselves not to manufacture, sell, or transport of
any such articles, below a common standard or figure, or by which they agree to keep such
article or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure, or by which they settle the price of
such article, so as to preclude unrestricted competition, is punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail for a period not less than twenty-four (24) hours or more than one (1) year,
or by fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both." Morr. Rxv. CODES
ANN. §94-1104 (1971).
Other states having similar provisions include Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, and
Wyoming.
30. See Mathews, History, Interpretationand Enforcement of Texas Antitrust Laws, in
SouTnwEsrtm LEGAL FOUNDATION, INSTrrUTa ON ANrrmusT LA S AND PRicE REGULATIONS 19,

-22-31 (1950); Hall 9- Seelye, Vertical Price Fixing in Texas, 35 TaxAs L. REv. 772 (1957);
Moody & Wallace, Texas Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement - Comparison with Federal
Antitrust Laws, 11 Sw. L.J. 1, 2-7 (1957); Nutting, The Texas Anti-Trust Law: A Post

Mortem, 14 TEXAs L. REv. 293 (1936); Wilson, supra note 21.
Section 1 of the 1889 Texas statute defined a "trust" as: "[A] combination of capital, skill
or acts by two or more persons, firms, corporations or associations of persons, or of either
two or more of them, for either, any, or all of the following purposes: First -To create or
carry out restricti6ns in trade. Second -To limit or reduce the production, or increase or
reduce the price of merchandise or commodities. Third-To prevent competition in manufacture, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or commodities.
Fourth -To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public shall be in any
manfier controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or
commerce intended for sale, use, or consumption in this state. Fifth -To make or enter
into or execute or carry out any contract, obligation or agreement of any kind or description
by which they shall bind or have bound themselves not' to sell, dispose of, or transport any
article or commodity, or article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below
a common standard figure, or by which they shall agree in any manner to keep the price of
:such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure, or by which they
shall, in any manner, establish or settle the price of any article or commodity or transportation between them or themselves or others to preclude a free and unrestricted competition
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Although differing in method, the early state enactments were designed to
achieve a common objective: to declare unlawful certain restrictive contracts
and agreements that were merely unenforceable under existing common law
doctrine.3 1 Most of the state laws were cast in the form of criminal statutes providing fines ranging from 50 dollars to 10,000 dollars and imprisonment from
30 days to 10 years.3 The original Iowa statute authorized fines of up to 20
per cent of the capital stock or amount invested by a violating company.3 3 In
addition to criminal sanctions, state remedies commonly included civil forfeitures, injunctions, and charter and license revocations. 34 From their inception, many state laws also provided for private damage actions against antitrust
violators 5
By augmenting traditional common law antitrust jurisprudence with new
statutory proscriptions and sanctions, the states at the turn of the century gave
every indication of sustaining their paramount role in antitrust enforcement.
Indeed, this was the expressed opinion of the chief proponent of federal antitrust legislation in 1890, Senator John Sherman. To counter arguments that
federal enforcement would displace existing state activity,3 Sherman began
the Senate debate on his bill by acknowledging the existing primacy and continued importance of state enforcement:37
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the aid
of the courts of the United States to ...

supplement the enforcement of

the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the
several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the
industrial liberty of the citizens of these States. It is to arm the Federal

among themselves or others in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity,
or by which they shall agree to pool, combine or unite any interest they may have in connection with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity that its price might
in any manner be affected."
The original Texas law, promulgated on March 30, 1889, is reprinted in full in WatersPierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 29 n.l (1900). Although amended many times, the
present statute contains substantially the same provision. See TEx. CODE Bus. & COM. ANN.
§15.02 (1968). States having legislation similar to the Texas Act include California, Florida,
Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio. Senator John
Reagan of Texas introduced a federal bill similar to the Texas Act in the United States
Senate in 1888 and 1890. 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890). Cf. H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at
169-70, 191.
31. H. THORELIT, supra note 21, at 155. Perhaps the best discussion of 19th century state
common law doctrine is the decision of then Circuit Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279-94 (6th Cir. 1898), afi'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Cf. text accompanying notes 586-87 infra.
32. State criminal sanctions are collected in H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 155-56; Flynn,
supra note 24, at 1343, 1346; Legislation, supra note 22, at 352.

33. H.

THORELLI,

supra note 21, at 155.

34. Flynn, supra note 24, at 1846.

35. H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 156.
36. Sieker, State and Federal Relations in Antitrust Cases -Many Questions and Few
Answers, 9 N.Y.L.F. 199, 200 n.2 (1963). See generally W. LErwIN, supra note 21, at 87-95;

H.

THORELLI,

supra note 21, at 170-202.

37. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
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courts within the limits of their constitutional power that they may cooperate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the
most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, property,
and trade of the people of the United States.
As events were to prove, however, neither Sherman's expectations of continuing state enforcement nor his original federal bill survived congressional en38
actment of the statute that carries his name.
In truth, state antitrust enforcement even prior to 1890 was quite limited
and based primarily on state incorporation acts or common law doctrine.39
The absence of state activity in the years immediately preceding passage of
the Sherman Act, when public anti-monopoly sentiment was at its crest, has
40
been attributed to a variety of circumstances.
The advent of state antitrust laws did generate an initial flurry of state and
private suits. 4 1 Yet whatever early hope may have existed for a significant and
sustained assault on trusts and trade restraints was short lived as the barriers
to state enforcement in the late nineteenth century, far from being eliminated,
became entrenched.

38. The Sherman bill was so extensively amended by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary that it bears no resemblance to the measure finally enacted. H. THORELLi, supra
note 21, at 210-14. Senator Hoar, a member of the 1890 Judiciary Committee, is quoted as
having written: "In 1890 a bill was passed which was called the Sherman Act, for no other
reason that I can think of except that Mr. Sherman had nothing to do with framing it
whatever." 2 C. HOAR, AUToBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARs 363 (1903). One commentator,
speaking with similar levity, recently attributed the Sherman Act to Senator Hoar. Austern,
An Involuntary Venture into Comparative Antitrust Law, 42 A.B.A. ANTrTuST L.J. 47 (1972).
Most give primary credit to Senator Edmunds, Judiciary Committee Chairman. W. LMwIN,
supra note 21, at 96; H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 211-12. Sherman was, notwithstanding,
the principal force behind federal antitrust legislation during this period.
39. H. THoRELLi, supra note 21, at 156. Several state suits to dissolve corporations that
acted without or exceeded state charter rights generated considerable public interest between
1887 and 1890. See, e.g., California v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 7 Ry. & CORP. L.J. 83 (1890);
People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 I1. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1889); Louisiana v. American
Cotton-Oil Trust, I RY. & CORP. L.J. 509 (1887); People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121
N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155
(1890). The cases are discussed briefly in H. THORELLi, supra note 21, at 78-84, 183; Letwin,
Congress and The Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REV. 221, 245 n.134
(1956). Among the states active in common law prosecution of monopolies and restraints of
trade were Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. See Aycock, supra note 28, at
208-12; Maroney, Antitrust in "The Empire State": Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices in New York State, 19 SYRAcusE L. REv. 819, 820-21 (1968); N.Y. ANTITRUST REPORT,
supra note 8, at la-7a; Comment, The Illinois Anti-Trust Law Disinterred, 43 ILL. L. REv.
205, 208-09 (1948); Comment, Antitrust Law in Wisconsin, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 657, 664. Private
suits based on common law doctrine were also brought during this period. See Letwin, supra
at 221, 244 n.133.
40. Among these were lack of funding of prosecuting offices, limited state jurisdiction,
and the reluctance of courts to injure citizens by ousting violating companies. H. THORELLI,
supra note 21, at 156.
41. For example, between 1892 and 1906, 11 states brought a total of 24 cases against
members of the Standard Oil Trust. Bicks, supra note 10, at 507 n.11.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES CONFRONTING STATE REGULATION

A. The FourteenthAmendment

42

Only a few months after passage of the 1889 Missouri antitrust act, the
Central Law Journal of January 3, 1890, predicted its demise on alternative
grounds: "that it violates property rights guaranteed by the constitution, and
that it infringes on the domain of Congress in attempting to regulate interstate commerce."' 3 In March, the same publication announced that a St. Louis
circuit court had declared the Missouri law unconstitutional on what appeared
4

to be a third ground.4

The Missouri experience was to be a harbinger. In the quarter-century
between 1890 and the First World War, a time when the Sherman Act
achieved substantial judicial acceptance, 43 state antitrust laws were subjected
to a prolonged series of constitutional challenges. 4 It was, in fact, a period of
fundamental philosophical transition for the Supreme Court, as post-Civil
War laissez-faire capitalism grudgingly yielded to the economic and social
realities of the twentieth century.47 Not infrequently, state antitrust laws were
declared unconstitutional in the shuffle. Illustrative is the 1903 decision of
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 4s Illinois had enacted an antitrust law in
1891 prohibiting any "pool, trust, agreement, combination, confederation, or
understanding ... to regulate or fix the price of any article, or ... to fix or
limit the amount or quantity of any article." 9 The law was supplemented and
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
43. 30 CENT. L.J. 1 (1890).
44. Id. at 257; "The decision . . . simply declared the statute unconstitutional, in so far
as it conferred authority on an executive officer of the State to assume judicial functions in
derogation of the Constitution."
45. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). This period is discussed
in Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 14, 19-22
(1964). The Supreme Court's highly restrictive holding in its first Sherman Act decision,
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), that manufacturing did not constitute
"trade or commerce," was quickly distinguished. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 397 (1905); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., supra at 235-40.
46. An excellent treatment of the constitutional limitations on state antitrust regulation
isJ. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 24-200.
47. The Supreme Court, in overruling Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928), had occasion recently to reflect on this period. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955): "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought."
48. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§569-57 (1947). See Comment, The Illinois Antitrust Law
Disinterred,43 ILL. L. REv. 205, 209-12 (1948).
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broadened in 1893 to include provisions similar to those of the 1889 Texas
law, 10 and to provide for additional penalties. 51 Section 9 of the revised statute
included an exemption for "agricultural products or livestock while in the
hands of the producer or raiser." 52 Section 10 contained a provision exempting
from liability for payment those who purchased from violators of the law. 3
Shortly after passage of the 1898 act, Thomas Connolly, an Illinois resident,
purchased pipe from the Union Sewer Pipe Company, an Ohio corporation
doing business in Illinois. When the company sued on the two promissory
notes he had given, Connolly answered that the company had violated the
Illinois antitrust act, section 10 of which exempted him from liability for payment. There was, in fact, little doubt that the company had engaged in trust
activities violative of the Illinois statute. 54 The Supreme Court, nonetheless,
fastened upon section 9 to hold that because agricultural and livestock producers and sewer pipe manufacturers "are alike engaged in domestic trade," 55
the Illinois classification exposing the latter to antitrust liability while exempting the former constituted a denial of fourteenth amendment equal protection. 56 Concluding that the exempting provision was not severable, the
57
Court declared the entire statute unconstitutional.
State court response to the Connolly decision varied. A few state courts
chose to invalidate all or part of their antitrust acts on equal protection
grounds. 58 Other courts attempted to distinguish their statute from the Illinois
law in Connolly59 Although the Connolly precedent was soon eroded, 0 and
ultimately overruled, 61 the initial doubt and extensive litigation it en-

50. See note 30 supra.
51. The 1893 Illinois law is reprinted in full in Connolly. 184 U.S. at 552 n.48.
52. Id. at 554. Such an exemption was common in state acts. Twenty-one state antitrust
acts contained such a provision in 1932. Legislation, supra note 22, at 354 n.65.
53. 184 U.S. at 554.
54. Id. at 556.
55. Id. at 560.
56. Id. at 564.
57. Id. at 564-65. Underlying Justice Harlan's decision for the majority may have been
a perceived inequity in Connolly's claim. The Court was not convinced that Connolly had
been damaged by the trust arrangement. Id. at 547, 549. Hence, Connolly would secure a
windfall were his defense upheld. Furthermore, not content with free sewer pipe, Connolly
had counterclaimed for treble damages under the Sherman Act and double damages under
the Illinois statute totalling $91,617A0. Id. at 543. The only means available to the Court
to avoid such an award was to nullify the Illinois act.
58. See, e.g., Brown & Allen v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902);
State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833 (1905); State v. Shippers' Compress &
Warehouse Co., 95 Tex. 603, 69 S.W. 58 (1902).
59. See J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 32.
60. See International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914); Smiley v. Kansas,
196 U.S. 447 (1904) (upholding the Missouri and Kansas antitrust acts against similar equal
protection arguments). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 420 (1910): "The
foregoing [equal protection] argument is one of the many attempts to construe the 14th
Amendment as introducing a factitious equality without regard to practical differences that
are best met by corresponding differences of treatment."
61. Tiguer v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
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gendered,62 could not but dampen state and private antitrust suits under the
new laws.
Nor was the equal protection clause the only fourteenth amendment impediment raised to initial enforcement efforts. State statutes were also attacked,
albeit with less success, on a broad range of substantive and procedural due
process grounds, including improper exercise of the state police power, statutory vagueness, and lack of state court jurisdiction.63 The due process assault
on state antitrust regulation is revealed in the series of arguments advanced to
counter the long tradition of state enforcement under the Texas antitrust
laws.64

In 1900, in the first of three decisions captioned Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas,65 the Supreme Court sustained the Texas statute against the contention that its corporate ouster provision violated property rights without due
process of law.66 The attorney general of Texas had revoked the permit to do
business of the defendant, a Missouri corporation, after it was convicted of
having engaged in trust practices violative of the state antitrust law. Rejecting
the claim that the statutory forfeiture denied defendant's right to freedom of
contract, the Court affirmed the principle "that the right of a foreign corporation to engage in business within a state other than that of its creation de'' 7
pends solely upon the will of such other state.
A similar due process challenge to the Texas forfeiture provision reached
the Supreme Court in 1905. On this occasion, after restating the commonly
perceived evils of monopolies and trade restraints and concluding that states
possess a legitimate interest in eliminating such practices within their borders,

62. Such litigation continued into the 1930's. See, e.g., Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154
So. 690 (1934); State v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Tex. 313, 107 S.W.2d 550 (1937).
63. See generally J. FLYNN,supra note 1, at 40-56.
64. Commentators credit Texas with the longest and most successful record of antitrust
enforcement of any state. See generally Breckenridge, Some Phases of the Texas Anti-Trust
Law, 3 TExAs L. REV. 335 (1925), 4 TEXAS L. REv. 129 (1926); Hall & Seelye, supra note 30;
Mathews, supra note 30; Moody, Texas Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement with Some
Reference to Federal Antitrust Laws, 9 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 100 (1956). But see Nutting,
supra note 30.
65. 177 U.S. 28 (1900). The later decisions are reported in 212 U.S. 86 (1909) and 212
U.S. 112 (1909). See also Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118 (1909).
66. 177 U.S. at 39. The involved Texas statutes are reproduced in the margin of the
Court's decision. Id. at 29 n.l. The defendant was charged and convicted in state court of
having participated in the Standard Oil Trust and other agreements for the purpose of
monopolizing and controlling the refining, transportation, and sale of petroleum and related
products throughout the United States and in the State of Texas. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 44 S.W. 936 (1898).
67. 177 U.S. at 46, quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895). At the same time,
the Court noted an exception to the state's authority "where a corporation created by one
state vests its right to enter another and engage in business therein upon the Federal nature
of its business." Id. Consequently, evidence of the company's interstate activities, which were
connected with the Standard Oil Trust, was kept from the jury, and the company's permit
revocation was restricted to its "intrastate" business. Id. at 33-39. Cf. discussion of Standard
Oil Co. v. Tennessee in text accompanying note 103 infra.
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the Court in National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas68 declared the Texas law to be
"a valid exercise of the police power of the State," and therefore not violative
of due process.6 9

After National Cotton Oil, the battle lines shifted. In 1909, the WatersPierce Oil Company returned to the Supreme Court to argue that the Texas
antitrust law was unconstitutionally vague.7 0 The Court again upheld the
Texas act, declaring that the statutory language, which condemned both contracts and arrangements "reasonably calculated" to fix and regulate prices and
acts that "tend" to accomplish that result, adequately defined an objective

standard of guilt.7 '
Five years later, however, the Supreme Court in International Harvester

Co. of America v. Kentucky72 found language in the Kentucky law that forbade the fixing of the price of a commodity above or below its "real value"
impermissibly vague. Subsequently, the Court nullified Colorado's antitrust
act in Kline v. Frink Dairy Co.,7 3 based on the statute's use of the term

"reasonable profit." As a consequence of the Court's vagueness holdings, the
constitutionality of at least one other antitrust law, California's Cartwright

Act, remained in doubt for over a decade, 74 and ultimately the Act was
partially invalidated.7 Nor are statutory vagueness challenges strictly a concern of the past. A 1969 amendment to the Illinois Antitrust Act, for example,
has been strongly assailed by members of the state antitrust bar on vagueness
M

grounds.76

68. 197 U.S. 115 (1905).
69. Id. at 130. See also International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914);
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale,
219 U.S. 307 (1911); Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905); Southern Cotton Oil
Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 134 (1905); Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447 (1905).
70. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909). After the first Waters-Pierce
case, the company was "reorganized" to avoid the permit forfeiture. The attorney general of
Texas than commenced a second action seeking permit forfeiture and penalties. Pursuant to
the Texas act, penalties of not less than $50 nor more than $5000 could be assessed for each
day the violation continued. Id. at 96, 101.
71. Id. at 108-11. The decision by the Supreme Court resulted in the state's collection
of $1,800,000 in penalties, which was "placed in specie in a wheelbarrow and rolled up the
main street of our capital city to the State Treasurer." Wilson, supra note 21, at 161.
72. 234 U.S. 216, 220-23 (1914); accord, Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914).
73. 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
74. See Note, The Cartwright Act- California's Sleeping Beauty, 2 STAN. L. Rlv. 200,
205-07 (1949). Compare Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (holding the Sherman Act
sufficiently precise). In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Supreme Court
stated: "The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision or of
crystal clarity and the Act itself did not define them. In consequence of the vagueness of the
language ...

the courts have been left to give content to the statute." Id. at 489. See also

United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (upholding the RobinsonPatman Act against the claim of vagueness).
75. See People v. Building Maintenance Contractor's Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 723-26, 264
P.2d 31, 35-36 (1953), and cases cited therein.
76. See Curtis 8- Decker, The 1969 Amendments to the Illinois Antitrust Act, 58 ILL. B.J.

698, 705-07 (1970).
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A further significant constraint on state enforcement resulted from due
process limitations on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the state courts.
Pennoyer v. Neff7 decided in 1877, established the rule, in effect for many

decades, that state courts could obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant
only by service of process upon him within the territorial borders of the state.
Limited exceptions existed for foreign corporations deemed "present" within
the state as a result of business conducted there, 78 but only in recent years has
the Supreme Court effected a fundamental expansion in jurisdiction by embracing the concept, both for corporations and individuals, that certain
"minimum contacts" with the forum state are sufficient to confer adjudicatory
authority. 79 During the period when Pennoyer controlled, effective state law
enforcement was limited by the physical absence of some or all of the involved
defendants.80
The true impact of the early fourteenth amendment limitations and litigation attending state antitrust regulation is difficult to assess. For example,
several issues have been either adjudicated from the outset in favor of state
enforcement, as in the case of the state police power, or have since been
favorably resolved, as in the case of state court jurisdiction. Moreover, states
have always been able to amend their statutes to counter adverse equal protection and vagueness rulings8s What seems clear is that during the formulative period of state statutory implementation, vigorous enforcement was
hindered by the burden and confusion engendered by repeated litigation of
such constitutional issues. Nor were these the only questions confronting the
states. Other constraints, premised on the commerce and supremacy clauses and
the nation's federal structure, did much to compound the uncertainty and
judicial hostility that met initial state antitrust efforts.

77. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1917).
78. This was the basis upon which Kentucky obtained antitrust jurisdiction over the
International Harvester Company. See International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 589 (1914). See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 110-12 (1962).
79. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Prior to International Shoe a series of exceptions were
engrafted onto the Pennoyer rule. See, e.g., York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890) (voluntary appearance); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (act within state); Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940) (state domicile).
80. Illustrating the need for a federal antitrust law during the Senate debates, Senator
Sherman observed with regard to New York's 1890 action against one of the Sugar Trust
participants in People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E, 834 (1890):
"That [North River Sugar Refining Co.] being a corporation of New York, it [the New York
court] could deal with that corporation alone, but the combination was between that company and 16 others ....
In the courts of the United States all of them might have been
parties, but as a matter of course, the supreme court of New York could not extend its
jurisdiction beyond the limits of its own territory." 21 CONc. Rac. 2459 (1890).
81. Texas, for example, amended its antitrust laws 16 times between 1891 and 1909, and
maintained one of the most successful enforcement records. See Mathews, supra note 30, at
31-43, 65-69. But see Note, supra note 74, at 206-07.
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B. Federal-StateCommerce Jurisdiction
1. Early Concepts. Although the Supreme Court has consistently upheld
the exercise of the state police power to regulate monopolies and trade restraints affecting local or intrastate commerce, 2 the extent to which the states,
consistent with the commerce clause,83 can address antitrust violations not
wholly intrastate in character has occasioned extensive debate and litigation
over the years. 84 At the outset, the demarcation between federal and state
antitrust jurisdiction was clearly, if not satisfactorily, drawn:8 5
In a period of relatively insignificant commercial intercourse between
the states, when rugged individualism and suspicion of governmental
interference were the credos of the day, what governmental powers did
exist were thought to be neatly divided and compartmentalized between
state sovereigns and the national sovereign. The national government
regulated interstate commerce, the state government regulated intrastate
commerce. A fiction existed that interstate commerce was the actual
movement of goods across state lines, and all else was intrastate commerce. Theoretically, in law at least, the two seldom overlapped.

82. See cases cited note 69 supra.
83. US. CoNsr. art. I, §8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
... among the several States..
" The Supreme Court, in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 150 (1971), recently explained that: "The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three
categories of problems. First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which
Congress deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods . . . or of
persons who have been kidnapped ....
Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft . . . or persons or things in
commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments. . . . Third, those activities affecting commerce." The antitrust laws concern this final element of interstate commerce
jurisdiction.
84. See Note, supra note 10, at 1476 nA1. Stanley Mosk, while attorney general of California, observed with respect to the issue of federal antitrust superintendence: "Were it not
for the astuteness of our legal brethren on the other side of the counsel table, I doubt the
question would even be raised. In the past it has usually been raised as a defense, a challenge
by a defendant that the wrong sovereignty has brought him into a court of law to answer for
his conduct." Mosk, supra note 22, at 361.
85. J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 81 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 28 (1900) (state antitrust acts limited to intrastate commerce); United States
v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sherman Act limited to interstate commerce). The
intrastate limitation on state antitrust regulation in 1890 was a prime reason given by
Senator Sherman for enactment of a federal antitrust law. 21 CoNG. REc. 2457 (1890).
Operation of the interstate-intrastate test is graphically illustrated in the Texas state court
decision in Waters-Pierce Oil v. Texas: "Shipments of oil or other products, made by the
Waters-Pierce Oil Company from points without this State to its agents within this State is
interstate commerce until such oils are sold by said company in the original packages in
which it was shipped into this State, and as such is not subject to the laws of this State
regulating the sale thereof . . . but, on the other hand, if the Waters-Pierce Oil Company
shipped oils from points beyond this State to its agents to points within this State, and, after
their receipt in this State the same were sold by said agents in this State, to parties in this
State in broken packages or by retail, and not in the original packages in which said oils
were shipped into this State, then such business is not interstate commerce, and is subject
to the laws of this State." 19 Tex. Civ. App., 44 S.W. 936, 937-38 (1898).
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With the growth in this century of industry and commerce to national
dimension and the development of social and economic forces transcending
local concern, the artificial and largely mechanical interstate-intrastate dichotomy animating the notion of a "dual sovereignty" proved untenable. 6 The
resultant break with then existing concepts first came with the Supreme Court's
expansive redefinition of federal "interstate commerce" powers to include
87
matters formerly considered "intrastate" in nature.
The expanded national power over commerce is reflected in enforcement
under the Sherman Act, for the Supreme Court has held that "Congress in
passing the Sherman Act, left no area of its constitutional power unoccupied""" and that "Congress exercised all the power it possessed"s 9 under the
commerce clause.9° Since Manderville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 91 federal courts have consistently recognized that activity that involves the "flow" of interstate commerce at any point, 92 or that otherwise substantially "affects" interstate commerce, 93 is within the compass of the Sherman

86.
VA.

Cf. J.

FLYNN,

supra note 1, at 61-62; Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36

L. REv. 1 (1950).

87. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill
(1942); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
88. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945).
89. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940). See also United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
90. Language in the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts requiring that the
challenged activity be "in commerce" has historically resulted in a more restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional scope. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954);
FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 899 (1974). Cf. Copp Paving Co. v. Gulf Oil Co., 487 F.2d 202, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 988
(1974) (limited to Clayton Act jurisdictional issues).
91. 334 U.S. 219 (1948). The opinion of the Supreme Court contains a detailed account
of the doctrinal expansion of interstate commerce jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Id.
at 230-31.
92. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); United States
v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954); United States v. Employing Plasters Ass'n,
347 U.S. 186 (1954); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d
373 (9th Cir. 1973); Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States. 306 F.2d
379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n,
201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962). Cf. United States v. Oregon
Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). See generally Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine
and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 IW. REs. L. REV. 66 (1963); Speer, Application of the
Federal Antitrust Laws to Small Business in Michigan, 39 U. DETROIT L.J. 213 (1961).
93. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). A history and analysis of the "affectation doctrine" are
contained in Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236; Krotinger,
supra note 92. The only recognized exceptions to this principle at present are professional
baseball, an acknowledged "aberration," Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972), and the
legal profession, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 15-19 (4th Cir. 1974). cert. granted,
43 U.S.L.W. 3246 (Oct. 29, 1974).
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Act. Often cited for its elucidation of these principles is the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers As94
sociation v. United States:
A case under the antitrust laws, so far as the interstate commerce
element is concerned may rest on one or both of two theories:
(1) That the acts complained of, occurred within the flow of interstate commerce. This is generally referred to as the "in commerce"
theory.
(2) That the acts complained of, occurred wholly on the state or
local level, in intrastate commerce, but substantially affected interstate
commerce.
Under both of these theories, the transactions complained of must
affect or have an effect on interstate commerce or the requirements of
the statute are not satisfied. Under the "in commerce" theory, the ultimate effect on interstate commerce is the impact on that commerce
under a qualitative and not a quantitative test. If there is price fixing or
division of the market involved, there are violations per se, as a matter
of law.
Turning to the second alternative, where acts wholly within intrastate commerce substantially affect interstate commerce, these intrastate
acts may occur before goods enter the flow of commerce, or after they
leave the flow of commerce. Here we have a question of fact as to
whether the wholly intrastate acts substantially affect the flow of commerce.
After determination of the issue as to whether the wholly intrastate
acts substantially affect the flow of commerce, we then reach the same
problem that is reached under the "in commerce" theory, namely the
ultimate effect or impact of the acts complained of on interstate commerce and again the test is a qualitative one and not a quantitative test,
and again is a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.
Because interstate and intrastate commerce historially have been viewed
as antipodal concepts, the vast expansion of interstate commerce authority has
necessarily been attended by a reduction in the realm of intrastate commerce
jurisdiction. The question naturally arises whether state regulatory enforcement is to be relegated to this dwindling sphere of competence. The initial
response of several state courts 5 and commentators, 96 in fact, supported such
a constriction in state authority. More recently, the Texas antitrust statutes
have been restricted in application to solely intrastate conduct and activities,9 7
94. 210 F.2d 732, 739 n.3 "(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954) (emphasis in
original). See generally 16 J. VON KALINOWSKr, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS §5.01 (1974).
95. See, e.g., J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Holloway, 182 Mo. App. 140, 168 S.W. 290
(1914); Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay P. & F. Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058 (1914). Such
rulings adhered to contemporary Supreme Court commerce clause analysis. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923).
96. Cooke, The Adequacy of Remedies Against Monopoly Under State Law, 19 YALE
L.J. 356 (1910); Legislation, supra note 22, at 355-56; 15 C.J.S. Commerce §133(b) (1939),
cited in Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 358 U.S.
516 (1959), for the proposition that "state anti-trust laws do not apply to transactions involving interstate commerce." Cf. Anfiot., 24 A.L.R. 787 (1923).
97. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Segal v.
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and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached the same conclusion with respect to an antecedent Illinois antitrust act. 98 Still other courts
continue to apply the interstate-intrastate formulism. 99
Today such restrictive holdings draw few adherents, for reasons well stated
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:°0 0
Monopolies and restraints of trade are of infinite form and variety....
Some expend their efforts almost wholly upon intrastate commerce and
are of only local interest and some almost wholly upon interstate commerce and so become matters of national concern, and there are all
graduations in between. In many cases it would be very difficult to draw
the line. If state laws have no force as soon as interstate commerce begins to be affected, a very large area will be fenced off in which the
States will be practically helpless to protect their citizens without, so
far as we can perceive, any corresponding contribution to the national
welfare .... Especially is this true in view of the immense broadening

in the conception of interstate commerce in recent years.
The current view is overwhelmingly supportive of the extension of state antitrust regulation to include conduct and practices that, while possessing a local
nexus, nonetheless "affect" or are "in" interstate commerce.' 0 '

McCall Co., 108 Tex. 55, 59-60, 184 S.W. 188, 189-90 (1916); Albertype Co. v. Gust Feist Co.,
102 Tex. 219, 222, 114 S.W. 791, 792 (1909); Sloan v. Miami Margarine Co., 247 S.W.2d 169,
171-72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See also note 86 supra. More recent decisions have recognized
that application of the Texas statutes is not precluded by the presence of interstate commerce and concurrent Sherman Act competence. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1313 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972); Elray, Inc. v. Cathode Protection Serv., 1974 Trade Cas. 74,990 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1974); Texas v. Southeast Texas Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractor's Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 711,
714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963). But see EFI, Inc. v. Marketers
Int'l, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. ff74,444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). Cf. Jeffers, State and Federal
Antitrust Actions Against Employer-Union Conspiracies: The Double Dosage Doctrine, 39
TEXAS L. REV. 811, 812-13 (1961); Note, The Present Revival and Future Course of State
Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 575, 582 n.51 (1963).
98. Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1958), afJ'd, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); accord,
Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Il. App. 2d 261, 297-98, 245 N.E.2d 263, 281 (1969). The decision
is criticized in Pollock, Federal Preemption and State Antitrust Enforcement, 43 CHi. B.
RECORD 145, 147-48 (1961). See also Curtis &, Decker, supra note 76, at 713; Note, supra note
10, at 1484. The Illinois Antitrust Act was recently amended to abrogate the Kosuga-Vendo
construction. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-7.9 (Smith-Hurd 1970): "No action under this
Act shall be barred on the grounds that the activities or conduct complained of in any way
affects or involve interstate commerce."
99. See, e.g., John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 198 N.W.2d 363,
367 (1972): "The parts of this section [of the Wisconsin antitrust act] making a conspiracy
in restraint of trade a crime and illegal is taken from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.
It applies to intrastateinstead of interstate transactions." (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
Exxon Corp. v. Time Indus., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. ,74,926 (E.D. Mich., 1974): "As the substantive law of the state, the Michigan [antitrust] statutes are applicable only to intrastate
commerce." (Emphasis added.) The district court in Exxon relied upon Kosuga v. Kelly,
257 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 195&), aff'd, 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
100. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 265, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762 (1950).
101. J. FLYNN, supra note 1. at 56-108 is the most comprehensive study of the subject.
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2. Expansion of State Commerce Authority. The proponents of a broadened
antitrust role for the states rely principally upon the 1910 decision of Justice
Holmes in Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Tennessee.30 2 The defendant, a
Kentucky corporation, entered into arrangements for the purpose and with
the effect of raising oil prices in Tennessee by inducing local merchants to
cancel orders placed with defendant's competitor, who was located in Pennsylvania. Upon conviction for violation of the Tennessee antitrust act, defendant's permit to conduct "intrastate business" in Tennessee was revoked. Before the Supreme Court, defendant maintained that "as the only illegal purpose that can be attributed to this agreement is that of protecting the defendant's oil against interstate competition, it could not be made the subject
of punishment by the state; that the offense, if any, is against interstate commerce alone.' ' 10 3 In a noted passage, Justice Holmes retorted: 104
The mere fact that it [the Tennessee act] may happen to remove an
interference with commerce among the States as well with the rest does
not invalidate it. It hardly would be an answer to an indictment for
forgery that the instrument forged was a foreign bill of lading, or for
assault and battery that the person assaulted was engaged in peddling
goods from another state. How far Congress could deal with such cases
we need not consider, but certainly there is nothing in the present state
of the law at least that excludes the States from a familiar exercise of
their power. See, Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co....
As the only specific statement by the highest court regarding the interface
of national and state antitrust enforcement within the framework of federalism, 05 Holmes' terse and analogical declaration leaves much to surmise. It
has been assumed by most to mean that no federal law, particularly the Sherman Act, has precluded states from regulating antitrust practices affecting

See also P. AREEDA, ANTrRUsr ANALYSIS, 115-20 (2d ed. 1974); Bicks, supra note 10, at 505-06;
Mantzoros, Federal-State Antitrust Jurisdiction, 9 N.Y.L.F. 74, 76-79 (1963); Maroney, supra
note 39, at 826 n.53; Mosk, supra note 22, at 361; N.Y. ANTrRusT REP., supra note 8, at 53a63a; Pollock, supra note 98; Rahl, supra note 1, at 756-58; Sieker, supra note 36, at 200-04;
Stem, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary on a Draft Statute,
39 TExAs L. Rav. 717, 719-20 (1961). Cf. HANDBOOK or NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 383 (1972) (upon which promulgation of the Uniform State

Antitrust Act is based).
102. 217 U.S. 413 (1910). On occasion, such reliance has been without analysis. See, e.g.,
Maroney, supra note 39, at 826 n.53.
103. 217 U.S. at 421.
104. Id. at 422.
105. In his detailed study of the commerce power and antitrust regulation, Professor
Flynn cites five subsequent cases in which the Supreme Court, without discussing the commerce issue, upheld application of state antitrust acts "where the activity involved was obviously interstate commerce." J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 71 n.251. Teamsters Local 24 v.
Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Puerto Rico v.
Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937). Of the listed cases, Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., most directly
addresses the issue of federal commerce preclusion, but in the somewhat unique context of
the application of section 3 of the Sherman Act to "insular possessions." In Teamsters
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"commerce among the States."' 0 The statement appears equally amenable,
however, to the interpretation that because no federal statute reached the
predominantly local activity of the Standard Oil Company, Tennessee could
10 7
properly regulate what was essentially intrastate trade and commerce.
The absence of definitive Supreme Court precedent has not deterred lower
federal' 08 and state' 0 9 courts from permitting state antitrust enforcement in a
variety of instances in which the involvement of interstate commerce is unmistakable. For example, in Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co of Anerica, 1 ° the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared: "It
is true that numerous cases have held that the federal antitrust laws are not
preemptive of state antitrust regulation.""' Involved were concurrent federal
and state private antitrust suits alleging monopolization and restraint of trade
in the production and marketing of natural gas in two Texas counties. One
aspect of the Hydra-headed federal appeal, pursued while the state claim remained pending, concerned plaintiffs' assertion that the private federal and
state suits constituted separate causes of action; accordingly, a final judgment
in the federal litigation would not be res judicata as to the parties and issues

Local 24, federal labor policy was actually held to preempt enforcement of Ohio's antitrust
act. 358 U.S. at 295-97. See text accompanying notes 215-218 infra. The limited precedent of
Giboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co. and Watson v. Buck is discussed in note 117 infra. See
also United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (state antitrust regulation of insurance not automatically precluded when insurance brought within coverage of
Sherman Act). Cf. Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222 (1913); Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 106 (1909).
106. See commentary cited note 101 supra. The authors of the N.Y. Antitrust Report,
for example, believe the commerce clause issue was definitively settled against state preclusion
in Standard Oil of Kentucky. N.Y. ANTITRUST REP., supra note 8, at 55a-56a.
107. This is essentially the position taken in J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 164-65; Pollock,
supra note 98, at 147; Note, supia note 10, at 1478-80. One commentator questions the current validity of Standard Oil of Kentucky, which was "decided long before the sensational
surge of the commerce power." Jeffers, supra note 97, at 815-16. In Field v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., 194 U.S. 618 (1904), cited by Holmes, the Court had simply stated: "In this day
of multiplied means of intercourse between the States there is scarcely any contract which
cannot in a limited or remote degree be said to affect interstate commerce. But it is only
direct interferences with the freedom of such commerce that bring the case within the exclusive domain of Federal legislation." Id. at 623.
108. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), afJ'd on other grounds, 407
U.S. 258 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Mathews Conveyor Co. v.
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943).
109. See, e.g., Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d. 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946);
Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950); People's Sav. Bank v.
Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.AV.2d 777 (1960); Leader Theater Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280, 58 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1945), afJ'd, 273 App. Div. 844, 76
N.Y.S.2d 846 (Ist Dep't 1948); Texas v. Southeast Texas Chapter of Nat'l EIec. Contractor's
Ass'n, 358 S.AV.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Washington v. Sterling Theaters Co., 64 Wash.
2d 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964).
110. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
111. Id. at 1313. In place of the "numerous cases," the court of appeals cited only
Standard Oil of Kentucky.
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in the state proceeding.
reasoned that while: 13

12

Responding to this argument, the court of appeals

[he pendency of a federal antitrust action involving the same parties
and the same operative facts does not preclude the prosecution of a state
action [citing Texas Cases] ... [t]his does not mean, however, that the
federal and state suits constitute separate causes of action. Rather, those
cases simply hold that prior to a final judgment the federal antitrust
laws do not have a preemptive effect.
Equally emphatic is the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Flood v. Kuhn."14 Curt Flood, a major league ballplayer,
challenged baseball's "reserve system"" 5 on several grounds, including the alleged violation of federal and state antitrust laws. Of immediate concern," 6
the court of appeals concluded that state antitrust regulation is not automatically precluded by the presence of interstate commerce and concurrent
1
federal jurisdiction: .7
It appears to be without question that, today, professional baseball,
with its complex web of franchises, farm teams and recruiters, and its
multi-million dollar contracts with television and radio networks, is
interstate commerce. Our difficulty lies in determining to what extent, if
at all, the states are precluded from antitrust regulation of interstate
commerce. See Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1469 (1961). The Supreme-Court has not, to
our knowledge, expressed any opinion as to the outer limits of state
antitrust policy, although it has clearly held that state antitrust policy
is not ousted from the regulation of local matters which may also be
affected by federal laws. See Watson v. Buck ....
Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co....
Augmenting this strong - if not clearly precedented - expression of support for application of state antitrust laws in the presence of interstate com-

112. Id. at 1311-16.
113. Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).
114. 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aIJ'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
115. "Briefly stated, the reserve system ... consists of a number of baseball rules, regulations and uniform contract terms which together operate to bind a player to a ball club and
restrict him to negotiating with that club only." Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272

(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
116. The further holding of the court of appeals, that the "burden" diverse state antitrust regulation would place on baseball operations precludes state enforcement is discussed
in text accompanying notes 269-291 infra.
117. 443 F.2d at 267 (emphasis added). Both Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 403-04 (1941),
and Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495 (1949), cited by the court of
appeals, failed to address directly the application of state statutes to activities involving interstate commerce. In Giboney the defendants were found to have engaged in "a local transportation combination." 336 U.S. at 494. In Watson, the Supreme Court apparently considered the challenged conduct related "to purely intrastate transactions." 313 U.S. at 403
n.6. The cited Columbia Law Review Note does not refer to Giboney, but with respect to
Watson concludes that the court's decision "would not appear to affirm the right of a state
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merce, the Supreme Court, in a variety of non-antitrust contexts, has validated
numerous state laws regulating or affecting interstate commerce. 1 8
Hence, it may fairly be said that while precise contours remain uncharted
by the nation's highest court, the preponderance of contemporary case law and
scholarship support the concept of a penumbral zone within which federal and
state antitrust statutes share concurrent interstate commerce application. 119
Moreover, outside this area of overlapping competence, effort has been made
to delineate the poles of purely intrastate commerce, in which the states retain exclusive province, and purely interstate commerce, in which the federal
government exercises sole authority.
3. ContemporaryInterface of Federal-State Commerce Jurisdiction.Federal
regulation of anticompetitive activity is limited by the broad terms of the
Sherman Act to "trade or commerce among the several states."'' 20 Congress
left the precise meaning of this jurisdictional clause to the courts, 121 which
early concluded it had no precise meaning, but rather "a practical one, drawn
from the course of business." 122 Judges have since applied "a practical, case-bycase economic judgment" in their efforts to plumb the federal antitrust reach
into essentially local activities.123 Not unexpectedly, the results have been as
24
diverse as the facts presented.
As earlier discussed,125 it is now established that any activity that occurs
"within the flow of interstate commerce" is within the scope of the Sherman
Act, even though the activity is predominantly local in nature and has only

to regulate antitrust other than on a 'purely intrastate' level." Note, supra note 10, at 1481.
It is true that the conduct involved in Watson, license fee fixing combinations by owners
of copyrighted musical compositions, had clear interstate ramifications, and had already been
the subject of federal enforcement. See United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. 156,104
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). Neither the Giboney nor Watson Court viewed the facts in this broader
context; consequently, the precedential importance of the two decisions appears less than
suggested.
118. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (protection of literary rights);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (shipping regulation);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (motor carrier regulation); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (railroad regulation); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). See generally Stein, The Commerce Clause and the
National Economy 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. RFv. 645 (1946).
119. See cases and authorities cited notes 101, 108-09 supra.
120. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1970). More restrictive language is employed with respect to interstate commerce jurisdiction in the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. See cases
cited note 90 supra and accompanying text.
121. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120 (1941).
122. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
123. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 412
U.S. 950 (1973). See Manderville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 232-33 (1948).
124. Earlier cases are collected in three leading studies. J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 62-63,
212-13, 217-21; Kallis, supra note 93; Krotinger, supra note 92.
125. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/1

22

Rubin: Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement

1974

RETHINKING STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

an insubstantial effect on the flow of commerce.12 6 Interstate commerce need
not be directly involved, however, for a court to determine the presence of
federal antitrust jurisdiction. Wholly intrastate activity may still violate the
Sherman Act when it is evident that interstate commerce is substantially affected. 27 It is only those activities that are not within the flow of interstate
commerce and do not otherwise substantially affect it that are "purely local"
and beyond the jurisdictional grasp of federal antitrust statutes. 2
The dividing line can be elusive. 2 9 The Supreme Court, for example,
found in United States v. Yellow Cab Co.130 that a conspiracy to restrain trade
among taxicab owners engaged solely in the transportation of interstate passengers between Chicago rail terminals "is clearly a part of the stream of interstate commerce."'' But the same conspiracy among owners engaged in the
transportation of interstate passengers between points in Chicago and the rail
terminals, the Court reasoned, "is too unrelated to interstate commerce to
constitute a part thereof within the meaning of the Sherman Act."32 Lower
federal courts have concluded that the printing of legal notices in Los
Angeles, 2 2 the sale of cemetery vaults'2 4 and monuments, 3 5 the furnishing of
hospital 36 and chiropractic services, 37 the operation of bowling alleys, 3 the
126. This is the "in commerce" or qualitative test used to determine whether particular
conduct supports interstate commerce jurisdiction. See authorities cited note 92 supra.
127. This is the alternative "affecting commerce" or quantitative test. See authorities
cited note 93 supra.
128. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTrruSr DEVELOPMENTS: 1955-1968, 39 (1968).
129. The opinion of Judge Browning in Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d
517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973), best articulates the difficulties inherent in
undertaking such distinctions: "Too often in this area, judicial discomfort with uncertainty,
aggravated by the rapid expansion of traditional conceptions of federal commerce power, has
led to a continued grasping for specific, easily applicable standards, standards which regularly
had to be 'reinterpreted' or discarded altogether in the face of changing economic realities. In
the final analysis, the real-world business nature of the Sherman Act's purpose and subject
matter permits no easy solutions. As noted earlier, it is the duty of the courts to apply 'a
practical, case-by-case economic judgment' rather than to take refuge in 'abstract or mechanistic formulae.'" Id. at 527 n.20. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, eschewing the
"case-by-case" approach, appears to assume the existence of commerce effect whenever one of
the per se category of offenses is alleged. See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967) (per
curiam). Cf. text accompanying note 94 supra.
130. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
131. Id. at 228.
132. Id. at 230.
133. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961): "The

test of jurisdiction is not that the acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate
commerce, but that the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of such business." 290 F.2d at 330.
134. Lawson v. Woodmere, Inc., 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954).
135. Northern Cal. Monument Dealers Ass'n v. Interment Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 93 (N.D.

Cal. 1954).
136. Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959).
137.
1952).
138.

Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir.
Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).
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county-wide collection and disposal of garbage," 59 the operation of Kansas City
barber shops, 1 40 the sale of state bar review courses, 1

,

and the construction and

rental of apartments in Ann Arbor, Michigan14 2 present too remote, insubstantial, or incidental a nexus with interstate commerce to confer Sherman Act
jurisdiction. Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit announced in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar1'3 that the practice of law is purely
an intrastate activity whose impact on interstate commerce is "merely incidental."
Conversely, federal courts have declared that wholesale liquor distribution
entirely within Oklahoma,1 44 a southern California vehicle-locating service,' 15
the supply of hospital services in Philadelphia, 146 the sale of burial insurance
policies,'- 7 the intrastate manufacture and marketing of a filled milk beverage
called "Go,' 4 8 and the sale of hot mix asphalt from storage tanks in Florida
to Florida purchasers 149 produce a sufficient effect on the flow of out-of-state
commodities to warrant Sherman Act scrutiny.
Efforts to ascertain the maximum reach of federal antitrust jurisdiction
into essentially local conduct parallel judicial efforts to determine the maximum reach of state enforcement into predominantly interstate activity. There
appears general agreement that while "states . . .can enact and implement

[antitrust] legislation which affects interstate commerce," they can do so only
"when such commerce has significant local consequences. '"o Thus, courts have
held state antitrust jurisdiction absent in situations involving broadcasts into
the forum state by an interstate closed circuit television network, 151 and a
139. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
140. Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers Int'l Union of America, 195 F. Supp.
664 (W.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962).
141. Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
142. Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Management Ass'n, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
143. 497 F.2d 1, 15-19 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3246 (Oct. 29, 1974).
144. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam): "The District Court and the
Court of Appeals found that the liquor 'came to rest' in the wholesalers' warehouses and
that interstate commerce ceased at that point. . . . But whatever the validity of that conclusion, it does not end the matter. For it is well established that an activity which does not
itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 321 (emphasis in original).
145. Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).
146. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973). The court of appeals expressly refused to follow Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (1959), and Spears
Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
147. Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974).
148. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 524-28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973).
149. Hardrives Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 329 F.2d 868, 869-71 (5th Cir. 1964).
Accord, United States v. South Florida Asphalt Co., 329 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1964); City of
Fort Lauderdale v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 329 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1964).
150. Leader Theatre Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280, 283, 58
N.Y.S.2d 304, 307 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 844, 76 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1st Dep't 1948).
151. TNT Communications, Inc. v. Management Television Sys., Inc., 1968 TRADE CAS.
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challenged conspiracy consummated in the forum state whose object was
monopolization of motion picture distribution in a contiguous state.152 In
contrast, an alleged conspiracy among three out-of-state corporations to fix
the price of calcium chloride was considered within the purview of the Wisconsin antitrust law, notwithstanding undisputed evidence that none of the
defendants owned, operated, or maintained any offices or facilities in Wisconsin, or had any employees or agents there; that all shipments of the chemical into the state were f.o.b. production points in Michigan and Ohio; and
153
that all prices were established on a nation-wide basis.
The "local consequence" or nexus that must be shown for state regulation
to comport with commerce clause requirements interfaces in some instances
with the previously considered fourteenth amendment due process limitations
on state in personam adjudicatory authority. 54 In the procedural due process
context, a defendant can only be compelled to answer in a foreign forum if he
possesses certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state, 55 or if the challenged activity has a "substantial connection" with the forum state and that
state demonstrates "a manifest interest in providing redress for its residents."'5 6
5
7 the defendant publishing company was
In Curtis PublishingCo. v. Birdsong,1
sued in Alabama for a nationally circulated statement purportedly libelous to
the Mississippi plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing
the assertion of in personam authority over the defendant pursuant to Alabama's nonresident "long-arm" statute, considered both the due process and
commerce clause ramifications of such litigation:5 8
This case raises the difficult problems occasioned by multi-state publications. These situations will grow more common and we must be careful
to evolve a rule that will be fair both to those injured and those who
through normal commercial activity are exposed to the spector of multistate litigation. We conclude that there is no rational nexus between
Alabama and the parties or the injury, that Alabama is not a constitutionally permissible forum, and that the motion to quash the extra-territoial service, should, therefore, have been granted. Any other ruling
would involve the danger of severe burdens on and impediments to
interstate commerce.
The burden on interstate commerce arising from multiple or multistate enforcement presents additional considerations for state antitrust regulation. It
is to these and related concepts that attention now turns.
f72,653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968): "[N]o particularized New York impact." Cf. Loew's Inc. v.
Radio Hawaii, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 587, 191 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
152. Baker v. Walter Reade Theatres, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 172, 237 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct.
1962). "The sale of rights here is of no overriding concern to the state since the significant
local consequences occur in another state." Id. at 173, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
153. State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960).
154. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
155. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249-53 (1958).
156. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
157. 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
158. Id. at 347. See also F. JAMrs, CIVIL PROCEDURE §12.16 (1965).
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C. The Commerce and Supremacy Clauses: Remaining Questions
1. Basic Principles. The jurisdictional division that has evolved under the
commerce clause is only one of several constitutional mechanisms defining and
structuring state and national relations within the federal union. Another, alluded to in Curtis Publishing Co., is the commerce clause proscription of state
regulation whose extraterritorial effect is found to burden unduly'5 9 or to
discriminate against6 ° the unfettered flow of interstate commerce. The supremacy clause affords an additional structuring mechanism. 16' Broadly, it
162
operates to invalidate state enactments found to conflict with the declared
4
6
or presumed 163 intention of Congress.

159. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 528-30 (1959); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773-75 (1945); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113-14
(1941); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
160. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951); Hale v.
Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1939); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938); Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 626
(1903).
161. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The constitutional corollary is the tenth
amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST., amend. X.
State-federal "conflicts" have arisen most frequently in the following contexts: "(I) state
law sanctions or orders that which federal law forbids; (2) state law forbids that which
federal law permits, encourages, or orders; (3) state law regulates that which Congress expressly forbids the states to regulate; and (4) enforcement of a state policy clearly defeats,
obstructs, or renders ineffective a federal policy or procedure." J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at
118-19. Cf. Mantzoros, supra note 101, at 76-78.
162. A useful example is afforded by §5(11) of the Reed-Bullwinkle Act, 49 U.S.C. §5(11)
(1970), which confers exclusive authority over carrier mergers, consolidations, pooling arrangements, and other transactions in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and expressly
relieves such transactions "from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints,
limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal."
163. In United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1944),
the Supreme Court inferred from the sweeping language of section 1 of the Sherman Act a
congressional intent to regulate the field of insurance, despite defendants' arguments that
"virtually all the states regulate the insurance business on the theory that competition in
the field of insurance is detrimental both to the insurers and insured, and that if the
Sherman Act be held applicable to insurance much of this state regulation would be
destroyed." Congress made clear its "intention" the following year by promulgating the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1011-1115 (1970), which exempted from operation of
the Sherman Act most state insurance regulation. Compare Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 668, 676-77 (1969), and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-33 (1964),
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) (state unfair
competition law preempted by federal patent law), with Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 561-70 (1973), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974) (state copyright laws upheld in the absence of express federal supersession).
164. In those instances in which Congress has not unequivocally expressed its intent
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The commerce and supremacy clause directives, although conceptually
distinct, '16 are often factually intertwined, and together form the basis of
numerous Supreme Court holdings. 66 At one end of the expansive case law
spectrum are situations in which Congress has unequivocally and expressly
declared its exclusionary exercise of authority over a particular subject matter, 167 or in which "[a] holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable
and requires no inquiry into congressional design . .. [because] compliance
s
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.16 At the
opposite end of the spectrum are situations in which Congress has manifestly
authorized state regulation, 69 or in which Congress is without effective power
to act due to the number, diversity, and local character of the matters to be
treated. 7 0 Between these poles "lies the infinite variety of cases, in which
regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce, in
which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of the state and national power
is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved.''"11
While a variety of tests have been used, five factors recur most often in
judicial efforts to appraise and reconcile competing interests of the states and
nation:

through legislation, intent has been inferred from its very inaction. See, e.g., State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 726-30, 144 N.W.2d 1, 15-18 (1966), discussed in text
accompanying notes 231-240 infra.
165. See J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 109-10. See also text accompanying notes 255-257 infra.
166. Supremacy and commerce clause issues are endemic to a federal framework of government and were early addressed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wilison v. Black-Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
See generally F. FRANKFURTER, TuE CO mmRCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WArrE
(1937).
It is sometimes difficult to discern whether the basis of a particular decision is the Supremacy Clause or the Commerce Clause. For example, the local nature of the involved
enterprise may result in a finding that interstate commerce is not sufficiently involved. Or it
may support the conclusion that Congress did not "intend" to preempt such local regulation
through existing statutes. Furthermore, the constitutional validity of the federal regulatory
statute given Supremacy Clause superintendence is measured by the Commerce Clause. A
fascinating discussion of the ramifications of the Supreme Court's failure to segregate these
concepts in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), is presented
in Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 1153 (1974).
167. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-54 (1971); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155-56, 167-69 (1942).
168. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
169. A recent illustration of congressional authorization is the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224 tit. 1, §102, 84 Stat. 91. See Askew
v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 329 (1973). See also note 180 infra.
170. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1943); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314
U.S. 390, 394-95 (1941).
171. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945). See also City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
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(1) the purpose and intent of Congress as disclosed by the federal
statute and its legislative history;172
(2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme and the design
of any implementing administrative procedures;1 73
(3) the nature
and degree of state interest in regulation of the sub17 4
ject matter;
(4) "whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case [state] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"; 1 75 and
(5) the nature of the subject matter regulated and whether it is one
that requires "exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity
vital to national interests." 176
Engendered by the exigencies of the Depression, the principle of "cooperative federalism" has now largely replaced the concept of dual sovereignty,
which historically cast the states and nation in the posture of constitutional adversaries. Thus, in striking a federal-state accommodation, a finding of preemption is disfavored;1 7 7 only where there is a demonstrated "actual conflict"
with federal acts, or a "burden which materially affects interstate commerce
in an area where uniformity of regulation is necessary," will state legislation
be precluded. 7 s Within these wide parameters, the Supreme Court has said:
"We deal not with absolutes but with questions of degree."179
State antitrust regulation has the attributes of neither of the readily resolved doctrinal poles. It is not unequivocally preempted by federal antitrust
legislation,180 nor is its subject matter so local and diverse as to prevent effec-

172. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1963);
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1961).
173. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973);
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971); Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees of America
v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-91 (1971); Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
174. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 94 S. Ct. 383, 395-96
(1973); Linn v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 59 (1966);
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1959); United States v. Southeastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 548-49 (1944).
175. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
176. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963). See also
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1884-89 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 552-60, 561-70 (1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
444 (1960).
177. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 94 S.Ct. 383, 389-90, 395-96
(1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
178. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960).
179. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959). See also City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
180. The most emphatic declaration to this effect is that of Robert A. Bicks, at the time
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division: "[T]he federal antitrust laws
make no demands for supremacy, preemption, 'primary jurisdiction' or the exclusion of state
exercise of sovereignty. Like federal antitrust, state antitrust seeks only to eliminate burdens
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tive federal treatment.' 8' It is, rather, in the middle area, necessitating accommodation and admitting of few dear lines.
The vulnerability of state antitrust regulation to charges of supremacy and
commerce clause preclusion is limited by several factors. For one thing, state
enforcement since World War I has been generally moribund. s2 Accordingly,
as a practical matter, there has been little occasion or opportunity even to
consider whether such problems may exist. Moreover, state antitrust policy, as
articulated in constitutions' 8 3 and statutes, 8 4 has as its dominant theme the
on commerce." Bicks, supra note 10, at 506. Indeed, the only argument for preemption appears to be that congressional silence during the period of tremendous growth in the federal
commerce power implies a purpose to narrow the area of state regulation. Such an argument
has been characterized as "thin" by the former attorney general of California. Mosk, supra
note 12, at 364. See also P. AREEDA, supra note 101, at 45; Mantzoros, supra note 101, at 77-78.
Congress has expressly disclaimed an intent to preempt state fair trade laws. See MillerTydings Act amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970); McGuire Act
amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(2)-(5) (1970). The congressional action followed Supreme Court decisions limiting application of state fair trade
acts to strictly intrastate commerce. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341
U.S. 384 (1951); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1937).
Nor has conferral of federal antitrust immunity been considered binding upon the states.
See, e.g., Capper-Volstead Act, partially amending section 6 of the Clayton Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§291-92 (1970); Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§521-22 (1970). Cf. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950).
181. The long reach of federal antitrust enforcement into essentially "local" enterprise is
emphasized in Speer, supra note 92. See also cases cited notes 144-146 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 266-267 infra.
183. The following state constitutional provisions condemn monopolies and trade restrictions: ALA. CONST. art. IV, §103; ARiz. CONST. art. XIV, §15; ARK. CoNsr. art. II, §19;
GA. CONsr. art. IV, §4(1); IDAHO CONsT. art. XI, §18; Ky. CONST. §198; LA. CONSr. art. XIII,
§5, art. XIX, §14; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. XLI; MINN. CONST. art. IV, §35;
MIss. CONST. art. VII, §198; MONT. CONST. art. XV, §20; N.H. CONsT. art. LXXXIII; N.M.
CONST. art. IV, §38; N.C. CONST. art. I, §34; N.D. CONST. art. VII, §146; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§32, art. V, §55, art. IX, §§41, 45; S.C. CoNsr. art. IX, §§13, 19; S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §20;
TENN. CONsT. art. I, §22 ;Tax. CONsT. art. I, §26; UTAH CONsT. art. XII, §20; VA. CONST. art.
XII, §165; WASH. CONST. art. XII, §22; WYo. CONST. art. I, §30, art. X, §8. Most prevalent is
language forbidding "perpetuities and monopolies" as "contrary to the genius of free government" (Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming);
or directing the legislature to "enact laws to prevent trusts, monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade" (Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington). In some instances, state constitutional provisions have been used to strike down
fair trade legislation. Compare Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc.,
139 Mont. 15, 359 P.2d 644 (1961), and General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d
326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956), with Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315
P.2d 967 (1957), and Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W.2d 971
(1950).

184. Many recently promulgated state laws contain an expression of antitrust policy. See
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970): "The purpose of this Act is to promote
the unhampered growth of commerce and industry throughout the state by prohibiting restraints of trade which are secured through monopolistic or oligarchic practices and which

act or tend to act to decrease competition between and among persons engaged in commerce
and trade, whether in manufacturing, distribution, financing, and service industries or in
related for-profit pursuits." States having comparable provisions include: Mn. ANN. CODE art.
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promotion of trade and the removal of economic discrimination. The consequent correlation and absence of basic conflict between federal and state
objectives has been traditionally recognized, 8 5 and continues to be reaffirmed.s6
Differences do exist in state substantive provisions and procedures.18 7 But
the potential burden or discrimination such statutory vagaries might cause is
reduced by the fact that many states have adopted antitrust laws emulative of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 88 Then, too, where important variances
persist, major reliance by state judges and practitioners upon federal precedent
in the construction and application of state laws has resulted in substantial de
facto uniformity1 s9 Nor has Congress ever broadly declared that national anti83, §36 (Cum.Supp. 1973); Nebraska, 4 TRADE REC. REP. §33,003 (April 24, 1974); New
Jersey, Preamble, 4 TRADE REC. REP. 33,301 (June 5, 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.86.920
(Supp. 1972). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. §133.27 (1957).
185. The legislative history of the Sherman Act evidences congressional intent to achieve
complementary federal-state enforcement. See remarks of Senator Sherman in text accompanying note 37 supra; PROTECTION OF TRADE AND COMMERCE AGAINST UNLAWFUL RESTRAINTS AND
MONOPOLIES, H. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1890): "It follows, therefore, that the
legislative authority of Congress and that of the several states must be extended to secure
the suppression of restraints of trade and monopolies. Whatever legislation Congress may
enact on this subject, within the limits of its authority, will prove of little value unless the
states shall supplement it by such auxiliary and proper legislation as may be within their
legislative authority."
186. See generally remarks of federal antitrust enforcement officials endorsing state enforcement efforts in authorities cited note 10 supra. Cf. State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64
Wash. 2d 761, 765, 394 P.2d 226, 228 (1964); State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d
290, 295-96, 101 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1960), in which federal agencies directly supported the
principle of concurrent state regulation of antitrust matters.
187. The diversity of state statutory formulations is discussed in notes 26-30 supra and
accompanying text.
188. See note 28 supra. For example, The Washington Consumer Protection Act passed
in 1961 adheres closely to the substantive provisions of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act,
sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, and section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.86.020-.060. See Dewell & Getting, The Washington Antitrust
Laws, 36 WASH. L. REV. 239, 242-69 (1961). Countering arguments that the state statute was
preempted by federal antitrust legislation, the Supreme Court of Washington observed in
State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wash. 2d. 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964): "The nearly identical
wording of the disputed provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act indicates that the motive or goal of federal and state regulation is the same,
and leads to the conclusion that state enforcement, far from frustrating or interfering with
federal purpose or national policy, will actually further it." Id. at 764-65, 394 P.2d at 228.
189. Representative of the cases incorporating federal precedent is Carl N. Swanson Co.
v. E.C. Braun Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 366, 77 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1969): "The California antitrust
law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act . . . is patterned upon the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act, and federal cases construing the Sherman Act, as well as the common law
policy against restraint of trade, are applicable with respect to the Cartwright Act." Id. at
368, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 379. See also N.Y. ANTITRUST REP., supra note 8, at 24a ("New York
accords 'great weight' to federal decisions on restraint of trade"; Baker & Hale, Commentary
on the Illinois Antitrust Act, 48 CHI. B. REC. 140, 153-54 (1967); Comment, Anti-Trust Law
in Wisconsin, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 657, 663. Many who have evaluated state antitrust laws and
policy have done so through comparison with the more sophisticated and comprehensive
federal antitrust doctrine. In general, a high level of correlation has been found to exist.
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trust uniformity is of paramount importance and preempts divergent state
enactments. 90 To the contrary, even with regard to federal enforcement,
Congress has reposed responsibility in three different and independent hands:
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 191 the Federal Trade Commission, 192 and private litigants. 193 Finally, it is now recognized that the mere
"coincidence" of federal and state antitrust enactments is no longer adequate
ground to oust the states from their regulatory role.19 4
2. Areas of Potential Concern. State antitrust laws and enforcement are,
without doubt, capable of conflicting with federal policy or burdening unreasonably or discriminating against interstate commerce. There is at least the
potential that enforcement of the myriad existing -state remedies and procedures, some of which may favor local industry, and the opportunity for
multiple state and federal prosecutions, may have such an effect. Indeed, with
the current resurgence of antitrust activity in many formerly dormant states, 9 5
this potentiality warrants closer appraisal.
One area of possible conflict is created when state antitrust enactments
operate in a manner repugnant to the policy engendered in federal antitrust
legislation. Illustrative are many of the older state acts requiring the mandatory charter forfeiture and dissolution of any domestic corporation and the
exclusion of any foreign corporation convicted of an antitrust offense. 196

See, e.g., Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North Carolina-Federal Law
Compared, 50 N.C.L. REv. 199, 201 (1972); Hanson, A Comparison of State and Federal
Antitrust Laws in Selected Areas, 29 A.B.A. ANTrrgUST L.J. 267, 283 (1965); Hanson & von
Kalinowski, The Status of State Antitrust Laws with Federal Analysis, 15 W. REv. L. RIEv. 9,
13 (1963); Mantzoros, State Antitrust Statutes-Rules of Construction and Enforcement, 24
RECORD Ass'N OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 425, 428-33 (1969); von Kalinowski & Hanson, The
CaliforniaAntitrust Laws: A Comparison with the Federal Antitrust Laws, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
533, 558 (1969); Note, A Suruey of Ohio Trade Regulation-A Comparison with Federal
Trade Regulation-A Recommendation, 25 U. CINN. L. REv. 476 (1956). Contra, Hoffman,
Spring Water from the City Tap: The Trial of a New York State Antitrust Case, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 484-89 (1967).

190. See note 180 supra.
191. The United States Attorney General, through the Antitrust Division, exercises
criminal and civil enforcement responsibilities pursuant to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §4
(1970), and civil jurisdiction pursuant to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §25 (1970). In addition,
the Attorney General is authorized by the Clayton Act to bring civil damage suits for injury
to the proprietary interest of the United States. 15 U.S.C. §15a (1970).
192. The Federal Trade Commission, an independent agency, exercises civil jurisdiction
pursuant to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §21 (1970), and Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §45 (1970). The Commission is without authority to enforce the Sherman Act.
193. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970), authorizes any person "injured
in his business or property" to bring suit for threefold the actual damages sustained as a
result of a violation of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts. An individual may not bring
suit for alleged violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Carlson v. Coca Cola
Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
194. See, e.g., California v. Zook, 386 U.S. 725, 731-33 (1949).
195. See text-accompanying notes 318-323 infra. 196. See, e.g., ARsz. REv. STAT. §§44-1402 to -1403 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. §70-103 (1957);
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Where a duopoly or tight-knit oligopoly exists in a particular state industry,
the mandatory removal of one competitor for an infraction of the state's antitrust statute is itself far more anticompetitive than the involved unlawful conduct. Indeed, it may bestow on a surviving duopolist the very monopoly section 2 of the Sherman Act 197 was designed to prevent, and thereby directly
conflict with federal policy.
Furthermore, differences between state and federal construction and application of the per se rule, 19s may theoretically be the basis for a conflict between the antitrust doctrine of each.199 The practical significance of such
0
distinctions, however, appears to be de minimus.20
Outside the sphere of antitrust legislation as initially defined 20 1 exists a
broad range of economic and trade regulation enactments that may operate to
curb, rather than foster, effective competition. State fair trade, price discrimination, and sales-below-cost statutes are primary examples.20 2 Were it not for
the fact that Congress has expressly authorized state fair trade acts,

20 3

and has

4

itself prohibited discrimination in pricing or terms of sale,20 state economic

(1973); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§48-107 to -108 (1948); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§50-103 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, §11 (1967); Mo. REv. STAT. §§416.070 -.080
(1952); S.C. CODE ANN. §§66-66 to -67 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. §133.21 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
Cf. Comment, Constitutionality of Ouster of a Corporation for Violation of State Antitrust
Laws, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 572.
197. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1970).
198. The operation of the per se rule is analyzed in C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN EcoNoIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 142-60 (1959). The per se rule is a refinement of
and principal exception to the rule of reason. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). See also note 366 infra.
199. For example, New York has no clearly defined per se category of offenses. N.Y.
ANTITRUST REP., supra note 8, at 24a-29a. Texas professes "on occasion" to have no rule of
reason. See Moody & Wallace, Texas Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement - Comparison
with FederalAntitrust Laws, 11 Sw. L.J. 1, 8 (1957).
200. See Legislation, A Collection and Survey of State Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUMf. L.
REx,. 347, 356 (1932): "Recognizing that the language of the general state anti-trust acts
would, if applied literally, very seriously hinder modern business, many state courts have
followed the federal 'rule of reason' in passing judgment on intrastate transactions." (Footnote omitted.)
201. See note I supra.
202. 4 TRADE REG. REP. i30,201-35,530, contains a compilation of all such state laws.
Fair trade and sales-below-cost statutes are examined in 2 TRADE REG. REP. 116017, 60416390, 6601-6855.
The opposition to state fair trade laws prevalent today is illustrated in BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 650, at A-25 (Feb. 12, 1974): "'New York State's so-called fair trade law
is an anachronistic anti-consumer device designed to maintain arbitrary product prices and
is particularly offensive in light of the inflation spiral,' [New York] Attorney General, Louis
J. Lefkowitz, declared in recommending legislative action to amend the law. The bill grew
out of the depression in the 1930's when requirements at the time required unusual remedies,
he stated, and the time has come for the laws to be abandoned as an 'anti-consumer device
for price maintenance.'"
203. See note 180 supra.
204. Clayton Act §2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1970).
FLA. STAT. §§542.03-.04
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regulation in this form would directly conflict with the broad federal policy to
20 5
promote free and unfettered competition.
As more states undertake antitrust enforcement concurrent with that of the
federal government, a further concern arises. The successive federal and state
criminal prosecutions that may result, though not violative of double jeopardy
principles,200 may nonetheless provide the basis for federal law supersession. In
the leading case of Nelson v. Pennsylvania20 7 the Supreme Court announced,
in dictum, that "[w]ithout compelling indication to the contrary, we will not
assume that Congress intended to permit the possibility of double prosecutions."20s The issue in Nelson was whether the federal Smith Act, which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the national government by
force and violence, precludes state antisedition laws proscribing identical conduct. A key factor in the Court's decision appears to be the absence of a substantial, independent state interest in protection of the federal government;
three years later the Court upheld state action pursuant to an antisedition
law aimed at protecting the state government. 20 9 Nor does it appear that the
threat of double prosecution is presumptively suspect in all cases. For example,
the threat of double prosecution in Californiav. Zook,210 which involved conduct condemned by both state and federal statutes, was not viewed as an impediment to state enforcement.211 It has been noted, however, that the penalty
involved in Zook was of far less severity than that involved in Nelson.212
Where the harshness and inequity of successive criminal prosecutions is force2 13
fully pleaded, the Nelson dictum may well be resurrected.
205. Several state fair trade laws were declared to violate state constitutional provisions
condemning monopolies and trade restraints. See note 183 supra. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMmITrEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUsT LAWS, RiEPORT 149-59 (1955). Barron, California Antitrust-Legislative Schizophrenia, 36 S. CAL.L. REv. 393 (1962).
206. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 577 (1922). A different rule exists as to successive
prosecutions by governmental units within the same state. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.

387 (1970).
207.

350 U.S. 497 (1956). Cf. Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon

of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
208. 350 U.S. at 509-10.
209. Uphaus v. Wyman, 860 U.S. 72 (1959).
210. 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
211. Id. at 731-32.
212. Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1469,
1492 (1961). In Zook, the conduct was a misdemeanor punishable under state law by a fine
of not more than $250 or 90 days imprisonment, or both; the federal penalty was limited to
$100 with no imprisonment. 336 U.S. at 778, 784. In contrast, the conduct involved in Nelson

was a felony under state law, punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or twenty years
imprisonment, or both; the federal penalty was a maximum fine of $10,000 or 10 years imprisonment, or both. 350 U.S. at 511-12.
213. The possibility of such an occurrence is graphically illustrated in Dillon, BUT THE
OTHER REFEREE SAID:-A Criticism of Multiple Litigation in Identical Bidding and

Merger Cases, 39 TExAs L. REv. 782, 793 (1961). Consonant with collateral estoppel principles,
there is little possibility that successive civil damage suits will produce comparable problems.
See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1313-16 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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3. The Labor Cases. There are, to be sure, clear instances in which state
antitrust regulation has been preempted by congressional action or national
policy. Thus, a state may not authorize by statute conduct that is prohibited
by the federal antitrust laws. 214 Nor may a state enforce its antitrust laws in an
area where an agency of the federal government has been granted broad
regulatory authority, if to do so would hinder or defeat the regulatory scheme.
In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 215 and InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, Local 24 v. Oliver,216 the Supreme Court held the principle of "exclusive
primary jurisdiction" conferred on the National Labor Relations Board by
federal statute217 operates to preclude state antitrust competence in matters
21
the Board is empowered to consider.
Federal superintendence may also arise when "[t]he needs of the subject
matter manifestly call for [national] uniformity."2 19 The Supreme Court has so
2 20
declared with respect to activity within the ambit of the Railway Labor Act.
Accordingly, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
221
Co.,
the Court held the Act's national scheme for labor dispute settlement
preempted enforcement under Florida's antitrust law.222 The Court considered
"the potentials for conflict . . . and for the imposition of inconsistent state

214. See N.Y. ANTITRUST REP., supra note 8, at 59a; P. AREEDA, supra note 101. However,
state control or regulation pursuant to a legitimate interest may immunize conduct from
federal antitrust application. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Business Aides,
Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority,
362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 947 (1966).
215. 348 U.S. 468, 473-82 (1955).
216. 358 U.S. 283, 295-97 (1959).
217. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§157-58 (1970).
218. This doctrine has evolved through a series of Supreme Court decisions. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427
v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972).
The governing principles were recently reiterated in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local
100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 2381 (1974): "The rule is
generally stated that whenever certain activity is either arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act, only the National Labor Relations Board may
make the initial determination whether the activity is protected, prohibited, or in the gap
Despite many criticisms .. we feel that Garmon
left without regulation by federal law ....
is still the law of the land on this issue.Thus, since it is obvious here that the activity in
this case is in all probability either protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act, we feel these decisions clearly establish that state antitrust laws cannot be applied to this
situation."
Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (Missouri antitrust act applicable to secondary boycott).
219. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 691 (1963).
220. 45 U.S.C. §§151-88 (1970).
221. 394 U.S. 369 (1969).

222.

FLA. STAT. §542.01-.12

(1973).
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obligations," which would result if state regulation were permitted, to be
223
"fatal to the goals of the Act."
A little over a decade ago, when much of the existing commentary on state
antitrust enforcement was written, the then recent labor decisions were carefully sifted to determine whether the preemption principles announced were
peculiar to federal labor policy, or whether their implications for state antitrust regulation were more encompassing. 22 4 The conclusion then and now is
the same. The labor cases have a limited application; they do not augur comprehensive federal preemption of all state antitrust activity.
Of first importance in preemption cases involving the National Labor Relations Board is the "unifying consideration" that "Congress has entrusted
administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized
knowledge and cumulative experience." 225 The evident congressional purpose
is "to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies.."22 6 In marked contrast, there is no administrative body that is accorded comparable authority in the antitrust
sphere. The Federal Trade Commission, the nearest paradigm, shares responsibility for antitrust enforcement with the Antitrust Division and private
litigants.227 Furthermore, the very real conflict experienced between state and
federal labor policy,228 is significantly lacking in the field of antitrust regulation. 229 Preclusive labor statutes such as the Railway Labor Act, 230 simply are
without parallel in the federal antitrust laws.
4. The Baseball "Anomaly." Where Congress has occupied a field, as in the
case of the Railway Labor Act, the overriding need for national uniformity
has been discerned from statutory language and congressional intent. But what
does Congress imply about national uniformity when it elects not to act in a

223. 394 U.S. at 381.
224. See, e.g., J. FLYNN, supra note I, at 128-35; Jeffers, supra note 97; N.Y. ANTrrRUSr
RE., supra note 8, at 58a-59a; Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEXAs
L. REv. 753, 756 (1961); Pollock, supra note 98, at 146; Note, supra note 212, at 1489-91.
225. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
226. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). Accord, Amalgamated Ass'n
of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-90 (1971).
227. See text accompanying notes 191-193 supra.
228. In Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), and San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmorr, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), for example, the conflict between federal and state
enactments was'direct and the supremacy clause, rather than "primary jurisdiction," was
invoked to strike down the state regulation. See also LaCross Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Cf. J. FLYNN,
supra note 1, at 129: "The national labor laws may be characterized as affirmative regulation
intended to carry out a federal policy of fostering, guaranteeing, and protecting the growth,
rights, and duties of labor organizations, while the federal antitrust policy is generally of a
negative and-prphibitive character." (Footnotes-omitted.)
229. See text accompanying notes 183-194 supra.
230. 45 U.S.C. §§151-88 (1970).
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given area? The question was recently posed in two suits challenging organized
baseball's professed comprehensive exemption from antitrust regulation. The
answers given may well determine the future path of state antitrust enforcement.
In the first of these cases, transfer of the Milwaukee Braves National
League franchise to Atlanta, combined with a refusal to franchise another
Milwaukee team, was challenged under the Wisconsin antitrust law.231 Dividing four to three, the Wisconsin supreme court in State v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc., 232 held state enforcement barred by the federal supremacy and commerce
clauses. Justice Fairchild began his opinion for the majority by examining
both United States Supreme Court decisions exempting baseball from federal
antitrust application, 23 3 and the concomitant history of congressional in3
action. 234 He explained:2 5
The state, may, ordinarily, protect the interests of its citizens by enforcing its antitrust act against persons doing business in interstate commerce, but then, ordinarily, the federal government has an antitrust
policy like that of the state. In the case of organized baseball, however,
there is no applicable federal antitrust law. The history of judicial
action and legislative inaction with respect to organized baseball at least
suggests a federal policy of approval of the existing structure, and the
question readily arises whether there is a conflict between state and federal policy, so that the state policy must yield.
Responding to the question thus posed, Justice Fairchild and "[s]ome members of this court" concluded that "the silence of Congress in this context implies ... a policy" of self-regulation and complete antitrust exemption, state
as well as federal, for professional baseball. 23 6 "Other members of the court,"
for whom Justice Fairchild also spoke, albeit with lesser exactitude, 237 were
said to "prefer the view" that baseball's league structure and interstate operations "require uniformity of regulation," which application of diverse state
238
laws and policy would defeat.
The dissenting justices took forceful issue with both majority contentions.
They felt total supremacy clause preemption unwarranted, believing that congressional silence should be interpreted narrowly to establish, if anything, only
231. The principal substantive prohibition of the Wisconsin antitrust act is reproduced
in note 28 supra.
232. 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966). Cf. Savarese, Developments in State Antitrust During the Past Year, 35 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 213, 220-22

(1967).
233. 31 Wis. 2d at 722-28, 1441 N.W.2d at 12-15. The cases are Federal Baseball Club v.
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (baseball held not to be "trade or commerce"), and
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam) (reaffirming Federal Baseball on principles of stare decisis).
234. 31 Wis. 2d at 717, 724-25, 729, 144 N.W.2d at 10, 14, 17.
235. Id. at 721, 144 N.W.2d at 12 (footnote omitted).
236. Id. at 730, 144 N.W.2d at 17.
237. The majority's alternative line of reasoning is more clearly articulated by the dissent.
Id. at 733, 144 NAV.2d at 17.
238. Id. at 730-31, 144 N.W.2d at 18.
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approval of federal antitrust exemption.23 9 In addition, while acknowledging
that state antitrust enforcement "imposes some restrictions upon baseball's
conduct in interstate commerce," the dissenters maintained that "the valid
interests of the state of Wisconsin, which are entitled to protection, outweigh
the restrictive effect on interstate commerce that might result from the enforcement of Wisconsin's laws. 240
The Wisconsin majority's dual supremacy and commerce clause rationale
prevailed in federal district court four years later in Flood v. Kuhn 241 As
earlier described, 242 Kurt Flood, a professional ballplayer, brought suit to
contest the validity of baseball's "reserve system" on a variety of grounds, including the asserted violation of federal and state antitrust laws. With regard
to state antitrust claims, Judge Cooper of the Southern District of New York,
held that the national policy against organized baseball's antitrust regulation
superseded state enforcement efforts.243 Citing Milwaukee Braves, he reasoned
that state antitrust enforcement "would appear to produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal antitrust laws interpreted by the
Supreme Court as excluding the business of baseball."244 He then added that
even if a federal policy against regulation was not manifest, "the nationwide
character of organized baseball combined with the necessary interdependence
of the teams requires that there be uniformity in any regulation of baseball
and its reserve system." 245 The application of "various and diverse state laws,"
he concluded, would "unduly burden interstate commerce." 24
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to apply either federal or state antitrust laws to organized baseball, but
adopted a different approach with respect to the state law issue.2 47 Disagreeing
with the analysis of both the Wisconsin supreme court and Judge Cooper, the
court of appeals held that the prior United States Supreme Court baseball
decisions "speak only to the applicability of federal antitrust policies: whether
state antitrust laws might apply was not directly decided. Thus, we are faced
with a question of first impression, and we must consider whether application
of state antitrust law to professional baseball is barred by a federal pre-emption of the field under the Commerce Clause." 248 The court stated that such
a determination must include a balancing of competing state and national
249
policies; however:

239. Id. at 733-36, 144 N.W.2d at 19-20.
240. Id. at 739-40, 144 N.W.2d at 22-23.
241. 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aJ'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S.
258 (1972).
242. The case is also discussed in text accompanying notes 114-117 supra.
243. 316 F. Supp. at 279. Judge Cooper had initially concluded that the same national
policy barred federal antitrust law enforgement. Id. at 276-78.
244. Id. at 279.
245. Id. at 279-80.
246. Id. at 280.
247. 443 F.2d at 266-68.
248. Id. at 267.
249. Id.

-

-
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[W]here the nature of an enterprise is such that differing state regulation, although not conflicting, requires the enterprise to comply with
the strictest standard of several states in order to continue an interstate
business extending over many states, the extraterritorial effect which the
application of a particular state law would exact constitutes, absent a
strong state interest, an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
The requisite strong interest, the court of appeals concluded, is not presented
by state antitrust regulation, especially when balanced against the perceived
2 50
detrimental impact of diverse state regulation on organized baseball..
In due course, the court of appeals' reaffirmation of baseball's comprehensive antitrust exemption reached the Supreme Court.2 5 1 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Blackmun, largely considered questions of federal antitrust
application.2 5 2 Disposition of the state antitrust issues was confined to a brief
concluding paragraph, here quoted in full: 263
The petitioner's argument as to the application of state antitrust laws
deserves a word. Judge Cooper rejected the state law claims because
state antitrust regulation would conflict with federal policy and because
"national uniformity [is required] in any regulation of baseball and its
reserve system." 316 F. Supp., at 280. The Court of Appeals, in affirming
stated, "[A]s the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the states'
interests in regulating baseball's reserve system, the Commerce Clause
precludes the application here of state antitrust law." 443 F.2d, at 268.
As applied to organized baseball, and in light of this Court's observations and holdings in Federal Baseball [Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922)], in Toolson [v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953)], in [United States v.] Shubert, [348 U.S. 222 (1955)] in [United
States v.] International Boxing [Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955)], and in
Radovich [v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957], and
despite baseball's allegedly inconsistent position taken in the past with
respect to the application of state law, these statements adequately dispose of the state law claims.
The precise ramifications of the Flood and Milwaukee Braves decisions for
future state enforcement remain difficult to assess. Yet such an assessment is
of first importance. Thus, a broad construction of the case law, one which
views professional baseball and other multistate enterprises that rely to varying
degrees on uniform national operations to be impermissibly burdened when
forced to conform to "the strictest state antitrust standard, 254 would effectively
insulate a major segment of American industry from state scrutiny. Con-

250. Id. at 268.
251. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
252. Id. at 269-84. Upon finding in Congress' "positive inaction" a "clearly evinced" purpose to confer immunity on that one professional sport, the Court sustained baseball's federal antitrust immunity. Id. at 283-84.
253. Id. at 284-85 (footnote omitted). In omitted footnote 21, the Court stated: "See
Brief for Respondent in Federal Baseball [citation omitted] and Brief for Respondent in
Toolson [citation omitted]. See also State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc. [citation omitted]."
254. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971).
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versely, a restrictive interpretation focusing upon the singular structure and
historic development of organized baseball would have a minimal impact on
state enforcement efforts in general. Although the final word has yet to be
written, it is fair to assume, for reasons now considered, that the baseball cases
will be subjected to the latter analysis.
At least conceptually, the baseball decisions rest on two distinct and
alternative grounds: (1) there is a clear and overriding federal policy against
all antitrust regulation of organized baseball; and (2) as a result of the requirement of national uniformity in baseball structure and operation, the potential for diverse state antitrust regulation constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The first proposition is premised on supremacy
clause principles, while the second derives from the commerce clause. The
distinction is more than semantic. To illustrate, although it was held in
Milwaukee Braves that federal "policy" preempts Wisconsin's regulation of
the asserted anticompetitive conduct of the Milwaukee Braves and the National
Baseball League, 255 the absence of a corresponding federal "policy" precluding
antitrust regulation of professional football256 would permit Wisconsin, consonant with supremacy clause notions, to regulate similar conduct on the part
of the Green Bay Packers and the National Football League. Nevertheless, the
comparable league structure of the two professional sports 25 7 would arguably
present similar burden-on-commerce concerns, requiring state antitrust preclusion in both instances.
The first ground, relied upon principally by certain majority justices in
Milwaukee Braves258 and by Judge Cooper in Flood,259 is deduced from the
unique juxtaposition of Supreme Court action26O and congressional "positive
inaction." 261 As such, baseball is manifestly the "aberration" and the "exception
and anomaly" it has been labeled.62 Indeed, subsequent to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Flood, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, emphasizing the "unique character" of the professional baseball exemption, refused to extend federal antitrust immunity to-organized amateur softball.263
Then, too, the Supreme Court has historically evinced a deep distrust of claims
for antitrust "self-regulation," 264 and has strictly construed even those antitrust

255. See note 236 supra.
256. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1957).
257. Cf. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa.
1953); Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 LAw & CoNEMP. PRoB. 85, 88-96 (1973).
258. See text accompanying note 236 supra.
259. See text accompanying note 246 supra.
260. See cases cited note 233 supra.
261. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
262. Id. at 282. Subsequent to its Flood decision, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that congressional inaction in the context of copyright regulation connotes preemption of state copyright authority. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 551-52, 560-70 (1973).
Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1884-89 (1974).
263. Amateur Softball Ass'n v. United States, 467 F.2d 312, 315 (10th Cir. 1972).
264. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 465

(1941).
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exemptions expressly conferred by Congress, "since they are restrictive of a free
economy."-265
If the reasons for rejecting baseball's implied exemption from federal antitrust regulation are clear, the reasons for rejecting an implied federal preemption of state enforcement are even stronger. As cogently observed by
George Sieker, former assistant attorney general of Wisconsin:-260
A basic if unwritten assumption of the antitrust philosophy is that
a diversity of effort and a diversity of power are good for the economy;
too much centralization of power and effort are feared. By this same
reasoning, no one unit and no one level of government should exercise
a monopoly over that body of law which controls the conditions of
competition; a spreading of the political power and responsibility for
the enforcement of these laws is a more effective means of achieving
their goals.
The Supreme Court has written in a similar vein.267 Notwithstanding such
declarations, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has stated in commentary accompanying the recently promulgated
26 8
Uniform State Antitrust Act:
If the conduct involved affects interstate commerce and is excluded
from the operation of the federal antitrust laws either expressly or by
implication, it would also be excluded from the operation of this Act.
See Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc....
This elevation of the narrow preemption-by-implication holding of Milwaukee
Braves to a doctrine of apparent unqualified application completely ignores
the historic and deeply rooted state interest in antitrust regulation. State and
national antitrust legislation have coexisted for decades without serious suggestion of conflict. At a time when many states are reasserting their coordinate
role in vigorous antitrust enforcement, it would be ironic indeed if a reform effort designed to further state regulation had the opposite result of eroding
established principles of state antitrust authority.
The alternative pillar of the baseball decisions, the burden-on-commerce
doctrine, is more sweeping and less readily answered than the courts' supremacy clause reasoning. If there is no congressional or judicial dictum applicable
to state regulation of baseball, as the court of appeals concluded in Flood,26
then the inherent nature of organized baseball's interstate operations becomes
decisive. In the absence of a declared national policy preempting state regula-

265. United States v. McKesson Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956).
266. Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement -Some Views and
Observations,39 TEXAs L. REv. 873, 884 (1961).
267. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 94 S. Ct. 383, 396
(1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).

268. (Emphasis added.) The Uniform State Antitrust Act is reported in 4 TRADE
REP.

REG.

T30,101 (Feb. 11, 1974). The commentary to the Uniform Act is presently unreported.

269. See 443 F.2d at 267.
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tion pursuant to the supremacy clause, the "familiar test" under the com270
merce clause:
[I]s that of uniformity versus locality: if a case falls within an area in
commerce thought to demand a uniform national rule, State action is
struck down. If the activity is one of predominantly local interst, State
action is sustained. More accurately, the question is whether the State
interest is outweighted by a national interest in the unhampered operation of interstate commerce.
State interest in baseball regulation is clear enough. Professional baseball
is today a multi-million dollar enterprise necessitating vast public expenditures
for land acquisition, stadia, and transportation facilities. It fosters local
tourism and spawns numerous satellite industries employing many hundreds.
The impact of restrictive or monopolistic trade practices on the state citizenry
and economy, such as those at issue in Milwaukee Braves, is both immediate
271
and pervasive.
Notwithstanding, neither the "certain other members" of the Milwaukee
Braves majority,27 2 nor eight of the eleven federal jurists who considered the
Flood case,27 3 felt the asserted state interest was compelling, much less controlling. The analysis of Judge Waterman for the court of appeals in Flood
274
is the most succinct:
On the one hand, it is apparent that each league extends over many
states, and that, if state regulation were permissible, the internal structure of the leagues would require compliance with the strictest state
antitrust standard. The consequent extra-territorial effect of necessary
compliance would be considerably more far-reaching than that in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.... On the other hand, we do not find that a
state's interest in antitrust regulation, when compared with its interest
in health and safety regulation, is of particular urgency.
The court's reliance upon Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona2 75 appears to be
misplaced. The Supreme Court there struck down the Arizona Train Limit
Law which for claimed reasons of safety, limited the number of passenger and

270. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
271. The majority in Milwaukee Braves noted: "mT1hat major league baseball, as now
carried on, is a business in which large sums are invested, and substantial gains received by
players and owners, and that many other business activities are generated by and dependent
upon it; [and] that defendants [the National League and its constituent baseball teams] have,
by agreement among themselves to transfer the Braves, terminated very substantial business
activity in Wisconsin, and are totally and effectively preventing its resumption at the present
time." 31 Wis. 2d at 718, 144 N.W.2d at 8.
272. See text accompanying note 236 supra.
273. The excluded federal jurists include Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, all of
whom dissented in Flood. 407 U.S. at 286-96. The dissenters made no reference to the state
antitrust issues presented.
274. 443 F.2d at 268 (footnote omitted).
275. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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freight cars a train could operate within the state. The Court found that the
law "materially impedes the movement of appellant's interstate trains through
the state and interposes a substantial obstruction to the national policy proclaimed by Congress, to promote adequate, economical and efficient railway
transportation service."276 Balanced against this, the Court determined that
the law "as a safety measure, affords at most slight and dubious advantage, if
any, over unregulated train lengths," 217 and that the state interest in railroad
2
regulation traditionally has been minor.

78

State economic regulation of organized baseball is in marked contrast.
There is no declared national policy supporting baseball's self-regulation,
simply congressional inaction.27 There is no reason to believe baseball will
collapse under the weight of antitrust regulation; other professional sports
have survived and flourished without baseball's antitrust umbrella.230 Then,
too, the burden on baseball's operations remains hypothetical; as Justice Fairchild remarked in Milwauhee Braves "[i]t is true that the suggested confusion
of state regulation does not appear presently to be a fact. ....
"281 Finally, the

276. Id. at 773. The national transportation policy is expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act, preamble preceding §I, Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49
U.S.C. preceding §§1, 30, 901, 1001 (1970).

277.

325 U.S. at 779.

278. Id. at 783.
279. The perceived preeminence of professional baseball appears to have substantially
influenced the judiciary. Thus, Judge Cooper remarked when denying a preliminary injunction in Flood: "Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that it would
not strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial notice that baseball is everybody's
business." 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Judge Moore, concurring in the court of
appeals decision in Flood, added: "Baseball for almost a century has been our country's
,national' sport. Every decade since the days of Abner Doubleday and A. G. Spalding has
developed outstanding players, heroes in the hearts and minds of millions of Americans heroes whose names are enshrined in a baseball 'Hall of Fame.'" 443 F.2d at 268-69. Justice
Blackmun dedicated part I of his Flood opinion to "The Game," commenting in part: "And
one recalls the appropriate reference to the 'World Serious,' attributed to Ring Lardner, Sr.;
Ernest L. Thayer's 'Casey at the Bat'; the ring of 'Tinkers to Evers to Chance'; and all the
other happenings, habits, and superstitions about and around baseball that made it the
,national pastime' or, depending upon the point of view, 'The great American tragedy."' 407
U.S. at 263-64 (footnotes omitted).
280. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1971); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n, 358
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351
F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
281. 31 Wis. 2d at 731, 144 N.W.2d at 18. Compare Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), where the Supreme Court upheld a municipal smoke ordinance enforced against a federally licensed vessel plying the Great Lakes. The Court stated:
"And while the appellant [vessel owner] argues that other local governments might impose
differing requirements as to air pollution, it has pointed to none. The record contains
nothing to suggest the existence of any such competing or conflicting local regulation. . ..
We conclude that no impermissible burden on commerce has been shown." Id. at 448.
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fundamental state interest in antitrust regulation of matters having -a local
28 2
impact, such as organized baseball, is manifest.
The burden faced by organized baseball in complying with variegated state
antitrust laws is by no means unique. In large part, the expansion of federal
commerce jurisdiction to include matters having any interstate effect, and
state jurisdiction to include matters having any intrastate effect, has subjected
American industry to multiple compliance obligations in a wide range of
areas involving safety, health, and economic regulation. 28 3 In a closely related
area of regulation, multistate firms for many years have functioned with
separate pricing and marketing systems to meet the divergent requirements of
fair trade and free trade states.2-8 4 Although baseball remains the only recent
and successful challenge to state antitrust regulation on burden-on-commerce
grounds, the very real problems of multiple compliance 5 may well encourage
further litigation. This will be particularly true as more states promulgate
new, and sometimes novel, antitrust laws.
The commerce clause quite properly serves as a check on intolerable and
economically wasteful burdens resulting from divergent state antitrust enforcement. The most troublesome element of the several baseball decisions is that
the specific injury to baseball operations was never demonstrated; the purported burden-on-commerce was assumed rather than assessed. Thus, instead
of the informed and impartial balancing of conflicting interests mandated in
numerous Supreme Court decisions, the interests of the states in effective local
antitrust regulation was given a cursory and hostile reading in Flood and
28 6
Milwaukee Braves.
It remains for the courts to reconcile state antitrust interests and commerce clause concerns in the wake of Flood and Milwaukee Braves. In what
appears to be the first such case, the Second District Court of Appeal in
California laconically noted in R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.: 28 7
The challenged activity relates solely to the use by Coors [a multistate beer producer and distributor] of territorial limitations within
California. We are not required to review the entire distribution scheme

282.

See N.Y. ArrrmusTr REP., supra note 8, at 63a. The Supreme Court recently com-

mented with respect to the federal antitrust laws: "Antitrust laws in general, and the
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Charta of free enterprise. They are as important
to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). Many of the state antitrust laws are patterned upon the
Sherman Act, see note 28 supra, and virtually all are construed in conformity with it, see
note 187 supra.
283. See cases cited note 118 supra.
284. The plight of the fictitious Zotto Company and its president in this context is
forcefully portrayed in Barnett, Problems of Compliance - Conflicts in State and Federal
Antitrust Enforcement, 29 A.B.A. ANTrrxusr L.J. 285 (1965). Cf. Stern, supra note 101, at 718.
285. See Dillon, supra note 23.
286. Compare the court's state interest analysis in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 94 S. Ct. 383, 395-96 (1973).
287. 37 Cal. App. 3d ., 112 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 n4 (2d Dist. .1974)..
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used by Coors. (See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.); afj'd, 407
U.S. 258). However, since California's regulation of Coors' distribution
scheme would clearly affect Coors' overall methods of distribution which
are in interstate commerce, interstate commerce is both involved and
affected.
The California antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act,28 8 was not challenged by
Coors on burden-on-commerce grounds. 289 Had such a contention been made,
however, it is implicit in the court's decision that the localized nature of the
activity and asserted injury overbalance any interest in uniform marketing
290
operations.
If, as elsewhere considered, 29 a certain amount of uniformity in state antitrust provisions is desirable, it is left to future courts to determine how much
is required. No indication is given in Flood or Miiwaukee Braves. Rather, the
baseball decisions simply rekindle constitutional doubts about state antitrust
regulation which last burned with a force more than half a century ago.
III. CURRENT DEFICIENCIES IN STATE ENFORCEMENT
The constitutional imperatives detailed above have operated, individually

and collectively, to shape and often to retard state antitrust regulatory efforts.
Yet in broad perspective, the several constitutional constraints have functioned
more as a framework for, rather than a categorical prohibition against, effective state enforcement. Indeed, notwithstanding these limitations, four
states - Texas,

2 92

New York,

2 93

Missouri,

2 94

and Wisconsin

2 95

- claim a history

of sustained and relatively successful enforcement. Constitutional barriers,
therefore, can be effectively surmounted given sufficient state commitment. Yet
until recently such state efforts have been demonstrably the exception; the
pronounced state antitrust apathy during most of this century is well documented..2 9 6 In fact, in a survey undertaken in 1956 by the Special Committee

288. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§16,700-58 (WVest 1964), as amended (West Cum. Supp.
1973).
,112 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
289. 37 Cal. App. 3d at
, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
290. Id. at
291. See text accompanying notes 499-515 infra.
292. See authorities cited note 64 supra.
293. See N.Y. ANTITRUST REP., supra note 8, at la-49a; Lefkowitz, New York State Antitrust Enforcement -Past, Present and Future, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 503 (1970); Moroney, supra
note 39.
294. See N.Y. ANTITRusT REP., supra note 8, at 99a-100a; Note, The Present Revival and
Future Course of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 575, 581 n.47 (1963).
295. See V. MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 424-26 (1950); Clemons, The Full Supply
Contract Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 208; Comment, The
Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1237; Comment, Anti-Trust Law in Wisconsin, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 657.
296. See V. MUND, supra note 295, at 426-27. Prof. Mund's 1949 survey of state attorneys
general produced such responses as:
"Legislature has refused to appropriate funds requested for enforcement of antitrust laws."
"No cases have ever been brought under the antitrust laws of this state."
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To Study the New York Antitrust Laws, only five of thirty-five respondent
states were able to report a single state antitrust suit brought within the preceding two decades. 297 In 1967, only eight states reported a "fairly active" enforcement program.298
The two most frequently acknowledged reasons for this state inactivity are
29
the chronic lack of legislative appropriations and attorney general interest.
Added to this are such factors as ineffective or nonexistent investigative procedures, 00° the lack of trained, full-time antitrust personnel,301 cumbersome
and often unworkable remedies and sanctions, 3°2 antiquated laws and pro-

"With great pleasure I have to report that state antitrust activities do not exist."
"Antitrust law enforcement is inactive."
"Our enforcement activity is lackadaisical."
"There have been no antitrust cases brought in the State of Tennessee within the past ten
years, and I would say that there exists no present sentiment favoring antitrust litigation."
Id.
See also Comment, The Illinois Anti-Trust Law Disinterred, 42 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1948);
Note, The Cartwright Act - California'sSleeping Beauty, 2 STAN. L. Rav. 200, 205-07 (1949).
297. See N.Y. ANTITRusr RaP., supra note 8, at 89a-116a. The five named are California,
Missouri, New Mexico, Texas, and Wisconsin.
298. See B. BuRRus, INVESTIGATION AND DIscovERY IN STATE ANTITRUsT 39-40 (1967). The
eight named are California, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Texas, Washington,
and Wisconsin.
299. Dean Rahl has commented in a leading article: "The most important suggestion
[for state reform] may be made at the outset very quickly. It is that for most of the states
which now have a law, however antique it may be, a resolution of the legislature directing
the Attorney General to enforce it and appropriating some money for that purpose would
mean more than a carload of new substantive provisions. For the basic deficiency now is not
lack of an ideal statute but lack of a decision as to whether the state really wants any antitrust law at all." Rahl, supra note 224, at 755.
With respect to funding and personnel constraints, it was reported in 1972: "[T]he states'
activities in the antitrust area generally are hampered by a lack of money or staff. According
to data submitted by the states to the [National Association of Attorneys General] antitrust
committee, for example, Virginia fights antitrust violations with two part-time employees and
a $1,500 budget. Missouri has an attorney who spends half his time fighting anticompetitive
practices with a $9,000 budget. Colorado spends $22,000; Maryland, $25,000; Connecticut,
$52,000. Some of the more populous states fare better: California has a $350,000 annual
budget, employing seven attorneys, six investigators, and two secretaries. New York's budget
approaches $250,000; Illinois spends $175,000 yearly; Pennsylvania allocates $150,000. Other
states have nothing." Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1972, §H at 1, 8, col. 1.
See also Note, supra note 294, at 587-88. Such problems are by no means unique to the
states. Identical difficulties beset early federal enforcement programs. See A. NEALE, THE
ANTrrusr LAWS OF TE U.S.A. 15-16 (2d ed. 1970); Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Early Administration, 68 YALE L.4. 464, 466-95 (1959).
300. The importance of investigative procedures to effective antitrust enforcement is
emphasized in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CommrrraEE To STUDY TiE ANTITRusT LAws,
REPoRT 343-44 (1955). In 1962 Congress increased the Antitrust Division's investigative
powers by passing the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1311-14, 18 U.S.C. §1505 (1970),
which followed closely the Report's recommendations. State investigative procedures have
not fared as well, as revealed in a comprehensive study published by the University of Michigan Law School Legislative Research Center. B. BuRius, supra note 298.
301. Rahl, supra note 224, at 764.
302. See N.Y. ANTRrmusr Rr., supra note 8, at 96a-97a; Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under
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cedures, 30 3 the apprehension in many state capitols that vigorous enforcement
will drive industry from the state,30 4 and the forceful opposition of businessmen and their attorneys to meaningful state reform. 30 5 None of these problems
are of recent origin, and most can be traced to the inception of state antitrust
06
legislation in the nineteenth century.3
The external pressure of federal antitrust enforcement has compounded
internal state difficulties. As federal commerce jurisdiction intruded ever
further into local enterprise,30 7 the bulk of governmental and private enforcement shifted to the federal level, and for good reason. While the states were
unwilling or unable to commit dwindling revenues to a concerted antitrust
effort, congressional appropriations for federal enforcement, though never
abundant, were nonetheless adequate to sustain an ongoing program.308 Then,
too, private litigants, who might otherwise have lobbied for strong state legislation, have in most circumstances both the option and inducement to proceed
under federal law.309 Federal antitrust precedent, almost exclusively the
product of United States Supreme Court decisions, 310 is far more comprehensive and sophisticated than the sporadic rulings available at the state level.311
The Clayton Act's prima facie evidence rule, 312 the modern Federal Rules of

State and FederalAntitrust Laws, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 1301 (1967).
303. While many state antitrust substantive provisions are noteworthy for their verbosity
and turgidity when contrasted with federal legislation, most are nonetheless serviceable. The
Special Bar Association Committee so concluded with respect to New York's Donnelly Act,
and recommended amendments aimed more at procedural reform. See note 336 infra.
304. See Comment, supra note 295, at 207.
305. See J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 95 n.358; Adkins, State Antitrust Enforcement and
Important New Amendments to the Illinois Antitrust Act, 58 ILL. B.J. 699, 717-19 (1970);
Rahl, supra note 224, at 766; Soma, Enforcement Under the Illinois Antitrust Act, LoYoLA
U.L.J. (Chicago) 25, 29 (1974).
206. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
307. See text accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
308. See generally Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAw &
ECON. 365, 367 (1970).

309. See note 193 supra. In some states federal suit is the only recourse available to
private antitrust litigants. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§542.01-.12 (1973), which contain no express
provisions authorizing private enforcement suits.
310. The development of such a body of precedent, at least in part, was the aim of
Congress when it passed the Expediting Act in 1903. 15 U.S.C. §29 (1970). See Tidewater
Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1972).
311. Indeed, in states such as Florida, which lack an antitrust tradition, the state judiciary
may be totally uninformed regarding antitrust doctrine and procedure. See Appendix C.
See also Note, supra note 29, at 353-55.
312. Clayton Act §5, 15 U.S.C. §16 (1970). Pursuant to §5(a), a civil or criminal judgment
or decree of violation in a government antitrust case becomes prima facie evidence against
the defendant in a subsequent private suit "as to all matters respecting which said judgment
or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto." Since 1960, the Antitrust
Division, in collusive bidding cases, has insisted upon a so-called "asphalt clause" in consent
decrees restraining defendants from denying their violation in a civil damage suit. The result
has been to generate significant federal litigation by state attorneys general involving such
practices at the state level. See Sicker, supra note 266, at 874.
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Civil Procedure, especially the class action311 and discovery provisions,31 4 and
avoidance of the previously discussed constitutional issues attending state law
enforcement, made federal litigation extremely attractive to private litigants.
As the gulf between state and federal enforcement progressively widened, the
state laws in most instances were quietly forgotten3 15 Federal superintendence,
if not constitutionally compelled in theory, nonetheless resulted in practice.
IV. THE IMPETUS TowARD STATE REFORM
Much of the modern regenesis in state antitrust activity may be traced to
the efforts of a cadre of state attorneys general. 31 6 The multifaceted and politically sensitive role of the attorney general as chief counsel, public pros-

ecutor, industry regulator, consumer advocate, and legal spokesman,317 has
placed that office at the confluence of several developments fostering resurgent
state antitrust regulation. One such factor was the advent of multistate federal
antitrust class action s " and bid-rigging suits,1 9 which introduced and largely

313. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Several major class actions brought in behalf of the states
and their political subdivisions have been recently maintained. See, e.g., In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., Standard Oil Co.
v. Alaska, 94 S. Ct. 1419 (1974); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,
481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C.),
aff'd sub nom., Illinois v. Bristol Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1972); West Virginia v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afj'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Cutler Drugs, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971); In re
Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510 (Judicial Panal on Multidistrict Litigation 1969); In re
Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 1969); In re
Library Editions of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139 (judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation 1969).
314. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
315. The possible exception has been state statutory provisions concerning convenants
not to compete, which have been the mainstay of private state antitrust litigation. See
Posner, supra note 308, at 409-11, table 33. See also the discussion of Florida cases in note 591
infra.
316. See, e.g., Howland (ass't attorney general of California), Enforcement of State Antitrust Laws from the Viewpoint of the State Department of Justice, 29 A.B.A. ANTrrRusr L.J.

258 (1965); Javits (former attorney general of New York), The Role of State Antitrust Laws,
1956 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N AtrrrRusr SYmposI um 56; Lefkowitz (attorney general of New York),
supra note 293; Mantzoros (ass't attorney general of New York), supra note 101; Mosk
(former attorney general of California), State Antitrust Enforcement and Coordination with

Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. ANTrrRUsT L.J. 358 (1962); Sieker (former ass't attorney general of Wisconsin), supra note 266; Wilson (former attorney general of Texas), The State
Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J. 160 (1961).
317. See generally NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, CoIMnr ER ON THE OFrICa OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL (1971); Adkins,
The Illinois Attorney General's Role in Consumer Protection-Illinois Antitrust Act, Consumer Fraud Act, and Other Available Remedies, 15 ANTrrausr BULL. 367 (1970); Comment,
The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate: City of New York v. Pennsylvania Public Util.
Comm'lfT,121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1170 (1973).
318. See note 313 supra.
319. See J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 179; Lefkowitz, New York State Antitrust Activity,
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educated a succession of attorneys general to the evils of anticompetitive conduct and the potentials of antitrust enforcement. A second major influence was
the re-emergence of antitrust populism and consumerism,320 fanned in part
3 21
by the broad public exposure given the Electrical Equipment Conspiracies
and Antibiotics cases 3 22 in the last decade. Added to this has been the un-

precedented intra-industry use of private antitrust enforcement, 323 which has
convinced at least some elements of the business community of the merit and
necessity of local antitrust provisions.
As early as 1956 Senator Jacob B. Javits, then attorney general of New
York, observed the increased incidence of antitrust related complaints reaching his office .3 He urged the New York Bar to undertake a study and evaluation of federal and New York antitrust measures to determine the efficacy of
existing state enforcement remedies. 325 The ensuing report, released the fol-

lowing year, contained some startling findings. 32 6 Principal among these was
the dual realization that many forms of local enterprise are beyond the constitutional grasp of federal regulation 3 -7 and that an even larger area of activity is beyond the practical and budgetary reach of federal government enforcement.23 The longstanding assumption that federal legislation and enforcement are adequate to meet local as well as national antitrust concerns was

1964 N.Y. STATE B. ASS'N SYsn'osiuu 27.
320. The reemergence of populist sentiment has been widely heralded. For a recent account, see Is John Sherman's Antitrust Obsolete?, BUSINESS WEEK, March 23, 1974, at 47.
321. In 1960, General Electric Company, Westinghouse Corporation, several other coinpanies, and certain of their executives pleaded guilty, or nolo contendere to indictments
charging themi with a vast price fixing conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., Crin. No. 20,399, E.D. Pa. (1960). In the largest of the more than 1700 treble damage
suits that followed the criminal cases, nearly $29 million was awarded. Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas., 171,123 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See generally
C. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS (1973);
"Administered Prices," Hearings on S. Res. 52 Before Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 27, at 507-17, 200 (1961); Smith,
Tie Incredible Electrical Conspiracy (pts. 1 & 2), FORTUNE, April 1961, at 132 and May 1961,
at 161.
322. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma., Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971), where prior to trial the defendants offered S100 million in settlement
of the claims.
323. See Holsendolph, New Challenges in Antitrust, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973, §C at 1,
col. 1.In a recent decision, the Telex Corporation was awarded nearly S260 million in damages from IBM Corporation. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, modified, 367
F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Okla. 1973), appeal docketed, Nos. 73-1874, -1878, -1961, -1962 (10th Cir.
1974).
324. Javits, supra note 316.
325. Id.

326. N.Y.

ANTITRUST REP.,

supra note 8.

327. Id. at 69a-89a. Officials of both the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission, responding to requests for information from the Special Committee, indicated many
cases involving local practices that were not pursued because of the absence of sufficient interstate commerce involvement.
328. Id. at 7-8.
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cogently disproved -a point federal officials continue to emphasize. 329 State
prosecutors were recently reminded of federal antitrust enforcement con330
straints by a Department of Justice spokesman:
Federal antitrust laws apply only to anticompetitive activity which involves or has a measurable effect upon interstate or foreign commerce.
While it is true that our jurisdiction has, for the most part, been
broadly interpreted, it is also true that many areas appear to be beyond
our reach or because of doubt are not likely to be the subject of federal
enforcement....
A second inadequacy in the protection afforded by federal enforcement is far more significant than the jurisdictional limitations. The
simple fact is that limitations on manpower and funds preclude federal
enforcement agencies from detecting and pursuing more than a fraction
of the local violations which exist.
The ongoing reform and modernization of state legislatures, given substantial thrust by the Supreme Court apportionment cases, 331 and the mount832
ing legislative receptivity to consumer and inflation oriented legislation,
increase the likelihood of meaningful antitrust reforms. This, in turn, has
encouraged serious efforts to draft and enact comprehensive and often innovative state antitrust statutes, or to revitalize existing provisions through
amendment.
V.

SURVEY OF RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

Nearly two decades have elapsed since the New York Legislature, responding to proposals of the Special Committee of the New York Bar,33 3 enacted important amendments to that state's Donnelly Act.3 34 The intervening years
have witnessed the promulgation of new or amendatory antitrust legislation
in approximately one-third of the states. In many instances, states have followed the New York practice of focusing upon reform of existing statutory
procedures, leaving intact language defining substantive offenses. 335 Influencing
this approach may be a desire to perpetuate a developed local antitrust
doctrine where such exists, 33 6 or to avoid the legislative and political un329. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
330. Developing a Local Enforcement Program, address by William M. Swope, Chief,
Atlanta Field Office, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, before Federal-State Conference on Antitrust, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1973.
331. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
332. In the somewhat related area of deceptive, unfair, and fraudulent trade practices,
Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon of the Federal Trade Commission recently reported that 13
states have adopted a comprehensive "Little FTC Act," and 31 more have adopted modem
legislation limited to deceptive trade practices. TRADE REG. REP., Weekly Rep. No. 115, at 9
(March 11, 1974). See also note 380 infra.
333. See text accompanying note 326 supra.
334. N.Y. G&N. Bus. LAw §§340-41, 345, 347 (McKinney 1968). See also N.Y. ANTrrRusr
REP., supra note 8, app. 11, at 117a-121a.
335. See note 5 supra.
336. For example, the Special Committee of the New York Bar recommended amend-
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certainties attending more broadscale reform.3 3 7 Then, too, in the many states
in which antitrust legislation was originally patterned upon federal enactments, sweeping revision has commonly been deemed unnecessary. 338 Indeed,
in recent years some states have apparently concluded that no modification of
their decades-old antitrust act is warranted and have sought to revitalize local
339
enforcement by simply increasing legislative appropriations.
The trend, however, appears to be away from such selective revisions and
34
toward the adoption of entirely new and comprehensive antitrust laws. 0

States pursuing this alternative course typically share a tradition of antitrust
inaction 3" 1 and an antediluvian 34 2 or even nonexistent 343 prior statutory framework. The promulgation of new legislation in such states may be designed as
much to symbolize a marked break with past antitrust desuetude as to codify
modern doctrine and procedure.
Not only do the recent antitrust reform measures instituted by the states
differ in degree, but they also differ fundamentally in content. Again, the
states basically have proceeded along alternative paths. One approach is
simply to recast the principal federal antitrust legislation as state law. Ha-

ment rather than complete revision of the Donnelly Act to preserve the developed and
familiar state precedent.
"The Committee finds New York law substantively adequate for the task at hand. However, in contrasting state and federal law one is struck by the verbosity, turgidity and complexity of the New York legislative language. Were we starting from scratch, in order to
avoid placing businessmen in the dilemma of having to comply with conflicting standards,
we might urge the use of identical wording in both state and federal statutes....
"But the Donnelly Act has been on the books now for close to sixty years and the substitution of Sherman law wording would produce more confusion than it would allay. Moreover, the state decisions seem to rest on the same fundamental concepts as does the federal
law, and the differences between state and federal jurisprudence are insubstantial. In the
few instances where state law seems to diverge from federal, the state decisions are often
generations old. Should the same issues arise again, they would presumably be decided in
the light of modern antitrust concepts which have been developed federally." N.Y. ANTITRUST
REP.,

supra note 8, at 8.

The Special Committee's thesis has been criticized. See Maroney, supra note 39, at 856-57.
337. Especially great may be special interest pressures for the total repeal of, or individual exemption from, state antitrust regulation. See, e.g., J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 95
n.358 (state bar association opposed antitrust law for Oregon as "an unnecessary burden and
expense to the state and its citizens, and detrimental to the economy of the state"); Soma,
supra note 305, at 29 (Illinois barber associations persuaded legislature to pass antitrust
exemption, but bill vetoed by Governor).
338. See, e.g., Aycock, supra note 189, at 254; Comment, Anti-Trust Law in Wisconsin,
1951 Wis. L. REV. 657, 680-84.
339. See note 299 supra.
340. See note 2 supra.
341. See, e.g., French, The Minnesota Antitrust Law, 60 MINN. L. REv. 59-60-68 (1965);
Soma, supra note 305, at 26-27; Comment, supra note 296, at 222.
342. See authorities cited note 341 supra.
343. Of the eight states that recently adopted new antitrust laws, Hawaii and New Jersey
were without antecedent antitrust legislation. In addition, the prior antitrust statutes of
Connecticut, Maryland, and Washington were limited in scope. Cf. Legislation, supra note 200,
at 347 n.4.
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waii 344 and Washington 345 in 1961, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
1964,s 6 have followed this course. All three use statutory language substantially identical to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,3 47 and sections 3, 5, 6,
and 7 of the Clayton Act. 348 The Hawaii 349 and Washington 350 acts also duplicate the operative provisions of the federal Antitrust Civil Process Act.35 1
More recently, the legislatures of New Jersey in 1970, Connecticut in 1971,
and Virginia in 1974 paralleled sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act in
promulgating their respective laws. 352 In addition, New Jersey incorporated
sections 4 through 7,353 and Connecticut sections 3 through 635 4 of the Clayton
Act.
States that have chosen to amend existing laws have most often duplicated
federal implementing procedures. For example, the four-year statute of limitations provision of section 4B of the Clayton Act has been adopted by amendment in California, 35 5 Nebraska,356 New Hampshire,357 and New York. s58 The
private treble damage remedy set forth in section 4 of the Clayton Act has
been emulated in California 359 and Wisconsin.360

344. HAwAII REV. STAT. §§480-1 et seq. (1968), as amended (Supp. 1972). See Kemper,
The Antitrust Laws and Land: An Answer to Hawaii's Housing Crisis?, 8 HAwAII B.J. 5,
10-12 (1971).
345. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§19.86.010 et seq. (1972). See Dewell & Gittinger, The
Washington Antitrust Laws, 36 WASH. L. REv. 239 (1961).
346. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§257 et seq. (Gum. Supp. 1978). Cf. von Kalinowski, supra
note 20, at 256.
347. HAWAH REV. STAT. §§480-4(a), -9 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§19.86.030, .040
(1972); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, §§258, 260 (Gum. Supp. 1973).
348. HAWAI REv. STAT. §§480-5, -7, -10, -22, -24 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§19.86.050,
.060, .070, .120, .130 (1972); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§261, 262, 268(c)-(d) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have also adopted §4 of the Clayton Act with respect to private
treble damages. HAWAI REv. STAT. §480-13 (1968); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 10, §268(a) (Gum.
Supp. 1973).
349. HAWAn REv. STAT. §480-18 (1968).
350. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §19.86.110 (1972).
351. 15 U.S.C. §§1311-14 (1970). In fact, the state enactment occurred at a time when
the federal legislation was still pending before Congress.
352. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§35-26, -27 (Cum. Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§56:9-3,
-4(a) (Gum. Supp. 1973-1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§59.1-9.5 to -9.6 (4 TRADE REG. REP. 135,102
(May 28, 1974)). Cf. Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 298 A.2d 682
(Ch. Div. 1972), where a state court engrafted the federal per se test onto the New Jersey
Antitrust Act.
353. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§56:9-4(b)-(d), 10, 12-15 (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974). Cf. Greene, The
New Jersey Antitrust Act, 15 N.J.B.J. 22 (1971).
354. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§35-29, -31, -34, -35, -36 (Gum. Supp. 1973). Cf. Brodigan,
The Connecticut Antitrust Act, 47 CONN. B.J. 1973).
355. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16750.1 (West Cum. Supp. (1973)).
356. NEB. REv. STAT. §19 (4 TRADE REG. REs'. 13,003 (April 22, 1974)); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §356:12 (Gum. Supp. 1974).
357. N.H. RE%,. STAT. ANN. §356:12 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The New Hampshire law,
amended in 1973, also contains a limited tolling provision. Id.
358. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §340(5) (McKinney 1968).
359. CL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16750(a) (West 1967).
860. Wis. STAT. ANN. §133.01(1) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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The alternative approach, the promulgation of modern acts designed to
fulfill individual state requirements, has been gaining adherents in recent
years. " ' Several of the more basic departures from traditional statutory formulations contained in such legislation involve delineation of substantive offenses; authorization of civil damage actions; provision for fines, penalties,
and imprisonment; enumeration of exemptions; and the promulgation of investigative and enforcement procedures.
A. Substantive Offenses
In 1963 the Legislative Research Center of the University of Michigan Law
School published what was to become a first tentative draft of the present
Uniform State Antitrust Act.362 Among the initial draft's several innovations
- and among the provisions that did not survive final editing - are sections 2,
3, and 4, which contain the draft's substantive prohibitions.36 3 These three
sections are essentially an attempt to synthesize and codify the evolved body
of federal statutory and decisional antitrust doctrine.3 6c Section 2 prohibits

361. The present state proclivity for variegated enactments has its parallel in the initial
period of state antitrust interest at the turn of the century. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
362. The first tentative draft is currently unavailable in published form. Portions of the
draft are discussed and quoted in Arnold g Ford, supra note 7. Cf. R. Savarese, supra note
11, at 2-18.
363. The final version of the Uniform State Antitrust Act, approved by both the National
Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws and The American Bar Association House
of Delegates, is reprinted in 4 TRADE REC. Rn',. 30,101 (Feb. 11, 1974). It is discussed in text
accompanying notes 516-552 infra.
364. "SECTION 2. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade or Commerce. A contract, combination,
or conspiracy between two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is
unlawful.
"SECTION 3. Establishment, Maintenance, or Use of Monopoly Power. (a) The establishment, maintenance, or use of monopoly power over any part of trade or commerce by any
person, for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices,
or an attempt to establish monopoly power over any part of trade or commerce by any person
is unlawful. (b) A combination or conspiracy between two or more persons to establish
monopoly power over any part of trade or commerce is unlawful.
"SECTION 4. Price Fixing; Production Control; Allocation of Markets; Collusive Bidding;
and Concerted Refusals to Deal. Without limiting section 2 of this Act, the following unreasonably restrain trade or commerce and are unlawful: (a) a contract, combination, or
conspiracy between two or more persons in competition; (1) for the purpose or with the
effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the market price, rate, or fee of any commodity
or service; (2) fixing, controlling, maintaining, limiting, or discontinuing the production,
manufacture, mining, sale, or supply of any commodity, or the sale or supply of any service,
for the purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the market price,
rate, or fee of the commodity or service; or (3) allocating or dividing customers or markets,
functional or geographical, for any commodity or service, (b) a contract, combination, or
conspiracy between two or more persons whereby, in the letting of any public contract, the
price quotation of any bid is fixed or controlled, one or more persons refrains from submission of a bid, or competition is in any other manner restrained, (c) a contract, combination,
or conspiracy between two or more persons refusing to deal with another person, except (I) a
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unreasonablerestraints of trade or commerce, thereby adopting the judicially
crafted "rule of reason" long applied in Sherman Act section 1 cases. 36 5 Section
4 of the initial draft classifies certain specified offenses, those customarily
deemed the most serious restraints on competition, as unreasonable per se.3 66
The generality and all-inclusiveness of section 2, combined with the specific
standards of antitrust legality for the more pervasive and hard core types of
violation contained in section 4, is designed to aid both antitrust administration and enforcement. 67 Hence, the clarity and certainty of section 4 facilitates
and encourages voluntary compliance and greatly simplifies the prosecution of
violators. Sufficient flexibility to avoid loopholes and to respond to changed
conditions is preserved through the general condemnations of section 2. Section
3 of the tentative draft perpetuates the objectives of clarity and certainty by
substituting the judicially developed "abuse" theory of monopoly power 368
for the amorphous "monopolization" language of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.3 69 There is, of course, the danger that judicial development and reform
of state antitrust doctrine in a manner similar to federal antitrust legislation
will be retarded by the particularization within state statutes of certain offenses. Because antitrust theory and economic conditions have changed sig-

refusal to deal by associations, trading boards, or exchanges predicated upon a failure to
comply with rules of membership, (2) exclusive dealing arrangements, or (3) exclusive territorial wholesale distributorships or retailer dealerships. Refusal to deal excepted under this
section may be unlawful under section 2."
365. R. Savarese, supra note 11, at 8-14. The authorship of the rule of reason is attributed to Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 65 (1911).
See

M. HANDLER,

ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY RoLEs OF RULE AND DIscRE-

3-28 (1957). Several state courts profess to construe their antitrust acts literally and
without application of a reasonableness standard, although the cases involved are quite dated.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Barnett v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 301 Mo. 445, 256 SAV. 175 (1923);
State v. Adams Lumber Co., 81 Neb. 392, 116 N.W. 302 (1908). See also note 199 supra.
366. The federal per se rule, the major exception engrafted to the rule of reason, is described in, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-12 (1972); Northern
TION

Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1958). See generally Report of the Special Subcomm. of the Sherman Act Comm.: The Per Se Rule, 38 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 781 (1969).

Augmenting the specificity of section 4 is section 1, which defines such terms as "contract,
combination, or conspiracy" and "trade or commerce."
367. The Supreme Court has so observed. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10, 610-12 (1972). Somewhat analogous to the tentative draft approach is
the adoption by Congress of the Clayton Act in 1914 to strengthen the Sherman Act's general
language through the specific enumeration of certain offenses. The background of the Clayton
Act is traced in Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
14, 21 (1964).
368. The origin of this theory is commonly attributed to United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Compare Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act:

Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949) ("structural" approach), with Johnston &
Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. REv. 269
(1949) ("abuse" approach).
369. See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, 1955-1968, 24-38
(1968).
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nificantly with time, and undoubtedly will continue to do so, interpretative
flexibility is an important legislative consideration. The first tentative draft
appears to have addressed this concern with section 2, and in its confinement
of statutory particularization to the most widely accepted judicial doctrines.
Then, too, if there is to be fundamental reformulation of longstanding antitrust concepts, it is far from clear that legislative abdication to the judiciary is
the preferred course.
Furthermore, by simplifying and thereby encouraging prosecution of per se
offenses, the draft act would assure that state enforcement resources are focused
on local restraints of trade, thus avoiding many of the commerce and supremacy clause obstacles earlier considered. Professor John Flynn has ac370
curately observed in this regard:
In light of pervasive federal enforcement, anemic state regulation, possible jurisdictional difficulties in enforcing state substantive antitrust
laws, and the problems involved where one state attempts to fashion a
remedy for a multistate restraint of trade, the tailoring of a proper,
utilitarian, and realistic state antitrust program ought to be directed
toward those cases where the interstate commerce involved is least extensive. In practice, this seems to be what the most active states are attempting to do. A study of recent cases involving local restraints of
trade has shown that the vast majority involve the equivalent of the
"per se" offenses under the Sherman Act.
This should not be considered unusual, since restraints of trade requiring an extended rule of reason inquiry, by definition, normally
cover greater geographic areas and economic volume. .

.

. In either [a

monopolization or merger] type of case, the character of the type of
restraint, its proof, and the implementation of an adequate remedy
normally involve interstate commerce and federal antitrust regulation.
On the other hand the "per se" category of offenses may be discovered
without an extended investigation, without proof from multistate marketing areas, and may often be remedied without reference to practices
outside the state.
The basic approach of the initial draft Uniform State Antitrust Act to the
problem of defining substantive offenses has found support in several states.
Today, Connecticut, 371 Illinois,

3 72

Maryland, 373 and Minnesota 74 have antitrust

acts reflecting to varying degrees the influence of the initial draft's substantive
offense concepts.
Further illustrations of the doctrinal change being effected in recent state
enactments include the expanded scope given section 3 of the Clayton Act,
which addresses exclusive dealing arrangements. 37 5 Among the states that have
paralleled the prohibitions of section 3, several have extended its coverage to
370. J.
371.

372.

FLYNN,

supra note 1, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-28 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §60-3 (1971).

373. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 83, §38 (Supp. 1973).
374. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§325.8013-.8015 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
375. On the scope and application of section 3 of the Clayton Act, see I TRADE REG.
11 2820-3040 (1971).
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include services as well as commodities and the conduct of purchasers as well
37
and
as sellers.37 6 In addition, the antitrust statutes of Hawaii, 377 Washington,
379
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico incorporate the pervasive condemnation
of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act against all "[u]nfair
methods of competition."3 80 Hawaii remains the only state to have adopted a
much expanded version of sections 8 and 10 of the Clayton Act governing
interlocking directorates. 381
B. Civil DamageActions
The utility of civil damage actions to augment government antitrust enforcement has long been recognized by both state legislatures3 8 2 and Congress. 38 3 Currently, section 4 of the Clayton Act perpetuates the federal tradition of "private attorneys general"38 4 by affording mandatory treble damages
and "reasonable" attorneys fees to "any person who shall be injured in his
38 5
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
Private litigants, including the states,38 6 who claim direct injury to their business or property resulting from an antitrust violation have been seeking federal treble damage redress in rapidly increasing numbers.38 7 The only proprietary plaintiff excepted from treble damage recovery is the federal govern-

376. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-29 (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 88,
§60-3(4) (1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §19.86.050 (Supp. 1972).
877. HAWAII REv. STAT. §480-2 (1968). See Kemper, Hawaii's Section Five of the FTC
Act: The UbiquitousAntitrust Law, 6 HAwAII B.J. 5 (1969).
378. WASH. RFv. CODE ANN. §19.86.020 (Supp. 1972).
379. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §259(a) (Cum.Supp. 1978).
880. 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1970). See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 289-44
(1972). Eleven other states have enacted separate "Little FTC Acts" containing the same
provision. 5 TRADE RE. REP. 50,190 (Nov. 12, 1978). The states listed are: Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See also Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TuL.
L. REv. 724 (1972).
881. HAwAI REv. STAT. §480-8 (1968). The historic concentration of economic interests
in the hands of a few Hawaiian families and businesses probably accounts for state adoption
of this provision. Cf. Kemper, supra note 844.
382. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. More than half of the states having
antitrust acts expressly provide for civil damage suits. See Flynn, supra note 807, at 1843-46.
All of the states that have recently enacted statutes provide for civil damages.
883. Section 7 of the original Sherman Act, Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §7, 26 Stat. 210,
provided for private damage suits and the mandatory trebling of damages. Section 7 was
superseded by §4 of the Clayton Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 321, §4, 88 Stat. 731, and
ultimately repealed, Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, §7, 69 Stat. 288.
384. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
385. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970). Under the so-called "dean hands" doctrine, the private "attorney general" need not himself be above antitrust reproach to maintain suit. See, e.g.,
Kiefer-Stewart 9- Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
386. See text accompanying note 318.
387. See A.B.A., supranote 369, at 274 n.1.
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ment, which the Supreme Court has determined not to be a "person" for
section 4 purposes.s3 8 In 1955, Congress added section 4A to the Clayton Act
to permit the United States, suing in its proprietary capacity, to recover
"actual damages by it sustained and the cost of suit." 3s19
Many state statutes authorize the recovery of treble damages, and two
states, California390 and Wisconsin,391 have amended their existing damage
sections to provide recovery of threefold the actual damages sustained as a
result of an antitrust violation. California expressly includes the state within
the treble damage provision. 392 The new antitrust acts of Connecticut, 393 Maryland, 3 94 Minnesota, 3 95 and New Jersey39 also expressly define "persons" for

whom the award of mandatory treble damages and reasonable attorneys fees
is authorized to include the state and its various subdivisions, in addition to
private litigants.
Permitting the state to recovery treble damages and attorneys fees accords
more with the realities of federalism than with policy. The principal rationale
for allowing such relief - to encourage private enforcement actions that, for
financial reasons, might not otherwise be maintained 397 - is inappropriate
where it is the state attorney general backed by a full-time staff and the state
treasury bringing suit.3 9 However, because the states, when litigating in their
proprietary capacity, are deemed "persons" under section 4 of the Clayton Act
for treble damage purposes, 399 the absence of comparable relief at the state
level would simply transfer an important and precedent generating class of
cases to the federal courts, a phenomenon with which many states are already
4 00

well experienced.

Notwithstanding such considerations of federalism, both Hawaii and Washington limit the state and its subdivisions and agencies to the recovery of
actual damages sustained as a result of a statutory violation, essentially dup388. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). By contrast, the inclusion of
states and their political subdivisions within the meaning of section 4 "persons" has long
been recognized. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161-63 (1942); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
389. 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (1970).
390. CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE §16,750 (West 1964), as amended (West Cum.Supp. 1973).
391. Wis. STAT. ANN. §133.01 (1957), as amended (Cur. Supp. 1973).
392. CAL. Bus. & PROF. COD §16,750 (WVest 1964), as amended (West Cum. Supp. 1973).
The Wisconsin provision does not distinguish between state and private damage suits. Wis.
STAT. ANN. §133.01 (1957), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1973).
393. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-35 (Cum.Supp. 1973).

394. MD.ANN. CODE art. 83, §41(2) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
395. MINN. STAT. ANN. §325.8019 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
396. N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-12 (Cur. Supp. 1973-1974).
397. The alternative rationale for treble damages - deterrence - is vitiated by tax deductibility of a damage award, and the ease by which damages may be passed on to consumers and
others.
398. Where it is the state that is maintaining suit, treble damages simply add to the fines
or penalties otherwise available as punitive relief. See state statutes cited motes 434-441 infra.
399. See note 388 supra.
400. See text accompanying notes 309-315 supra.
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licating the federal Clayton Act pattern at the state level.401 Nebraska recently revised its antitrust act to provide for actual damages for injured
litigants, public and private, in place of the mandatory treble damages previously accorded. 40 2 Nonetheless, the limitation of recoverable damages to
those actually sustained remains the decided exception in modern enactments.
Hawaii has also provided, in damage actions by private litigants, that the
amount recoverable shall be 1,000 dollars or threefold the damages sustained
"whichever sum is the greater," in addition to reasonable attorneys fees and
costs. 403 By thus setting a floor on recoverable civil damages, Hawaii affords
the most liberal financial inducement to date for private state antitrust en4 04
forcement.
In terms of over-all deviation from prevailing civil damage norms, the
statutes of Virginia, Washington, and Illinois are by far the most significant.
Virginia and Washington apparently adopted the 1955 recommendation of the
Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws which
"favor[ed] vesting in the trial judge discretion to impose double or treble
damages." 405 Accordingly, the statutes of those states authorize the award of
actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees to persons aggrieved by a statutory violation as the normal form of recovery. 40 In addition, in all Virginia
cases and in all cases but one in Washington, the trial court may in its discretion increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times
the actual damages sustained. 07 The exception in Washington is a suit based
on a violation of section 19.86.020, which declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods
of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 40s In such cases the
discretionary increase in damages may not exceed 1,000 dollars. 40 9
The Illinois Antitrust Act goes further. As earlier described,410 Illinois has

401. HAWAII REv. STAT. §48-14 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
The Washington Consumer Protection Act distinguishes between "counties, municipalities,
and all political subdivisions of this state" and "the state of Washington" itself. The former
are included within the general damage provision; the latter is restricted by separate provision to actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees. Id.
402. NEB. REv. STAT. §16 (4 TRADE REG. REP. f133,003 (April 24, 1974)). The Nebraska
revision continues the authorization of treble damages for civil suits brought by the attorney
general "in the name of the state against anyone violating either state or federal antitrust
laws." Id. §5.
403. HAWAII REv. STAT. §480-13 (1968), as amended (Supp. 1972).
404. The impact of such a provision in class action suits involving numerous consumers
each of whom has sustained minor economic injury has yet to be assessed.
405. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. To STUDY THE ANTrrusr LAWs, REPORT 379 (1955). See
also D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 145-47 (1959).
406. See note 401 supra.
407. VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-9.12(b) (4 TRADE REG. REP. f35,102 (May 20, 1974)); WASH. Rv.
CODE ANN. §19.86.090 (Supp. 1972). The respective sections do not specify any factors or
standards the court shall consider in deciding whether to exercise its discretion or in computing what additional damages are appropriate.
408. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.86.020 (Supp. 1972). The section duplicates §5(a)(1) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. See note 380 supra and accompanying text.
409. WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
410. See text accompanying note 372 supra.
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followed the concept of the initial draft Uniform State Antitrust Act by both
broadly condemning unreasonable trade restraints and certain forms of
monopoly power and specifically enumerating hard core practices that constitute per se violations. Building upon the premise that by thus focusing attention on the most pernicious and persuasive antitrust offenses local enforcement efforts will be optimally utilized, section 7(2) of the Illinois Act authorizes mandatory treble damages and reasonable attorneys fees in all civil
damage actions, both private and governmental, resulting from one of the
hard core violations. 411 The remaining substantive violations permit the
award of only actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees unless it can be
shown that such violations are "willful," in which case the trial court has the
discretion to increase the award to a maximum of threefold the actual dam412
ages sustained.
The official commentary does not explain Illinois' unique damage structure.' 1 3 If intended to channel private enforcement toward the most pernicious
antitrust violations, as appears to be the case, the Illinois Act draws several
difficult distinctions. For example, the mandatory treble damage offenses are
set forth in subsections 3(1) and 3(4) of the Act.414 Subsection 3(1) is limited
to contracts, combinations, or conspiracies between or among actual or potential competitors to fix or control prices, to limit the supply of commodities
or services, or to divide markets or customers. Yet vertical price fixing agreements - those not between actual or potential competitors - have long been
condemned as hard core violations.415 In fact, a vertical price fix may be more
blatant than a horizontal one involving the purported consciously parallel
behavior of competitors.4 1 6 Notwithstanding, treble damages are mandatory
for any horizontal price fix and only problematic for one vertically imposed.
Subsection 3(4) of the Illinois Act prohibits certain exclusive arrangements,
such as tie-ins and requirements contracts, whose effect "may be to substan-

411. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
412. Id.
413. Chicago Bar Ass'n, Committee on Antitrust Law, Commentary on the 1967 Illinois
Antitrust Act, following ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
414. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-3(1), (4) (Smith-Hurd 1970), as amended (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1973-1974).
415. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911). Certain vertical price fixing arrangements are sheltered by state fair trade legislation.
See note 202 supra. However, in the large area remaining, distinctions between vertical and
horizontal practices have been eroded. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967).
416. For the difficulties of proof inherent in conscious parallelism cases see Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), where it was said
that evidence of a common and conscious course of action among competitors does not, in
the absence of other proof, conclusively establish or even compel an inference of an unlawful
combination or conspiracy. Id. at 541. Cf. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. Rnv. 1562, 1565-77 (1969). To be sure, proof of the existence of
a vertical agreement is not always free from doubt. See, e.g., Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate
Doctrine Dead?, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 772 (1968).
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tially [sic] lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." 41 7 When the subsection was added to the Illinois Antitrust Act in
1969, it was placed within the classification of offenses for which automatic
treble damage recovery is provided. Why such cases, which may require complex market analysis,418 and which may only "tend to create a monopoly," 41 9
warrant mandatory treble damages and not the actual exercise of monopoly
power "for the purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or
42
4 20
maintaining prices" is mystifying. 1
Uncertain, too, has been the impact of section 7(2) on private damage
litigation in Illinois. A recent article concludes that private antitrust enforcement has not been the success originally anticipated. 422 However, the full effects of the Illinois civil damage experiment remain conjectural.
Related to the state civil damage trend has been the provision in modem
acts for the award of reasonable attorneys fees to private litigants who successfully petition for injunctive relief. 42 3 Because attorneys fees constitute an
appreciable impediment to private enforcement, especially where actual damages are minor or are only threatened, such relief may be the only effective
means of making injunctive suits independently viable.
C. Fines, Penalties,and Imprisonment
424
Of the forty-two states currently possessing a general antitrust statute,
all but seven provide for the imposition of jail sentences 425 and only one,
Georgia, presently is without a provision authorizing fines, civil forfeitures, or
penalties. The historic diversity of existing sanctions defies useful classification.426 This is not true, however, with respect to the most recent state antitrust
enactments, which generally deemphasize utilization of prison sentences and
civil forfeitures in favor of dramatically increased statutory fines or penalties.

417.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §60-3(4) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1973-1974).

418. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 330-35 (1961).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §60-3(4) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1973-1974).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-3(3) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
421. Indeed, some members responsible for ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. To STUDY THE
ANTrrRusT LAWs, REPORT (1955) urged exactly the opposite result. Id. at 379.
419.
420.

422. Soma, supra note 305, at 39. The Illinois attorney general's frequent acceptance of
consent decrees in state cases, thereby depriving private litigants of the prima facie benefit
of a final judgment, is primarily blamed for the absence of significant private antitrust
litigation. Id.
423. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-34 (Cum. Supp. 1973); HAwAII REv. STAT. §48013(a)(2) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd
1970), as amended (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973-1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §41(2) (Cum. Supp.
1973); NJ. STAT. ANN. §56:9-10(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974) (limited to permanent injunctions);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §19:86.090 (Supp. 1972). Cf. Flynn, A Study of Injunctive Relief
Under Federaland State Antitrust Laws, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 344.
424. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
425. The seven states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Mississippi, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Washington.
426. See Legislation, supra note 22, at 352.
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Among the states that have promulgated new laws, Arizona, Connecticut,
Virginia, and Washington make no provision for imprisonment. Hawaii has
a one-year maximum jail term, 427 while the maximum sentence in Illinois and
Maryland for a "willful" violation is six months. 428- In New Jersey, a "knowing" violation constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by up to three years imprisonment. 429 Only Minnesota makes a "willful" violation a felony subject to
30
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a maximum of five years.4
There is support for the proposition that the imposition of jail terms on
"white collar" antitrust offenders, particularly of the severity of the Minnesota
law, is counter productive because it discourages competitor complaints, contravenes ingrained community mores and conceptions of justice, and is infrequently, and consequently unevenly, administered.431 Others maintain imprisonment is both morally warranted and an effective deterrent for the more
egregious and invidious violations.432

It is likely that incarceration of antitrust offenders, where authorized, will
continue to be invoked with great circumspection by state enforcement officials. Yet its presence on the statute rolls, and its periodic invocation in hard
core cases, may well serve to deter executives who view statutory fines or
penalties, and the risk of private suits, of minor consequence in comparison
with the enormous profits to be reaped by a successful and prolonged trade
restraint.433 And the concurrence of moderate and realistic criminal sentences

427. HAWAn REV. STAT. §480-16(a) (1968).
428. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-6 (Smith-Hurd 1970), as amended (Smith-Hurd Cum.
Supp. 1973-1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §40 (Cum. Supp. 1973).

429. N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974).
430. MINN. STAT. ANN. §325.8018(2) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
431. See, e.g., N.Y. ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 8, app. 1,at 96a-97a; Breit & Elzinga,
Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693,
695 (1973); Soma, supra note 305, at 25, 43. See generally D. DEWEY, supra note 405, at
148-49; Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 423 (1963).

432. See, e.g. Address by Thomas E. Kauper, Ass't Att'y General, Antitrust Div., Dep't
of Justice, before the Practising Law Institute, Washington, D.C., Dec. 7, 1973, at 3-7. In his
address, the Assistant Attorney General quoted the statement of Judge Cassibry prior to
sentencing three price fixing defendants to pay substantial fines, and to serve 30 days in
jail and one year of probation, in United States v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., Crim. No. 73-48-E
(E.D. La., Oct. 31, 1973): "It is true that you have not taken the money of any one person
but your price fixing activities have cost the people of this community hundreds of thousands
of dollars.
"These dollars went to enhance the profits of your companies, and thus, indirectly, your
compensation and your status. You did not do this because you were hungry or cold or in
need. You did this out of motives of selfishness and avarice. You had the benefits of the
finest education and material advantages our society can grant. You acted in full awareness of
the illegality of your conduct, knowingly and willfully and deliberately, not in a moment of
passion, but as a calculated course over a period of years.
"This nation now - as it has been many times in the past - is engaged in testing the
validity of the fundamental premise on which our Constitution rests: no man is so small as
to be beneath the law nor so great as to be above it." See also Flynn, supra note 302, at
1329-35; Rahl, supra note 224, at 780.
433. The jail sentences imposed in the Electrical Equipment Conspiracy Cases, cited in
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and mounting public outrage over trade schemes that augment inflation and
economic hardship renders the future imposition of such sanctions much more
probable.
The desire for meaningful deterrence has also prompted some states to
raise statutory fines or penalties. 434 The Maryland Antitrust Act, one of the
most recent modern statutes, authorizes the largest remedies. Without distinguishing between individuals and business entities, the Act subjects anyone
convicted of a per se violation 43s to a "fine" of up to 500,000 dollars. 43 6 In
Connecticut violation by an individual is punishable by a maximum 25,000
dollar "civil penalty"; any other person is subject to a maximum 250,000 dollars. 437 The New Jersey Antitrust Act punishes a "knowing" statutory violation with a maximum "fine" of 50,000 dollars for individuals and 100,000 dollars for corporations. 438 New Jersey, in addition, provides for civil forfeiture.
Hence, any person found to have violated its act is further subject to "a
penalty of not more than the greater of $100,000 or $500 per day for each
and every day" of violation. 439 The new Virginia law, perhaps indicating the
legislature's desire to avoid the problems of multiple federal and state prosecutions considered previously, 44 0 authorizes a "civil penalty of not more than one
hundred thousand dollars for each willful or flagrant violation," with the exception that "[n]o civil penalty shall be imposed in connection with any viola' 441
tion for which any fine or penalty is imposed pursuant to federal law.
Further, of the six recent state antitrust laws that contain provisions
modeled upon the Clayton Act, those of Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington
follow the federal pattern of authorizing only injunctive and damage relief for
a violation. Three other states, Connecticut, Illinois, and New Jersey, include
such violations within the scope of their criminal sanctions.

note 321 supra, for example, produced a noticeable response from the corporate community.
See Wright, Jail Sentences in Antitrust Cases, 37 F.R.D. 183, 186 (1965). By contrast, the

deterrent impact of fines and penalties is reduced by two main forces. First, the federal experience graphically demonstrates that rarely, if at all, is the maximum penalty imposed. See
Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a Policy, 48

GEo. LJ. 530, 532 (1960); Note, Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime -A
Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 287 (1961). Of equal importance, "Many
states grant corporations the power to indemnify corporate officers or give corporate officers
the right to receive indemnification for engaging in litigation which benefits the corporation."
Flynn, supra note 302, at 1335. The corporation is normally able to pass such expenditures
on to the consumer.
434. Similar efforts are being undertaken at the federal level. Senator Tunney has introduced a bill entitled the "Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act" that would, inter alia,
increase the present $50,000 maximum penalty for a violation of sections 1-3 of the Sherman
Act to $I00,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations. S.782, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). Prior to 1955, the maximum penalty authorized was $5,000.
435. See note 394 supra and accompanying text.
436.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §40 (Cum. Supp. 1973).

437. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-38 (Cum.Supp. 1973).
438. N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-11(a) (Cum.Supp. 1973-1974).
439. Id. §56:9-10(c). Section 56:9-16 renders all statutory remedies cumulative.
440. See text accompanying notes 205-224 supra.
441. VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-9.11 (4TPAPE REG.REP. 335,102 (May 28, 1974)).
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D. Statutory Exemptions
Modern state antitrust enactments, adhering to established doctrines, customarily exempt from state prosecution those enterprises and practices that
have secured comparable immunity from federal antitrust enforcement. Principal among these are labor and professional organizations, agricultural and
horticultural cooperative associations, and certain industries regulated by fed44 2
eral or state administrative agencies, or both.
The antitrust law of Washington is exceptional in the restrictiveness of its
exemption section.4 43 In several states, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey for
example, express antitrust exemption has been bestowed upon a dozen or more
enumerated enterprises and practices. 4 4 4 Less specific, and potentially more
sweeping, are the exemptive provisions in Connecticut and Virginia. 4"
The new Arizona Antitrust Act departs somewhat from these existing patterns. The Act itself exempts specified practices of labor, agricultural, and
horticultural organizations.4 G Legislation exempting various regulated industries, however, was not added to the antitrust statute, but rather to the
44
pertinent regulatory laws. 7
It is to be anticipated that special interest pressures to expand state exemptions will increase in step with the renewal of state enforcement efforts.
E. Civil Investigative Procedures
The importance of fair and effective pre-complaint civil investigative
48
process in antitrust enforcement is widely acknowledged:4
The inevitable generality of most statutory antitrust prohibitions
renders facts of paramount importance. Accordingly, effective enforcement requires full and comprehensive investigation before formal proceedings, civil or criminal, are commenced. Incomplete investigation
may mean proceedings not justified by more careful search and study.
Public retreat by the prosecutor may then be difficult, if not impossible,
and the result may be a public trial exhausting the resources of the
litigants and increasing court congestion. Thus the adequacy of investigatory processes can make or break any enforcement program.
442. A number of federal antitrust exemptions are considered in A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Laws, Comm. on Antitrust Exemptions, Antitrust Exemptions, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
1 (1967).
443. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.86.070 (Supp. 1972).
444. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §39 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-5 (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974).
445. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-31 (Cum. Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-9.4 (4 TRADE
REG. REP. 35,102 (May 28, 1974)).
446. AIZ. REv. STAT. §44-1414 (4 TRADE REG. REP. 930,402 (May 6, 1974)).
447. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. §§30-356.01 (power districts), 30-552.01 (electrical districts), 40-285.01 (public service corporations) (4 TRADE REG. REP. 130,402, at 35,405-06 (May
6, 1974)).

448.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAIIONAL COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT

343-44

(1955).
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While all states have established discovery or factfinding procedures that
operate subsequent to the filing of a civil complaint or criminal indictment,
only half the states parallel the prosecutor's pre-indictment criminal investigative powers with some form of pre-complaint civil investigatory mechanism. 449
In the absence of pre-complaint process, state enforcement officials are confined to three equally unsatisfactory alternatives in civil antitrust investigations: the voluntary cooperation of suspects and witnesses, the filing of a civil
complaint for the purpose of utilizing discovery procedures, and resort to
grand jury processes.
It was to avoid such difficulties in federal civil investigations that the Antitrust Civil Process Act was passed in 1962.450 The Act authorizes issuance of a
pre-complaint "civil investigative demand" that may require the disclosure and
production of all "documentary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation," which is believed to be in the possession, custody, or control of "any
[corporate] person under investigation." 451' The demand must meet enumerated
specificity, compliance, and custodial requirements, and conform to the priv452
ilege and reasonableness standards of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
In practice, these directives have operated to impose a substantial burden on
government attorneys to demonstrate in court the necessity of the information
453
sought before compliance can be compelled.
Anticipating the federal Act, Hawaii and Washington included substantially similar pre-complaint investigative powers in their respective antitrust
statutes in 1961. 4 54 The Maryland Antitrust Act, promulgated in 1972, provides for similar investigative procedures. 45 5 The Hawaii, Washington, and
Maryland statutes, however, do not require that the person to whom the demand is directed be a corporation and the subject of investigation, and Hawaii additionally authorizes its attorney general to secure sworn testimony or
456
other information from any "complainant.
Other states have gone even further in expanding the scope of pre-complaint investigative procedures. Texas, for example, amended its statute in

449. A comprehensive survey of state investigative procedures in this context is provided
in B. BuRaus, supra note 298. The survey was completed under the auspices of the Legislative
Research Center of the University of Michigan Law School.
450. 15 U.S.C. §§1311-14 (1970); 18 U.S.C. §1505 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1090, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1-9 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1886, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-4 (1962); ATrroEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMm. To STUDY THE ANTrrRusT LAws, REPORT 844-49 (1955).
451. 15 U.S.C. §1812 (1970).
452. Id.
458. House Judiciary Comm. Chairman, Peter Rodino introduced H.R. 18,992, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), to extend the scope of the present law. The bill, prepared by the Dep't of
Justice, provides that individuals may also be required to give information, including oral
testimony. It further permits use of the civil investigative demand to investigate incipient
violations without the extended showing of need now required.
454. HAWAII REv. STAT. §480-18(b) (1948); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. §19:86.110 (Supp.
1972). Cf. Comment, Recent Antitrust Developments: Civil Investigative Demand -Needed
Weapon or Undue Power for ProsecutingAgencies?, 87 WASH. L. Rav. 278 (1962).
455. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88, §44 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

456,

HAWAII REv. STAT.

§480-18(a) (1968).
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1967 to authorize the compulsory examination of any person the attorney
general "believes ... knows of a violation," provided a court order is first obtained. 457 Compulsory testimony and other information "relevant" to a potential or suspected violation may be obtained from a person without prior
46 1
46 0
4 9
4 8
and New Jersey.
court order in Connecticut, 5 Illinois, 5 Minnesota,
Such expansive pre-complaint civil investigative powers are by no means
new to state antitrust law. Kansas, New York, and North Carolina are among
the states that have long authorized comparable procedures. 46 2 To insure
against overstepping constitutional bounds, many of the state laws include
provisions conferring varying degrees of immunity from criminal prosecution
on individuals whose compliance with a civil antitrust investigation must be
compelled.

43

F. Parens Patriae and State Prosecution
The present era of state antitrust legislation has also been marked by efforts to define and structure the enforcement authority of state prosecutors.
As in the federal system, where antitrust prosecution is distributed, in part,
between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in Washington
4 64
and the United States Attorneys in each of the 94 federal judicial districts
a majority of the states divide antitrust responsibilities between the state attorney general and local district or county attorneys. 46 5 In practice, however,
the normally low visibility of antitrust crimes and the normally high burden
of antitrust litigation in terms of personnel and funding, the greater suscepti457. TEX. CODE Bus. & Com. ANN. §15.14 (1968).
458. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§35-42 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
459. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-7.2 (Smith-Hurd 1970). The Illinois provisions were
added in 1969 after much contention between members of the bar and the state attorney
general's office. See Atkins, State Antitrust Enforcement and Important Amendments to the
Illinois Antitrust Act, 58 ILL. B.J. 699, 719-22 (1970).
460. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 32,605.01 (April 22, 1974). The new Minnesota provision amends
and substantially strengthens the pre-complaint investigative powers accorded the attorney
general in the original antitrust act. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §325.8021 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
461. N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-9 (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974).
462. KAN. STAT. ANN. §50-153 (1964); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §343 (McKinney 1968); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §75-10 (1965).
463. In the federal context, the Supreme Court has recently concluded that a limited
immunity barring use of any testimony or other information that has been compelled in any
criminal case is constitutionally sufficient. Kastegar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
464. See, e.g., Sherman Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §4 (1970); Clayton Act §15, 15 U.S.C. §25 (1970).
Cf. H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 370.
465. In a map appended to Bicks, An Appropriate Role Under Our Federal System for
a State Antitrust Enforcement Program, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 515 (1960), ten states were
listed as vesting exclusive enforcement authority in the attorney general, while twenty-four
were listed as allocating such responsibility jointly between the attorney general and local
prosecutors. Only five jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, conferred
exclusive authority in local prosecutors. Two of these jurisdictions have since enacted comprehensive antitrust laws according exclusive enforcement responsibility to the attorney general. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-32 (Cum. Supp. 1973); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, §272
(Cum. Supp. 1973).
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bility of local prosecutors to business community pressures, and the absence of
trained antitrust legal and investigative staffs at the local level have combined
over time to center virtually all national and state enforcement respectively
in the national and state capitols.
In most instances the advent and numerical growth of antitrust personnel
in the offices of the state attorneys general results from administrative action.
Few state statutes expressly provide for the separate funding of antitrust enforcement; 60 fewer still have followed the lead of Wisconsin, Puerto Rico,
and most recently, Nebraska, in the statutory creation of a distinct antitrust
467
enforcement arm within the office of the attorney general.
The number of antitrust personnel presently employed by state attorneys
general reflects for the most part the increased participation of the state at468
torneys general in individual and class action federal antitrust damage suits.
Indeed, several states, some of whom have gone without local antitrust enforcement for a half-century, are today amending their antitrust laws to
for
authorize the attorney general to maintain federal treble damage suits
9
proprietary injury to the state, its agencies, and political subdivisions.46
A more recent and potentially more significant development is the mounting interest in parens patriae actions in which a state, through its attorney
general, may sue to recover damages for injuries sustained either by its 4in70
dividual citizens or its general economy as a result of an antitrust violation.
Such suits have thus far received scant support in the courts when premised
47 1
the Supreme
on federal antitrust claims. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
Court construed narrowly both the standing requirements of section 4 of the
4 3
Clayton Act 472 and its prior decision in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. 7 in

466. Among the states that have such provisions, Arizona has created a revolving fund
to finance future antitrust litigation from past recoveries. See 4 TRADE REG. REP. 1130,410
(May 18, 1970). New Jersey appropriated an initial $100,000 to meet the first year expenses
under its new antitrust law. N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-10 (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974). An appropriation measure accompanying the recently amended Nebraska antitrust law contained a similar
allocation. TRADE R G. REP. Weekly Rep. No. 121, at 5 (April 24, 1974).
467. Wis. STAT. ANN. §165.065 (Cum. Supp. 1973); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, §272 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. §84-211, as amended (4 TRADE REG. REP. 133.006.01 (April 22,
1974)).
468. See text accompanying note 313 supra.
469. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16,750(c) (West 1964), as amended (West Cum.
Supp. 1973); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, §10 (1973); NEB. REv. STAT. §84-211 (1971); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW §342-b (Cum. Supp. 1974); Tax. CODE Bus. & Com. ANN. §15.40 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
470. See generally Malina & Blechmen, Patens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under
the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. Rav. 193 (1970). As discussed here, the parens patriae
remedy is distinguished from a FED. R. Cwv. P. 23(b)(3) class suit brought in the state's own
proprietary behalf and as representative of all private purchasers and consumers within the
state. Such class suits have been allowed. See Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (per curiam); cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972). See also
Lefkowitz, The Attorney General's Office: The Year Past and the Year Ahead, 1971 N.Y. ST.
B. ASS'N, ANTrRUST LAw SYMPOSIuM 27, 29-33.
471. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
472. See note 388 supra.
473. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). In Georgia, the only other case in which the Supreme Court
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rejecting the concept of recovery for injuries sustained by the general economy
of a state as a result of a federal antitrust violation. Fearing that such actions
would create the possibility of duplicative damage awards, the Court stated
that "if injury [to the state's economy] is to be compensable under the antitrust laws, we should insist upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose
to make it so, and no such expression is to be found in section 4 of the Clayton
Act. ' '4 7 4 Accordingly, the State of Hawaii, acting in its sovereign capacity, was
held without standing to sue as parens patriae to recover threefold damages
for injuries to its economy said to be the direct result of defendants' restrictive
47 5
and monopolistic trade practices.
A similar result was subsequently reached by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in California v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 476 upon its determination that
the state's common law capacity of parens patriae did not give it authority to
bring suit under the Clayton Act for injuries directly sustained by its citizens
as a result of an alleged price fix by snack food manufacturers. The court of
appeals was careful, nonetheless, to leave open the possibility of procedural
47
modifications that would validate the parens patriae remedy: 7
The state most persuasively argues that it is essential that this sort of
proceeding be made available if antitrust violations of the sort here alleged are to be rendered unprofitable and deterred. It would indeed appear that the state is on the track of a suitable answer (perhaps the
most suitable yet proposed) to problems bearing on antitrust deterrence
and the class action as a means of consumer protection. We disclaim any
intent to discourage the state in this search for a solution. However, if
the state is to be empowered to act in the fashion here sought we feel
that authority must come not through judicial improvisation but by
legislation and rule making, where careful consideration can be given
to the conditions and procedures that will suffice to meet the many
problems posed by one's assertion of power to deal with another's property and to commit him to actions taken in his behalf.
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., has introduced an antitrust parens patriae bill that responds to the Supreme Court's
request for clarification in Hawaii and meets several of the Frito-Lay objechas considered the validity of the parens patriae remedy in an antitrust context, the Court
upheld the state's authority to obtain injunctive relief against the railroads' asserted price
fixing, without addressing directly the state's treble damage claims. The Court, nonetheless,
commented: "Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a wrong which, if
proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards her development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among her sister states. These are
matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected." Id. at 451.
474. 405 U.S. at 264.
475. Id. at 262-64.
476. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See also Illinois v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 1972 TRADE CAS. 174,256 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The question of
parens patriae recovery in behalf of citizens was not before the Supreme Court in the
Hawaii case.
477. 474 F.2d at 777.
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tives. 478 The bill would add sections 4C, 4D, and 4E to the Clayton Act,
authorizing a state attorney general to recover damages and secure other re4 79
lief:
(1) as parens patriae of the citizens of that State, with respect to
damages personally sustained by such citizens, or, alternatively, if the
court finds in its discretion that the interests of justice so require, as a
representative member of the class consisting of the citizens of that
State, who have been personally damaged; or
(2) as parens patriae, with respect to damages to the general economy of that State or any political subdivision thereof.
The bill establishes procedures for the ascertainment and distribution of
damages4 ° and permits the Attorney General of the United States, in enumerated instances, to assume the parens patriae capacity and responsibility of
his state counterpart in behalf of the state's citizens or economy. 481 The bill
contains no requirement of notice to the involved state citizens of actions instituted in their behalf, nor does it specify procedures for their participation
in, or exclusion from, a patens patriae suit brought in their behalf. Furthermore, no limitation is placed on the dollar amount of the individual claims
that may be involved.42 The bill's principal response to individual citizen in48
terests is a provision requiring recovery distributions.
[E]ither (A) in accordance with State law, or, (B) in the absence of any
applicable State law, as the district court may in its discretion direct,
subject to the requirement that any distribution procedure adopted
afford each citizen of the State a reasonable opportunity to secure a
pro rata portion of the fund attributable to his respective claims for
damages, less litigation and administrative costs, before any of such fund
is escheated or used for general welfare purposes.
The absence of any provision for notice to persons whose interests are in
issue presents few procedural due process concerns when the parens patriae
mechanism is used to fulfill its historic role of redressing the rights of otherwise helpless "infants, idiots and lunatics." 484 The much hybridized remedy
contemplated in the Rodino bill, which appears aimed at providing a timely

478. H.R. 12,528, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
479. Id. §4C(a). Unlike section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizing treble damage recovery,
only actual damages are recoverable pursuant to the Rodino bill.
480. Id. §4C(b).
481. Id. §§4D-E.
482. In California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973), the state maintained that the typically small injury sustained by -each citizen
rendered individual antitrust suits impractical, thus placing the citizen in the category of
"infants, idiots and lunatics," who are the historic subjects of parens patriae concern. It is
conceivable, however, that at least some individuals will be swept under the state's parens
patriae umbrella who have substantial claims that they may desire to litigate independently.
483. H.R. 12,528, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §4C(b)(2) (1974).
484. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 470, at 197-99.
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substitute for the Rule 23(b)(3)4 15 mass-claimant class action suits recently
restricted in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,4 6 is another matter. Both the existing federal antitrust class action and the proposed parens patriae suit involve
representative litigation in which monetary damages are sought in behalf of
injured persons who, at least legally, are competent independently to maintain the action. 4 87 In the class action context the Supreme Court declared in
Eisen:4518

[I]ndividual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary
consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23. As the Advisory Committee's Note
explained, the Rule was intended to insure that the judgment, whether
favorable or not, would bind all class members who did not request
exclusion from the suit. Accordingly, each class member who can be
identified through reasonable effort must be notified that he may request exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his opportunity
to press his claim separately or that he may remain in the class and
perhaps participate in the management of the action.
Certainly there is no language in the present parens patriae bill comparable
to the Rule 23(c)(2) requirement of notice to all identifiable individuals;
therefore, Eisen may be thought distinguishable. The Supreme Court's construction of the notice requirements expressed in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. 4 9 and Schroeder v. City of New York4 90 suggests, nonetheless, that individual notice is a constitutional imperative in all circumstances
in which individuals will be bound by a court determination491 - which appears true in the parens patriaebi1192 - and can be identified through reasonable effort. Thus, the procedural due process questions left unanswered in the
proposed federal parens patriae legislation constitute a major weakness in the
much needed mass-claimant antitrust recovery mechanism. Such questions,
493
however, do not appear to be insurmountable.

485. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
486. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
487. See note 482 supra.
488. 94 S. Ct. at 2152 (citations omitted).
489. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
490. 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962).
491. 94 S. Ct. at 2151. Both Mullane and Schroeder were decided prior to the revision of
Rule 23 in 1966 to require individual notice to identifiable class members in FFD. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) class suits. Neither case, moreover, was a class action proceeding. The Supreme
Court appears to be adopting a more relaxed -,iew of due process notice requirements in
creditor actions. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
492. The Rodino bill is silent regarding this point. Failure to give collateral estoppel
effect to parens patriae judgments with respect to represented injured individuals, however,
would permit multiple and potentially inconsistent judgments offensive to procedural due
process notions of justice and fair play.
493. Because of the substantial financial resources, legal personnel, investigative procedures, and computerized address files commonly available to the state attorney general, an
amendment to the Rodino patens patriae bill requiring individual notice to identifiable
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If ultimately enacted, the parens patriae bill will further centralize enforcement interest and authority in the office of the state attorney general and
afford an important nucleus around which other antitrust activity may be
developed. The bill may tend to continue federal statutory dominance in
antitrust litigation, but there is nothing to prevent - and indeed much to encourage- the promulgation of parens patriae procedures by individual state
legislatures.
Indeed, in recent weeks two states have done just that. The first state to
adopt a parens patriae provision, Nebraska, has substantially tracked the provisions of the Rodino bill relating to citizen claims by permitting its attorney
general to institute suit "against anyone found violating either state or federal
antitrust laws... as parens patriae of the citizens of this state with respect to
damages personally sustained by such citizens . . . . "494 The law further pro495
vides:
[The attorney general] shall distribute, allocate, or otherwise pay
out of the funds so recovered to each citizen of the state a pro rata
portion of the fund attributable to his respective claims for damages,
less litigation and administrative costs, and any balance remaining after
the payment of such individual claims and the costs of litigation and
other administrative costs shall be placed in a fund to be distributed to
the common schools of this state.

citizens would not operate to hinder state maintained parens patriae suits in the same manner
as private class actions. Moreover, the attorney general as state prosecutor could maintain a
civil or criminal action, or both, prior to instituting the parens patriae suit to establish the
existence and extent of any antitrust violation. Because modern state antitrust acts give such
civil or criminal judgments presumptive weight in subsequent suits involving the same facts,
the uncertainty and risk attending the expenditure of state funds for notice in the later
parens patriae proceeding would be largely eliminated. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §441419 (4TRADE REG. RIEP. I30,402 (May 6, 1974)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §85-36 (Cum.Supp.
1973); VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-9.13 (4 TRADE RG. REp. 1135,102 (May 28, 1974)). Of course,
where the involved individuals are many and the damages are minor the expense of mailed
notice may alone exhaust the potential damage recovery, rendering suit impractical.
Omitted here is an extended analysis of the fluid recovery mechanism for multi-claimant
damage distribution, which was adopted by the district court in Eisen, 52 F.R.D. 253, 265
(1971), and is the central element of section 4(C)(b) of the Rodino bill. The validity of the
fluid recovery concept, which addresses damage distribution in terms of the class as a whole
rather than in terms of each individual member's claim, was not assessed by the Supreme
Court in Eisen. In the sub judice court of appeals decision of Judge Medina, fluid recovery
was rejected inter alia on constitutional grounds: "Even if amended Rule 23 could be read
so as to permit any such fantastic [fluid recovery] procedure, the courts would have to reject
it as an unconstitutional violation of due process of law." 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
Judge Medina cited no authority in support of his dictum and it has been the subject of
criticism. See, e.g., Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin -Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and
Notice in Class Actions, 54 B.U.L. REv. 111, 116-25 (1974); Note, Managing the Large Class
Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REv. 426, 446-54 (1973).
Section 542.24(4) of the Draft Florida Antitrust Act set forth in Appendix A attempts to
address the due process issues attending state invocation of the parenspatriaeremedy.
494. NEB. REv. STAT. §5 (4 TRADE REo. REP. 13,003 (April 22, 1974)).
495. Id.
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The Nebraska provision, like its federal counterpart, contains no requirement
of notice to affected citizens. Clearly impermissible, moreover, is Nebraska's
attempt to create federal antitrust standing through unilateral state enactment.
The Nebraska act does not permit parens patriae claims for injury to the general economy of the state.
The Virginia Antitrust Act does authorize the attorney general to sue in
496
his parens pairiae capacity for damages sustained by that state's economy:
The Attorney General may bring a civil action to recover damages
and secure other relief as provided by this chapter as parens patriae
respecting injury to the general economy of the Commonwealth.
No provision is made in the Virginia law, however, for parens patriae suits
on behalf of citizens injured as a result of a violation of the antitrust act.
The federal and state statutory focus of antitrust resources and responsibility in the office of the state attorney general has the advantage of promoting
the development of a concerted and rational statewide policy of enforcement.
It also facilitates closer enforcement coordination among federal and state
antitrust officials. Such coordination and cooperation becomes more significant
as state programs proliferate and, as concluded in Flood v. Kuhn, 497 possibly
collide. For this reason, perhaps one of the most basic provisions in modern
enactments is one directing the state attorney general to cooperate fully with
federal antitrust authorities.49s
VI. THE

UNIFORMITY ISSUE

The multifarious provisions disclosed by a selective survey of recent state
antitrust enactments parallel to some degree the legislative pattern that
emerged in the decades bracketing the turn of this century. 499 Common to
each period has been the implementation of generally accepted antitrust objectives through independently promulgated, and consequently varied, statutory formulations. The true diversity of the initial reform period, however, is
more apparent than real in the modern era.
A principal force shaping the congruence of current legislation is the vast
federal experience that has developed in the intervening decades. It has both
fostered the refinement of state antitrust policy and produced a basic consistency among recent state statutory provisions. Thus, state substantive prohibitions now almost exclusively emulate the language and evolved precedent
of the Sherman Act.500 The limited departures from this practice commonly

496.

VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-9.15(d) (4

TRADE REG. REP.

135,102

(May 28, 1974)).

497. 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971). See text accompanying note 274 supra.
498. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §35-42(g) (4 TRADE REG. REP. 1f30,901.19, (Nov. 12,
1973)); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-6(3) (Smith-Hurd 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §47 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); cf. Sieker, supra note 36, at 204-09.
499. The earlier era of antitrust reform is discussed in text accompanying notes 20-35
supra.

500. See discussion of recent state enactments in text accompanying notes 362-381 supra.
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involve inclusion of one or more sections patterned upon the Clayton Act. A
similar consistency has been achieved with respect to antitrust procedure.
Furthermore, remaining statutory variances are largely effaced by judicial and
practitioner reliance upon established federal antitrust jurisprudence.501
Contemporary state antitrust law, accordingly, has achieved a fair degree
of conformity both among recently active states and with national legislation
and policy. Present experience indicates, moreover, that those remaining states
that have substantially deviant and currently unenforced antitrust statutes will
enact comprehensive modem laws derived from the federal model prior to
commencement of an active enforcement program.
Reform progress thus far achieved has come without the benefits - or the
constraints - of a promulgated uniform state act. With such legislation now
available, it is time to investigate the benefits and corresponding deficiences of
statutory uniformity.
Principal among the benefits envisioned by proponents of a uniform state
antitrust act 502 are the development of a common and readily interpreted body
of state statutory precedent, the removal of burdens of compliance faced by
multistate corporations, and the availability of a modern and comprehensive
statute that will hasten state reform.
A. Interpretation
It is true that the existence of universal statutory language will foster the
multistate growth of judicial precedent and ease interpretative difficulties.
In states currently lacking active antitrust enforcement, the construction and
application of novel antitrust regulations may impose a substantial problem.
In Florida, a state that has never experienced active public enforcement, 503 a
recent questionnaire distributed to state trial and appellate judges discloses
that eighty-four per cent of the respondents have had no judicial experience in

501. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
502. The use of the term "proponent" should be explained. While many have advocated,
and even drafted, uniform legislation, implicit in much of the writing is the assumption that
the statute ultimately proposed would comport with the proponent's individual predilictions
as to content. Whether a uniform act substantially different from the writer's preconceived
version would secure his support is unclear. Richard H. Stem, presently Chief of the Patent
Section of the Antitrust Division, was one of the first to advocate state antitrust uniformity
and to draft a uniform act. Stern, supra note 101. His draft act, which has not been adopted
by any state, follows the substantive prohibitions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
(restraints of trade and monopolization) and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act (exclusive
dealing and mergers). In a companion article, Dean Rahl suggested several substantive provisions for state consideration in which he expressly rejects inclusion of provisions derived
from the Clayton Act. Rahl, supra note 224, at 772-75. See also J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at
79, 92-96 (favoring a uniform act and a merger provision); Saverese, supra note 11, at 61-79
(favoring a uniform act without monopolization, merger, and exclusive dealing provisions);
Arnold & Ford, supra note 7, at 109 (favoring a uniform act with a merger provision); Hanson &.von Kalinowski, supra note 189, at 33 (favoring a uniform act without a merger provision).
503. See text accompanying notes 598-607 infra.
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antitrust matters. 50 4 It may be assumed that a majority of the state bar is

equally inexperienced. 05 In such circumstances, the existence of a comprehensive interpretative gloss generated by those states that have previously
adopted identical legislation will doubtless be an important aid to legislative
enactment and subsequent enforcement. 506
It would appear, however, that many of the same advantages may be derived from independent state legislation modeled upon federal law and expressly incorporating federal precedent. Indeed, the proposed Uniform State
Antitrust Act and the recently adopted state antitrust acts attempt to conform
to federal law and principles, and in all likelihood each will continue to rely
predominantly on the highly developed federal case law.50 7 As later discussed,508
the substantive prohibitions of the Uniform Act contain several features that
are not found in comparable federal statutes and that may serve to engender
interpretative confusion. Most of the modern state acts, while not verbatim
copies of federal law, nonetheless adhere closely to established federal interpretation and doctrine. On balance, therefore, the interpretative advantages
of uniform legislation over existing independent state enactments appear insubstantial.
There is one clear benefit to be obtained from uniform legislation. Difficult problems concerning the appropriate state law to be applied may arise,
particularly in private damage suits involving multistate parties and fact
situations. 0 9 Such choice-of-law issues are significantly lessened when selection
is among identical statutes.
B. Compliance
The elimination of multistate burdens of compliance presented by the
existing diversity of state laws has been a longstanding focus of uniform act
proponents. In a Prefatory Note to the Uniform State Antitrust Act, the
drafters reiterate this concern:51 0

504. See Appendix C.
505. Id.
506. There are, to be sure, countervailing considerations. New York, for example, has
decided to amend its existing antitrust act rather than to promulgate a new law derived
from federal legislation on the theory that the transition from longstanding state practice
and precedent would produce more confusion than would retention of the old law. See note
336 supra.
507. Several modern antitrust laws expressly incorporate federal law interpretation where
applicable. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §60-11 (Smith-Hurd 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §36
(Cum. Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:9-18 (Cum. Supp. 1973-1974); WASH. REV. CODE AN-,.
§19.86.920 (Supp. 1972).
508. See text accompanying notes 531-552 infra.
509. See Stern, supra note 11, at 718.
510. Uniform State Antitrust Act "Prefatory Note" at 2 (unpublished, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Feb. 12, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Prefatory
Note].
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If state antitrust legislation is to form an integral part of our overall
antitrust policy, the burden of compliance with the antitrust laws of the
several states must be abated by the adoption of a uniform state antitrust act. Existing state antitrust legislation is similar in many respects,
but hardly can be called uniform. This lack of uniformity coupled with
the many drafting defects and substantive inadequacies found in some
of the state legislation motivated the formulation of this proposed
Uniform State Antitrust Act to mitigate the burdens of compliance....
Given this uniform Act paralleling substantive federal antitrust, compliance with federal law will be tantamount to compliance with all
antitrust law.
The Note's reference to "substantive" uniformity is presumably an acknowledgment that the procedural and enforcement aspects of antitrust legislation
do not directly influence compliance decisions. Therefore, uniformity in such
matters as the allocation of enforcement responsibility between the attorney
general and local prosecutors, investigative procedures, the availability of
multiple damages, and the prima face evidence doctrine, although desirable,
is not vital. It is of legitimate compliance concern that the legality of specified
conduct be clearly and uniformly established, not that investigation, prosecution, and relief be identically prescribed. The latter affect compliance primarily
when the risks of conviction are balanced against the profitability of continuing known unlawful conduct, a difficulty of which states need not be overly
solicitous.
Diverse state substantive prohibitions do present a major burden for
multistate compliance. The recent opinions in Flood v. Kuhn"11 and State v.
Milwaukee Braves, Inc. 512 establish that at least in certain industries such
compliance difficulties constitute an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. The effect of such decisions is to insulate particular industries from
all state antitrust regulation. Moreover, because the courts in these two cases
concluded that problems of compliance extended to all state antitrust statutes,
not merely those currently enforced,513 it appears that unless all forty-two states
now possessing antitrust laws of general application bring their laws into substantial conformity, the potential burdens on commerce will continue. Without the direction and momentum provided by a uniform antitrust act, achievement of the requisite congruence within a reasonable period is remote.
C. State Reform
Whether the proposed Uniform State Antitrust Act will achieve the wide
acceptance it requires is uncertain at this early date. Nevertheless, its important effect of directing attention to the deficiencies and turgidity of existing
legislation in many still dormant states cannot be doubted. Apart from the ex-

511.

316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S.

258 (1972).
512.

31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).

513. See text accompanying note 281 supra.
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hortations of certain state attorneys generaP 14 and federal officials 515 state antitrust reform has lacked a common focus and sense of purpose during this era
of renewed activity. The prestige and access to legislative councils commanded
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, sponsor of the proposed Act, may well serve to regenerate the common state antitrust concern that once existed and hasten the removal of the most serious
state statutory derelicts from the mainstream of modern antitrust regulation.
On balance, then, much will be gained through state statutory uniformity,
particularly with respect to antitrust substantive prohibitions. This assumes,
of course, that the uniform act promulgated is an effective enforcement tool.
Concerning this, there likely will be substantial debate.
VII. THE UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT: AN ASSESSMENT

At a time when federal antitrust laws and policy are the subject of major
reevaluation and reform5 16 it would be extraordinary if the new and sometimes novel provisions of the Uniform State Antitrust Act-11 were to be received without controversy or opposition. Yet the Uniform Act has apparently
progressed far toward avoidance of such difficulties. The very designation
"Uniform Act" connotes this, for the authors of the Act, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, believe such terminology:5 18
[S]hould have special significance and should normally be limited to
acts which have a reasonable possibility of ultimate enactment in a substantial number of jurisdictions. The designation should normally not
be applied to any act which Commissioners from a substantial number
of states oppose as unsuitable or impracticable for enactment in their
states.
Adding further impetus to the adoption of the Uniform Act by a significant
number of states is the unqualified endorsement the Act recently received from
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. 519
Perhaps as a consequence of National Conference efforts to promulgate an

514. See note 316 supra.

515. See note 10 supra.
516. See, e.-., S. 1196, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (bill to establish Antitrust Review and
Revision Commission to study and reform antitrust laws); S. 1167, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)
(Industrial Reorganization Act); S. 782, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act); H.R. 13,992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (bill to amend Antitrust Civil
Process Act); H.R. 12,528, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (bill to amend Clayton Act to permit
parens patriaedamage suits).
517. The Uniform State Antitrust Act is reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. 130,101 (Feb.

11, 1974).
518. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 385
(1972). An act that does not have a reasonable possibility of adoption in a substantial number
of states or that a significant number of Commissioners oppose, is designated a "Model Act."
Id.
519. 4 TRADE REG. REP. f130,101 (Feb. 11, 1974).
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antitrust law of broad acceptability, one that represents the middle ground of
state antitrust philosophy, the proposed Uniform Act contains several inexplicable and unprecedented provisions and omissions. These novel formulations are made all the more striking by the fact that the avowed intention of
the National Conference drafters is to track federal antitrust legislation as
much as possible in order to encourage utilization of federal precedent and to
make "compliance with federal law . . . tantamount to compliance with all
antitrust law."5 20 Indeed, in attempting to draft legislation satisfactory to all
states, including those with minimal antitrust interest, the National Conference has promulgated a statute that may find complete favor with none.
Cracks in the uniformity wall, in fact, have begun to surface. Arizona,
which became the first state to adopt the Uniform Act on April 24, 1974, did
so only after modification of several key provisions.5 21 Of wider consequence,
the National Association of Attorneys General, a vital force in the movement
to enact new state antitrust laws, has been sharply critical of preceding drafts
of the Uniform Act. A recurring complaint of the Association is the failure of
the proposed act to conform to the substantive language of federal statutes.
The most salient provisions of the Uniform Act - and the most troublesome - are its two proscriptive sections. They provide:522
Section 2. Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy To Restrain or
Monopolize Trade. A contract, combination, or conspiracy between
two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in a relevant market is unlawful.
Section 3. Establishment, Maintenance, or Use of Monopoly. The
establishment, maintenance, or use of a monopoly, or an attempt to
establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in a relevant market by any
person, for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing,
or maintaining prices, is unlawful.

Section 2 is a hybrid of traditional Sherman Act condemnations5 23 and
.totally new language. This section, similar to section 1 of the Sherman Act,
prohibits a "contract, combination, or conspiracy... in restraint of... trade
or commerce" without distinguishing between restraints that are "reasonable"
520. Prefatory Note, supra note 510, at 2.
521. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§41-1411 to -1420 (4 TRADE REG. REP. 1130,402 (May 6,
1974)). For example, the Arizona Legislature deleted the relevant market analysis requirement of the Uniform Act. See text accompanying notes 535-544 infra. Moreover, since publication of the Uniform Act in August 1973, it has been implicitly repudiated by the Missouri and Virginia Legislatures, which promulgated independent statutes. See Mo. REv. STAT.
§§416.011 et seq. (4 TRADE KEG. REIP. ff32,801 (June 17, 1974)); VA. CODE ANN. §§59.1-9.1
et seq. (4 TRADE Rr. REP. 135,102 (May 28, 1974)).
522. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 1130,101 (Feb. 11, 1974).
523. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§l, 2 (1970), provide in material
part: "Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in. restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is hereby declared to be illegal. . -. . Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...:'
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and those that are not. The judicially evolved rule of reason and per se rule 524
have restricted the Sherman Act prohibition to "unreasonable" restraints, and
presumably the corresponding language of the Uniform Act will be subject to
a similar construction.
In a Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act, the National Conference ex52
plains: 5

[T]here was considered the possibility of listing as illegal all of the per
se offenses presently recognized by the federal courts. This approach was
rejected despite the attraction of its certainty, not only because of the
obvious difficulty in obtaining agreement on the offenses to be so listed,
but also because it would destroy the fluidity of application which has
arisen from the generalities of the Sherman Act language. The Uniform
Act should not freeze for the future disputed current economic-judicial
concepts.
This statement of antitrust philosophy is of central importance. There is
growing support for the view, as is evidenced by several recent state enactments, 52 6 that state regulation of restrictive trade practices is rendered more
effective by the enumeration of specific per se violations. Disagreement may be
anticipated with respect to the inclusion of certain practices, exclusive dealing
arrangements for example,5 27 as hard core offenses. Notwithstanding, a provision substantially reproducing the per se listing of section 4 of the first tentative draft of the Uniform Act 525 would not seem especially controversial in
states committed to a vigorous antitrust enforcement program. Moreover, a
section condemning price fixing, market and customer division, bid rigging,
and certain refusals to deal does not involve "disputed current economicjudicial concepts," for the per se nature of such conduct is settled doctrine.5 29
Resort to specific standards of illegality for the most prevalent antitrust
violations will also foster substantive antitrust uniformity among states adopting such a provision. If the federal experience with the generalities of the
Sherman Act has demonstrated anything, it is the latitude and importance accorded particular economic and judicial philosophies in the enforcement
process. Statutory specificity will greatly reduce the areas of statutory construction open to conflicting interpretation.
It is true that statutory specificity will tend to "freeze for the future" the
illegality of hard core practices. The disadvantages of this reduced flexibility,
however, are relatively minor when weighed against the likelihood that the
524. See notes 365-366 supra.
525. Prefatory Note, supra note 510, at 1-2.
526. See text accompanying notes 371-374 supra.
527. In 1969, Illinois amended its antitrust act to include exclusive dealing arrangements
within the per se category of offenses. ILL. ANN. STAT. §60-3(4) (Smith-Hurd 1970). The
amendment has been strongly criticized. See Curtis & Decker, supra note 76, at 705-08.
528. Section 4 of the first tentative draft is reproduced in note 364 supra.
529. This is not to state that such concepts as the per se illegality of horizontal market
division will not continue to be questioned. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972). Cf. Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A
Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
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root "economic-judicial concepts" will be judicially overturned in the fore5 30
seeable future.
Moreover, with respect to other language in sections 2 and 3 of the Uniform Act, the National Conference has appeared willing to "freeze" Sherman
Act doctrine or to depart from the existing and long established "generalities
of the Sherman Act language." Illustrative of this is the requirement contained
in section 2 of the Act that the involved "contract, combination, or conspiracy
[be] between two or more persons." This language is not present in the Sherman Act and, in fact, appears to be mere surplusage. It is axiomatic that a
contract, combination, or conspiracy requires two or more participants. Nor
would the language preclude the intra-enterprise conspiracies presently actionable under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 531 as section 1 of the Uniform Act
defines "person" with sufficient breath to encompass corporate subsidiaries as
532
co-conspirators.
The only apparent justification for this rather confused language is the
fact that it emphasizes the distinction between the use of the term "monopolize" in section 2 of the Uniform Act and its more general meaning in section
2 of the Sherman Act. While section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes a combination or conspiracy to monopolize, it also makes it unlawful to monopolize
or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce by unilateral conduct. Thus, although section 2 of the proposed Act retains the monopolization terminology,
its prohibition is more limited than that of the Sherman Act.
Unilateral monopoly conduct is addressed in the third section of the Uniform Act. Here, too, the National Conference has rejected the generality of the
Sherman Act's monopolization language, substituting the requirement that a
monopoly or attempted monopoly be "for the specific purpose of excluding
competition, or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices ....,,533 This added
language is a codification of the "abuse" theory of monopoly power distilled
from "economic-judicial" concepts. 534 If there is justification for this freeze of
monopoly doctrine, it is again unclear why the National Conference is opposed to the enumeration of per se unlawful trade restraints.
The most radical departure from not only the language of the Sherman
Act, but from judicially evolved principles as well, is the requirement, contained in both sections 2 and 3 of the proposed Act, that the challenged conduct involve trade or commerce "in a relevant market." The Sherman Act

530. The general stability of Sherman Act jurisprudence, however, is not mirrored in
section 7 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 94 S. Ct.
2856, 2881 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
531. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951). But see Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 80-82 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1970).
532. Section 1(1) of the proposed act states: "'persons' means an individual, corporation,
business trust, partnership, association, or any other legal entity." 4 TRADE REG. REP. ff30,101
(Feb. 11, 1974).
533. Id.
534.

See note 368 supra.
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contains no comparable provision, although relevant market analysis has been
judicially mandated in some contexts. 35 As defined in section 1 of the Uniform
Act, a relevant market is "the geographical area of actual or potential com536
petition in a line of commerce, all or part of which is within this State."
The commentary accompanying the Act suggests two basic reasons for the
required finding of a relevant market. First, the requirement is designed "to
make it clear that the conduct constituting the offense need not be confined
wholly to the state, but must be at least partially within the state." 5 37 In essence, the Act codifies current concepts of state regulatory authority over conduct affecting interstate commerce.5 38 While such a statutory expression is useful to avoid judicial interpretations restricting state enforcement to wholly
intrastate matters, 539 this could be accomplished through a separate provision
that would not complicate, and arguably confuse, the substantive language of
the statute.5 40
The second justification advanced by the National Conference for the required relevant market analysis is less easily explained. Concerned that
"practices that are undesirable on a national scale are not necessarily undesirable, or even avoidable, in local areas" and that "there are a large number
and variety of local monopolies which were not created with an anti-competitive intent and which are not continued with such a purpose," the drafters
added the requirement to insure that the prohibited conduct occurs in a
54 1
market in which "actual or potential competition" is otherwise possible.
Although these concerns are legitimate, the mandatory requirement of relevant
market analysis in all contexts 542 appears to be an unwarranted refinement of
established principles. Section 2 of the proposed Act is already restricted to

535. The most common instance involves efforts to determine market power in monopolization suits brought pursuant to section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244
(D.R.I. 1964), afI'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
536. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 130,101 (Feb. 11, 1974).
537. Prefatory Note, supra note 510, commentary to section 1.
538. See text accompanying notes 150-152 supra.
539. The relevant Illinois experience is recounted in note 98 supra.
540. See, e.g., the Illinois provision quoted in note 98 supra.
541. Prefatory Note, suprra note 510, at 1. It is to be noted that the existence of a local
"market which is only large enough to permit one successful enterprise" does not operate
automatically to remove monopolization concern. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers
of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140 (D. Mass. 1959), afJ'd in part and rev'd in part,
284 F.2d 582 (lst Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
542. In the commentary accompanying section 2 of the Prefatory Note, the authors
state: "The application of the term 'in a relevant market' to conduct in restraint of trade
is not intended to require market analysis in the case of conduct which the state court finds
is unreasonable per se." An exception of this importance should appear clearly in the
statutory provision itself. Moreover, because the National Conference eschewed enumeration
of per se offenses, it is likely that state judges will reach variant conclusions regarding the
legality of particular trade practices.
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multiparty anticompetitive practices. Such practices, moreover, historically
have had a localized impact. 543 Section 3 proscribes only monopoly conduct
that is shown to be deliberately anticompetitive. The mandatory relevant
market analysis accordingly adds relatively little to the safeguards already
present in sections 2 and 3.
Furthermore, the disadvantages of the relevant market provision overbalance its claimed utility. Addressing the 1973 Federal-State Conference on
the problems inclusion
Antitrust, a Justice Department attorney summarized
544
of a relevant market requirement would engender:
[T]he draft law requires a finding of a relevant market. This addition
seems to be an unnecessarily confusing addition to the basic Sherman
Act language. Relevant market analysis is not uniformly necessary to an
analysis of anticompetitive agreements and conspiracies commonly attacked under Sherman Act Section 1, and I have some difficulty seeing
how the addition of this language is consistent with the goal of a simple
and easily administered state antitrust law ....
Existing federal case law, as well as economic theory, is fairly clear
on the necessity of determining product and geographic markets before
any analysis as to monopolization offenses is possible. Neither the case
law nor economic theory is clear on whether proof of a relevant market
is necessary in showing attempts to monopolize, and I as a prosecutor
would prefer to leave the question of the necessity of proving a relevant
market in such cases to a court. Finally, case law is clear that such proof
is unnecessary in a conspiracy to monopolize case, where the act of conspiring is the gravamen of the offense. I see no reason at all to alter the
law in this respect.
The substantive prohibitions of the Uniform Act are not only more restrictive than federal antitrust legislation in what they include; they are also
far more limited than federal law in what they omit. Most significantly, the
proposed act lacks any provision comparable to sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton
Act, which respectively condemn exclusive dealing arrangements and certain
mergers and acquisitions. To be sure, the appropriateness of such provisions
in state law remains the subject of debate. 545 The prosecutorial flexibility
these Clayton Act sections afford, however, argues for their inclusion, particularly because they augment the Sherman Act's focus upon actual competi-

543. The National Conference concedes this, at least in part. See note 542 supra. See also
J. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 78-79. In the case of monopolization, federal doctrine presumably
would require market analysis without statutory command. See text accompanying note 535
supra.
544. The Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law, address by Joe Sims, Attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Dep't of Justice, before the Federal-State Conference on Antitrust, Washington, D.C. April 11, 1973, at 9-11. Mr. Sims' remarks were directed toward the
third tentative draft, which immediately preceded the Uniform Act as now promulgated. Cf.
Note, "Attempt To Monopolize Under the Sherman Act" Defendant's Market Power as a
Requisite to a PrimaFade Case, 73 CoLi m. L. REy. 1451, 1459-71 (1973).
545. See authorities cited note 502 supra. With respect to the interstate commerce problems emanating from merger and exclusive dealing prohibitions, both of which require extensive market analysis, see text accompanying note 370 supra,
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tion by also protecting potential competition. 5 46 This is especially true of an
exclusive dealing provision similar to that of section 3 of the Clayton Act, because of its applicability to anticompetitive practices in the burgeoning fran5 47
chise industry.
Other sections of the proposed act also appear unduly limited and, consequently, ineffective. The civil pre-complaint investigatory powers conferred
by section 6 of the Act are more restrictive than those contained in most
modern state enactments. 4 8 In particular, the Uniform Act places the burden
on the attorney general, where voluntary compliance is refused, to establish to
the satisfaction of the appropriate court that "there is reasonable cause to
believe there has been a violation of this Act, and the information sought or
' 9
document or object demanded is relevant to the violation."54
By thus forcing
the state essentially to prove its case prior to its investigation, the proposed
Act's investigatory mechanism is of reduced utility.
A further weakness of the Uniform Act is its limitation of civil penalties
to a maximum of 50,000 dollars for each violation,5 ° and its total omission of
any provision for criminal penalties. There is substantial indication that this
structure of sanctions lacks meaningful deterrence for any but minor violations.551
Nor is the threat of private damage suits as great a deterrent under the
Uniform Act as under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Section 8 of the proposed
act limits recovery to actual damages for all but flagrant violations. Even when
a violation is shown to be flagrant it is left to the discretion of the trial judge
whether damages should be increased to a maximum of treble the damages
sustained.
Finally, in perhaps a tacit admission of the Uniform Act's fundamental
departure from federal antitrust concepts, section 12 of the Act declares that
its provisions shall be construed to effectuate its general purpose of uniformity
among the states. Omitted from the Act is any reference to state reliance upon
the comprehensive and well established body of federal precedent. During a
period when the states can most profitably use and build upon the federal
enforcement experience of more than three-quarters of a century, the Uniform Act's unusual and unexplained departures from federal law miss a
critical opportunity. Indeed, as a consequence of its novel and restrictive
formulations, and the availability of more effective federal and state statutory
models, it is unlikely that the proposed act will achieve the complete ac-

546. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-37 (1973); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962).
547. See Note, Selected Antitrust Problems of the Franchisor:Exclusive Arrangements,
Territorial Restrictions, and Franchise Termination, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 260, 264-76 (1969);
cf. Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972).
548. See text accompanying notes 455-62 supra.
549. 4 TRADE Rae. REP. 3130,101 (Feb. 11, 1974).
550. Uniform State Antitrust Act §7, 4 TRADE REC. REP. f130,101 (Feb. 11, 1974).
551. See text accompanying notes 432-439 supra.
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ceptance necessary to make state antitrust laws and enforcement approximately uniform. More fundamentally, the very existence of the Uniform Act
and the controversy it probably will engender may serve to impede the progress of meaningful antitrust reform in states where such is desired.
In a seminal article written at the outset of the present reform period,
Dean Rahl5 outlined several "necessary qualities" of effective state antitrust
legislation: 52
It must be broad enough substantively to reach all of the serious and
common restraints of trade. It should clearly cover the two most common of all types -price fixing and allocation of markets. It should
definitely cover commercial services as well as activities concerning commodities. It must be reasonably clear in meaning and capable of interpretations which will take advantage of the great amount of federal
experience in the field. It should be accompanied by practical, effective
remedies and enforcement procedures, centralized in the state government and not left to the counties, and supplied with adequate funds
and personnel. The state officials in charge should be under a clear duty
to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with federal officials, and to
avoid double prosecutions and duplication of effort.
Future state antitrust reform would be well served by a closer adherence to
Dean Rahl's recommendations than that evidenced by the current Uniform
State Antitrust Act.
VIII.

INDIVIDUAL REFORMI

AND FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION: AN ALTERNATIVE

The preceding pages have traced the vagrant path of state antitrust enforcement from its statutory origins in the late 1880's to the present reform
movement. In the face of the many difficulties that continue to beset state
enforcement, there is cause to question whether antitrust legislation is possible
or even desirable at the state level. At the moment, Florida is one of a number
of states seriously confronting these issues. 5 3 Florida, moreover, shares with
the majority of states an antitrust tradition marked by decades of enforcement dormancy. 554 Accordingly, Florida's current reform efforts may provide
a useful insight into the possible future course of state antitrust regulation
throughout the nation. A synopsis of current Florida antitrust law follows.
A. FloridaAntitrust Statutes
A year after enactment of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts, and following a decade in which antitrust policy was the subject of
national attention and debate, 555 the Florida Legislature passed an antitrust

552. Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEXAS L. Rxv. 753, 771-72
(1961).
553. Other states are listed in note 4 supra.
554. See text accompanying notes 296-98 supra.
555. The period is described in W. LrnVIN, supra note 21, at 238-78.
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trust act in 1915. 5 56 The content of the law was not novel; it duplicated existing state formulations, particularly the widely followed provisions of the
Texas statute557 In its present form, section 542.01 of the Florida Statutes defines a "trust" as: 55 8
[A] combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons, firms,
corporations or associations of persons, or either two or more of them,
for either, any or all of the following purposes:
(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, or aids
to commerce, or to c-eate or carry out restrictions in the full and free
pursuit of any business authorized or permitted by the laws of this state;
(b) To increase or reduce the price of merchandise, produce or
commodity;
(c) To prevent competition in manufacture, making, transportation,
sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or commodities, or to prevent
competition in aids to commerce;
(d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public
shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, use or
consumption in this state; or,
(e) Except as otherwise provided in chapter 541 [the Fair Trade
Law] to make or enter into or execute or carry out any contract, obligation, or agreement of any kind or description by which they shall bind
or have bound themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article,
commodity or article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure, or by which they shall agree in
any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graded figure, or by which they shall in any manner
establish or settle the price of any article or commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves or others in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, or by which they shall agree
to pool, combine or unite any interest they may have in connection with
the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity that its price
might in any manner be affected.
Consonant with section 542.05, as amended in 1971, any person who participates in such a "trust" commits a felony of the third degree, punishable
by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years or a fine not to exceed
5,000 dollars, or both. 55 9 Significantly, each day of violation constitutes a
separate offense. In addition, every person violating the statute forfeits to the
state the sum of 50 dollars for each day the offense is committed or con-

556.

FLA. STAT.

§§542.01-.02 (1973).

557. See note 30 supra.
558. FLA. STAT. §542.01 (1973). The statutory requirement of "two or more persons" has
been strictly construed to prevent suits based on unilateral conduct, such as monopolization.
See Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
559. FLA. STAT. §542.05 (1973). Prior to the amendment, a violation was punishable "by
a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten years." Fla. State §542.05 (1969).
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tinued.5 60 Notwithstanding the vast potential liability the Act affords, and
perhaps because of its severity,561 no case has been discovered in which criminal or civil forfeiture sanctions were successfully invoked.
Quo warranto authority is provided in sections 542.02, 542.03, and 542.04
of the Act, which require compulsory charter forfeiture and dissolution of Florida corporations and the ouster of foreign corporations upon conviction for a
02
statutory violation.
The Florida Act, in common with the Texas statute, makes no provision
for private damage recoveries. Section 542.10 does render any private contract
or agreement in violation of the Act "void and not enforceable either in law
or equity."5 3 Section 542.12, added in 1953, further condemns covenants not
to compete with certain specified exceptions. 564 The remaining sections of the
Act address the sufficiency of the indictment, the applicable rules of evidence,
the criminal liability of non-residents, and the investigatory powers of the
state.06 5

Although essentially unchanged since 1915, the Florida Antitrust Act has
been revised on several occasions. In 1925 agricultural and horticultural cooperative associations were exempted from the prohibitions of the Act.566
Practices authorized by the Florida Fair Trade Law, first enacted in 1939,
were also exempted from the antitrust act by amendment in 1941.567 Section
542.12, governing contracts in restraint of trade, was added in 1953.568 The
scope of the Act was expanded in 1961 when section 542.01 was amended to
define the term "commodity," as used in the Act, to include commercial serv570
ices.5 69 Most recently the criminal penalties of section 542.05 were reduced.
In addition to the state'antitrust act, the Florida Legislature has promul-

560. FLA. STAT. §542.09 (1973).
561. See authorities cited note 431 supra.
562. FLA. STAT. §§542.02-.04 (1973); cf. Ervin & Rhodes, Quo Warranto in Florida, 4
U. FLA. L. REv. 559, 566 (1951).
563.

FLA. STAT. §542.10 (1973).

564. FLA. STAT. §542.12 (1973); cf. Comment, Unfair Competition: Effect of a Convenant
Not To Compete, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (1955).
565. FLA. STAT. §§542.06.08, .11 (1973).
566. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10,283, §§1-2, presently codified as FLA. STAT. §§542.01, .05
(1973). The Florida amendments followed by three-years enactment of the Capper-Volstead
Act by Congress, which contained similar provisions with respect to the federal antitrust
laws. See 7 U.S.C. §291 (1970). Other Florida statutes also operate to exempt such organizations. See FLA. STAT. §§618.21, 619.02 (1973). Sponge cooperative associations have been
granted comparable exemption. FiA. STAT. §617.14 (1973).
567. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 21,001, at 2636; FLA. STAT. §§542.01, .05 (1973). The troubled
history of the Florida Fair Trade Act, FtA. STAT. §§541.01-.09 (1973), is recounted in several
commentaries. See Fink, Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintenance in Florida, 6 MIAMI L.
R.v. 553 (1961); Hudson, Constitutionality of the Florida Fair Trade Act and Continuing
Myths of Resale Price Maintenance, 24 U. FLA. L. Rv. 641 (1972); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Fair Trade Act-A Possible-Turning Point in the Validity of Statutes Authorizing
Price FixingAgreements, 4 MiAMi L. Rv. 98 (1949).

568. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 2804, §§1-4.
569. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-324, §1.
570. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, §531.
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gated laws that address specific competitive concerns. The first of these laws
was enacted in 1893 to condemn combinations and conspiracies against workmen. 571 Since that time statutes have been passed prohibiting restrictive and
monopolistic practices in fresh meats, 5 7 2 musical compositions, 573 motor vehicle
financing, 57 4 insurance, 5 75 and state procured consultant services.56

On October 1, 1973, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act5 7 7 became the most recent, and potentially the most important, antitrust

legislation yet enacted in Florida. The core of the new law provides:57
(1) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful.
(2) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection
(1) of this section due consideration and great weight shall be given to
the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts relating to §5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
In recent years, the federal courts have construed section 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act expansively to permit the Federal Trade Commission to challenge anticompetitive practices "in their incipiency without
proof that they amount to an outright violation of . . . the Clayton Act or

other provisions of the antitrust laws." 5 79 Indeed, in Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson

Co.,

580

the Supreme Court concurred with the

Commission that "considerations of consumer interests independent of possible
582
or actual effect on competition" 5' come within the reach of section 5(a)(1):
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if,
in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public
571. FLA. STAT. §833.02 (1973).
572. FLA. STAT. §§544.01, .06 (1973).
573. FLA. STAT. §543.01 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has sustained section
543.01 against the claim that it violates the Federal Constitution and copyright laws. Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941), modifying Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Fla. 1940).
574. FLA. STAT. §545.02 (1973).
575. FLA. STAT. §626.959 (1973).
576. Consultants' Competitive Negotiation Act, FLA. STAT. §287.055 (1973).
577. FLA. STAT. §§501.201-.213. 570.283 (1973). See generally Tennyson, The Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act: A New Approach to Trade Regulation in Florida, 2 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 223 (1974). The statute is popularly denominated the "Little FTC Act." Other
states that have recently passed similar legislation are listed in note 380 supra.
578. FLA. STAT. §501.204 (1973). Although antitrust in nature, see note I supra, the
primary focus of such legislation is the prohibition of consumer fraud. In Florida this has
been the primary application given the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act to date.
579. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694, 708-09 (1948).
580. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
581. Id. at 248.
582.

Id. at 244; cf. Note, Advertising and Shared Monopoly in Consumer Goods In-

dustries, 9 COLUM. J.L.

& SOCIAL PROBLEMs

241, 259-62 (1973).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/1

84

Rubin: Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement

1974]

RETHINKING STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

values beyond those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit
of the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, unlike
its Federal Trade Commission Act forebear, is not restricted to enforcement
by state prosecutors. 8 3 Instead, section 501.211 of the Florida Act authorizes
both a private injunctive suit by any "aggrieved" person, and the recovery of
actual damages, costs and attorneys fees by a "consumer who has suffered a
loss as a result of a violation. 84 Accordingly, the Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act has the potential of becoming of first importance in state antitrust regulation. Actual enforcement experience will determine whether this
potential is realized.
Viewed alone, Florida's several antitrust laws suggest a comprehensive enforcement structure. In fact, Texas has long sustained an effective antitrust
program based on a general antitrust statute not appreciably different from its
Florida progeny. 5 5 Notwithstanding, the history of enforcement of all but the
most recent enactments, about which too little is known, is largely one of
inaction. Fault must lie partly with state prosecutors; however, the Florida
judiciary has, at least to date, played an important supporting role.
B. Antitrust in the FloridaCourts
Prior to passage of the Florida antitrust act in 1915, common law principles
relating to restraints of trade and monopolies were regularly enforced by the
courts. In the leading case of Stewart v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co.,5 86 the
Supreme Court of Florida articulated these governing principles:567
Public policy favors competition in trade, to the end that commodities may be obtained with the greatest convenience and at the lowest
possible prices, and opposes monopolies and restraints upon trade in
useful commodities that tend to inconvenience or to control the supply
or to higher prices, to the injury of the public or any considerable portion thereof in any locality.
58

The court further explained:

The validity or invalidity of an agreement that in operation tends to
restrain trade or to monopoly is in general determined by the element
of whether it is or is not injurious to the public. If injurious in any
perceptible degree to any considerable portion of the public, the agree-

583. See note 193 supra.
584. Inhibiting utilization of the private remedy are provisions authorizing the recovery
of reasonable costs and attorneys fees by a successful defendant and the posting of a bond
by a plaintiff to insure defendant's indemnification. FLA. STAT. §§501.210(3), .211(3) (1973).
585. See authorities cited note 64 supra.
586. 50 Fla. 570, 48 So. 19 (1908).
587. Id. at 588-89, 48 So. at 25.
588. Id. at 691-92, 48 So. at 26.
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ment is contrary to public policy, and will not be enforced. If not so
injurious, it may be enforced if otherwise legal and binding.
In common with most states, Florida's enactment of an antitrust law in
1915 was designed to expand and strengthen these common law principles by
declaring unlawful agreements that previously were merely unenforceable.58 9
In practice, however, the Florida Act has advanced state antitrust doctrine
little beyond antecedent common law concepts.590 Few suits have been brought
by the state, and private actions under the Act overwhelmingly involve defensive invocation of antitrust principles to render a covenant not to compete
or other contractual obligation unenforceable. 91
Lee v. Clearwater Growers Associationr'2 was one such early private action.
Upholding the cooperative marketing contract there involved against the contention that it unlawfully restrained trade, the Supreme Court of Florida declared:5 93
In construing statutes and contracts against monopolies or in restraint of trade both state and federal courts in this country have applied the rule of reason rather than the literal import of the statute, and
have said in substance that it must amount to an undue or unreasonable
restraint of trade.
In 1927, the year of the Clearwater Growers decision, the Supreme Court
of the United States held in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.594 that
"uniform price-fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade
or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite
the reasonableness of the prices agreed upon."' 59 Since Trenton Potteries,
market and customer allocations, tie-ins, and group boycotts have been added
to the federal list of per se unreasonable anticompetitive practices.596 Not-

589. "Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade were not unlawful at common law in the sense of being criminal or giving rise to a civil action for damages in favor
of one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void, and not enforceable by the
courts. Statutes of the character of the one under consideration in this case, modeled as they
are upon the federal [Sherman Act] . . . have the effect to render such contracts unlawful
in an affirmative or positive sense and punishable as a misdemeanor." Brock v. Hardie, 114
Fla. 670, 676-77, 154 So. 690, 693 (1934). For a discussion of the state policy, see text accompanying note 31 supra.
590. See, e.g., Hardrives Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 166 So. 2d 810, 811 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1964).
591. See, e.g., Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971); City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas
Sys., Inc., 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965); Massari v. Salciccia, 102 Fla. 847, 136 So. 522 (1931);
McQuaig v. Seaboard Oil Co., 96 Fla. 275, 118 So. 424 (1928); Kenco Chem. & Mfg. Co. v.
Railey, 286 So. 2d 272 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
592. 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927).
593. Id. at 219, 111 So. at 723.
594. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
595. Id. at 398.
596. See note 366 supra.
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withstanding, Florida courts have steadfastly adhered to the Clearwater Growers rule of reason approach without concern for the particular form of restraint alleged. 597 As a consequence, antitrust enforcement involving per se
offenses is made more difficult for state prosecutors and plaintiffs. ,
The absence of an established per se doctrine of antitrust illegality in Florida may well result from the failure of state enforcement officials to convince
local courts of the necessity and significance of such principles. Only two antitrust actions commenced by state prosecutors appear to have resulted in reported decisions. Both opinions were written in 1934 by Justice Ellis.
In the first of these cases, Neal Brock was arrested upon a warrant charging
that he, along with others, had combined to fix prices and rates and to divide
territories in the sale of fire insurance in Dade County in violation of the
Florida Antitrust Act. In defense, Brock asserted the then common constitutional objections to state antitrust regulation, including the lack of an ascertainable standard of guilt, 98 improper exercise of the state police power,599
and the denial of equal protection resulting from the special statutory exemption granted cooperative marketing associations.600 The supreme court, in
Brock v. Hardie,601 upheld the statute against each of these contentions, but
agreed with Brock's further argument that the business of fire insurance was
outside the scope of the Act. The court reasoned that fire insurance "is not a
business of commerce or trade ... nor is it a business in which the public has
any direct right,"60 2 and accordingly does not constitute a trust as defined by
the statute. A decade later, the United States Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the Sherman Act in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association603 when a combination of fire insurance
companies was successfully challenged. Hence, the specific holding in Brock
is of uncertain validity today.
The Florida attorney general was slightly more successful in State ex rel.
Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co. 6 0 4 Kress, a Texas corporation with a permit to do
business in Florida, was accused of having combined with other Kress companies incorporated elsewhere to violate the state antitrust law. Proceeding by

597. One reason for this may be the fact that most litigation brought under the antitrust
act involves covenants not to compete, which historically have been subject to rule of reason
inquiry. For example, the Florida supreme court in Ricou v. Crosland, 81 Fla. 574, 88 So.
380 (1921), gave only summary consideration to plaintiff's arguments that the price fixing
agreement there sought to be enforced was reasonable: "Our view of the contract is that
its obvious purpose was to prevent or lessen competition in the commodity in which the two
companies dealt to the injury of the producers and consumers . . .and was therefore in
violation of the [Florida antitrust] act above mentioned, and void." Id. at 579, 88 So. at 381.
Had cases of this court been prosecuted by the state attorney general with some regularity,
it is probable that the equivalent of a per se doctrine would have emerged in Florida.
598. See text accompanying notes 70-76 supra.
599. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
600. See text accompanying notes 48-62 supra.
601. 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).
602. Id. at 686, 154 So. at 697.
603. 322 U.S. 583 (1944).
604. 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934).
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an information in the nature of quo warranto, the attorney general sought the
revocation of Kress' permit to do business in, and its ouster from, the state.
Kress' antitrust "crime," in essense, was to undersell local merchants who did
not share the advantages of Kress' high volume and low overhead chain store
operation. ° 5 The attorney general's action was precipitated by the complaints
of the local merchants who joined in the quo warranto action as "co-relators."60 The narrow question before the court was whether the attorney
general properly invoked his quo warranto authority; the supreme court held
that he did, and remanded the case for trial on the issue of violation.60 7
In the four decades since the Brock and Kress cases, no major prosecution
under the state antitrust act appears to have been brought.60s Private actions
have been inadequate to fill this enforcement void. To some degree the absence of private litigation can be traced to the lack of private damage and
injunctive provisions in the antitrust statute. Florida courts have suggested
that both civil damages60 9 and injunctive relief6lo are nonetheless available,
but such judicial indications seem to have been for the most part ignored.
IX.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTITRUST REFORM IN FLORIDA

The absence of vigorous antitrust enforcement in Florida, both public and
private, belies the extent of anticompetitive activity in the state. Appendix B,
Table 1, of this article discloses the significant number of federal antitrust
suits filed in Florida federal district courts. Table 2 reveals that in many of
these suits both plaintiffs and defendants are Florida corporations, indicative
of the essentially local nature of the practices in issue. This fact is underscored
in Table 5, which summarizes the many Florida based industries involved in
federal antitrust litigation.
The earlier considered limitations on federal interstate commerce jurisdiction, moreover, suggest that additional suits might have been maintained
under the federal antitrust laws were it not for the want of a substantial effect

605.

Id. at 195, 155 So. at 825-26.

606. Id. at 200, 155 So. at 825.
607. Id. at 205, 155 So. at 829.
608. In a study conducted prior to enactment of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act for the purpose of determining the status of consumer affairs in the state, it
was reported: "The Attorney rarely proceeds under [the] Florida [antitrust] law. Federal
antitrust laws are used." CONSUaMR ADVISOR TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 18, at 127 n.1. The
statement was made in reference to the use of available state consumer-related felony laws by
Florida enforcement agencies. Suits by the attorney general pursuant to the federal antitrust
laws are limited to civil actions to recover for proprietary injury to the state. See text accompanying note 388 supra. Hence, the statement is a non sequitur.
609. "The absence of an express statutory remedy does not prevent a third person from
recovering damages proximately caused by violations of the [Florida antitrust] act." Hardrives
Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 166 So. 2d 810, 812 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). See also Lee's
Prescription Shops, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 1974 Trade Cas. ]173,180 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
610. See Scherer & Sons, Inc. v. Ladies' Garment Workers' Local 415, 142 So 2d 290,
292-93, 295 (Fla. 1962) (semble).
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upon interstate commerce. 611 Doubts about the interstate character of some
practices, or the anticipated difficulties of proving sufficient interstate commerce impact, may well have discouraged additional suits.612
The antitrust enforcement "gap" resulting from commerce clause limitations demonstrates the desirability of state regulation. In addition, the likely
increase in enforcement that will result in less densely populated areas of the
state, where federal district courts are far less accessible, argues for complementary antitrust legislation at the state level.
Florida has at least implicitly acknowledged the necessity of state enforcement in the enactment of the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. That
legislation, however, carries little of the federal antitrust jurisprudence and
statutory specificity that simplifies both enforcement and compliance.61 3 For
tis reason, a specific antitrust law, structured to optimize enforcement of
hard core violations, remains necessary.
X.

Tim CONTENT OF REFORM: SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS

Rather than concluding with broadly phrased reform recommendations,
Appendix A to this article contains a suggested antitrust act for the State of
Florida. The draft act is a distillation of the many concepts advanced in the
preceding pages. With appropriate amendment of those provisions written
expressly for Florida, the exemptions section in particular, the draft act may
be adopted in any state. The root philosophy of the legislation is the use of
federal doctrine to the fullest and most effective extent feasible.
In suggesting legislation that deviates from the Uniform State Antitrust
Act, thought has been given to the disadvantages, earlier considered, 61 4 of state
statutory diversity. However, state enactments that closely track federal antitrust law, as does the draft Florida act, when combined with active and ongoing enforcement coordination among state and federal antitrust officials,
should largely balance the supposed advantages of formal antitrust uniformity.
The coordinating efforts already undertaken by the Justice Department, 15
the Federal Trade Commission,6 .6 and the National Association of Attorneys
General 1 7 give every indication that state antitrust congruency can be realized
without the constraints imposed on individual states by rigid statutory uniformity.

One added recommendation may be advanced to further insure both state
antitrust consistency and enforcement effectiveness. Florida's meager antitrust
tradition suggests that many jurists and lawyers are presently unversed in

See text accompanying notes 120-149 supra.
See text accompanying note 330 supra.
See text accompanying note 367 supra.
See text accompanying notes 511-513 supra.
See authorities cited note 10 supra.
Id.
617. See, e.g., State Support of FTC Oil Company Case, TRADE REG. REP., Weekly Rep.
No. 105, at 5 (Dec. 31, 1973).
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
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antitrust principles. In fact, the results of a questionnaire, reproduced in Appendix C, reveal that eighty-four per cent of the sitting state judiciary, excluding supreme court justices, have had no judicial contact with antitrust matters
and seventy-seven per cent have had no antitrust experience while in practiceyls Accordingly, the enactment of modern and comprehensive antitrust
legislation should be attended by programs designed to introduce the bench
and bar to the principles and policy of antitrust law enforcement. Responding
to the same questionnaire, a significant number of state judges favored the
suggestion of a judicial conference to address aspects of antitrust litigation and
enforcement. Such educational programs would produce multiple benefits.
Judges familiar with the new laws would tend to be less hostile to its proper
implementation and could manage litigation more efficiently. Practitioners
could better advise their clients concerning preventive compliance or the possible existence of an antitrust claim. Finally, such programs would establish
at the formulative stages of state enforcement the manifest utility of federal
precedent in both the implementation of state law and he maintenance of a
uniform national antitrust policy.
CONCLUSION

The focus throughout this article has been on the manifold statutory and
constitutional foundations of state antitrust enforcement. It is nonetheless appropriate to conclude with a consideration of a separate aspect of state regulation, one that eludes legal analysis. Antitrust policy in this country, dating to
the agrarian discontent that followed the Civil War, has been very much a
creature of politics and politicians. The present revival of state enforcement
interest constitutes no exception. Consumerism, neopopulism, and the per
vasive public economic restiveness, as much as uniform acts and constitutional
constraints, have determined and will continue to determine the form and
content of state antitrust enforcement.
This political dimension makes prediction of the future antitrust role of
the states conjectural. As just one example, politics and public pressure largely
account for the recent passage of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act. Politics and other pressures also account for the absence of a
meaningful legislative appropriation for enforcement of the Act this year. 619
In the final analysis, the achievements of state antitrust regulation in this
final quarter of the twentieth century will be largely dependent upon such
realities of the political process. On balance, these forces at no time appear
more favorable for state antitrust enforcement than they do today.

618. See responses to question 16, Appendix C.
619.

See Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 19, 1974, §C at 1, col. 6: "'The Little FTC [Florida

Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practiccs Act] in one fell swoop covered a lot of abuses we have
been seeing including auto repairs, advertising and service contracts,' [State Senator George]
Firestone said.
"However, Ass't Att'y Gen. Rod Tennyson, who is charged with prosecution of offenders,
says the legislature has failed this year to come up with the necessary funding."
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APPENDIX A
DRAFT FLORIDA ANTITRUST Acr
An Act curbing monopolies and outlawing restraints of trade; creating sections 542.15
through 542.39, Florida Statutes; prescribing procedures for investigation and enforcement;
establishing penalties, civil remedies, and injunctive relief; repealing sections 542.01 through
542.12, Florida Statutes; providing for severability and an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section L Sections 15 through 89 of Chapter 542, Florida Statutes, are created to read:.
542.15. SNORT TrrLE
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Florida Antitrust Act.
542.16. PuRPosE; RuLEs or CONSTRUCTION.
The legislature declares it to be the purpose of this chapter to complement the body of
federal law governing monopolistic and restrictive trade practices in order to foster effective
competition in the commerce and industry of this state and secure to the public the fundamental benefits and safeguards of an unfettered economy and a free society. It is the intent
of the legislature that this chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficial
purpose, and that the courts in their construction of this chapter shall be guided by the
prevailing interpretation given to comparable federal antitrust statutes by the federal courts.
542.17. DEFINMONS.

(1) Unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, for the purposes of this
chapter, the terms defined in this section have the meanings ascribed to them.
(2) "Commodity" means any goods, merchandise, wares, produce, chose in action, land,

article of commerce, or any other tangible or intangible property, real, personal, or mixed,
for use, consumption, enjoyment, or resale.
(3) "Service" means any kind of activity performed in whole or in part for financial gain.
(4) "Contract, combination, or conspiracy" means any agreement, arrangement, collusion,
or understanding. "Contract" includes, but is not limited to, a purchase, a contract to purchase, a sale, a conjract to sell, a lease, a contract to lease, a license, a.rontract, to license, a

franchise, or a contract to franchise. "Combination" includes,-but is. not limited to, a trust,
common selling or purchasing agent, pool, or holding company.
(5) "Person" means any individual, corporation, firm, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, or-any other legal or commercial entity.
(6) "Trade or commerce" means any economic activity of any type whatsoever involving
any commodity or service whatsoever.

(7) "Documentary material" means any original or copy of any book, record, memorandum, paper communication, tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription,

or other tangible document or recording.
542.18. UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE OR COMMERCE.
A contract, combination, or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is
unlawful.
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542.19. ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE, OR USE OF MONOPOLY POWER.
The establishment, maintenance, or use of, or any attempt or conspiracy to establish, maintain, or use monopoly power over any part of trade or commerce in this state by any person
or persons for the purpose of excluding competition or fixing, controlling, or maintaining
prices is unlawful.
542.20. REQUIREMENTS AND OUTPUT CONTRACTS; TYING ARRANGEMENTS.
A contract for the supplying of commodities or furnishing of services, or for the fixing of
prices charged therefor, or for the giving or selling of a discount or rebate therefrom, on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that one party shall not deal in the commodities or
services of a competitor or competitors of the other party, is unlawful where the effect of
such contract, or such condition, agreement, or understanding, may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of this
state.
542.21.

PRICE FIXING; PRODUCTION CONTROL; ALLOCATION OF MARKETS; COLLUSIVE BIDDING; CON-

CERTED REFUSALS To DEAL.

Without limiting this chapter, the following shall be deemed to restrain trade or comnerce unreasonably and are unlawful:
(1) A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons;
(a) for the purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the market
price, rate, or fee of any commodity or service;
(b) fixing, controlling, maintaining, limiting, or discontinuing the production, manufacture, mining, sale, or supply of any commodity, or the sale or supply of any service,
for the purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the market price,
rate, or fee of the commodity or service; or
(c) allocating or dividing customers or markets, functional or geographic, for any commodity or service.
(2) A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons whereby, in the
letting of any public contract, (a) the price quotation of any bid is fixed or controlled, (b)
one or more persons refrain from the submission of a bid, (c) contract specifications are
drawn in such a manner as effectively to limit the submission of bids to a number less than
the number of otherwise qualified bidders who deal in the same commodities or services and
who might, therefore, reasonably be expected to participate in the bidding process, or (d)
competition is in any other manner restrained.
(3) A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons refusing to deal
with any other person or persons for the purpose of effecting any of the acts described in
subsections (1) and (2) of this section.
542.22. SCOPE OF CHAPTER.
(1) This chapter applies to any contract, combination, or conspiracy, wherever created,
formed, or entered into; any establishment, maintenance, or use of monopoly power; and
any attempt or conspiracy to establish, maintain, or use monopoly power; whenever any of
the foregoing affects the trade or commerce of this state.
(2) In deciding whether conduct restrains or monopolizes trade or commerce or may substantially lessen competition within this state, determination of the relevant market or effective area of competition shall not be limited by the boundaries of this state.

(3) No action or proceeding instituted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be
barred on the ground that the activity or conduct complained of in any way affects or involves interstate or foreign commerce.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/1

92

Rubin: Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement
1974]
542.23.

RETHINKING STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
EXEMPTIONS.

No provisions of this chapter shall be construed to make unlawful:
(1) The activities of any labor organization, or of individual members thereof, which are
directed solely to labor objectives that are legitimate under the laws of either the State of
Florida or the United States;
(2) The activities of any agricultural, horticultural, or sponge cooperative organization, or
of individual members thereof, which are permitted under sections 617.15, 618.21, or 619.02,
Florida Statutes, or the laws of the United States;
(3)The activities of any public utility, as defined in section 366.02 or section 779.06, Florida Statutes, to the extent that such activities are regulated by the Public Service Commission
or the Department of Transportation of this state, or any federal regulatory body or officer
acting under the laws of the United States;
(4) The activities, including, but not limited to, the making of or participation in joint
underwriting or joint reinsurance arrangements, or any insurer, insurance agent, insurance
broker, independent insurance adjuster or rating organization to the extent that such activities are regulated by the insurance commissioner and treasurer of this state under, or
are permitted or authorized by, the Florida Insurance Code, chapters 624 through 632, Florida
Statutes;
(5) The activities engaged in by securities dealers, brokers, or agents who are (a) licensed
by the State of Florida under the Sale of Securities Law, chapter 517, Florida Statutes, or
(b) members of any national securities association or national securities exchange registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, in the course of their business of offering, selling, buying and selling, or otherwise
trading in or underwriting securities, as agent, broker, or principal, and activities of any
national securities exchange so registered, including the establishment of commission rates
and schedules of charges;
(6) The activities of any state or national banking institution to the extent that such activities are regulated or supervised by the comptroller of this state under the Florida Banking
Code, chapters 658 through 661, Florida Statutes, or any federal regulatory body or officer
acting under the laws of the United States;
(7) The activities of any state or federal savings and loan association to the extent that
such activities are regulated or supervised by the comptroller of this state under the Savings
Association Act, chapter 665, Florida Statutes, or any federal regulatory body or officer acting
under the laws of the United States;
(8) The religious and charitable activities of any not-for-profit corporation, trust, or organization established exclusively for religious or charitable purposes, or both such purposes.
542.24. Csacurr CoURT COMPETENCE.
Actions and proceedings instituted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be
brought in the circuit courts of this state.

542.25. PENALTIE.

(1) An individual who is found to have violated this chapter shall be subject to a civil
penalty of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); any other person shall be subject
to a civil penalty of not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
(2) Any person who willfully fails to comply with a final judgment or decree rendered by
a court of this state issued for a violation of this chapter, or who willfully fails to comply
with a consent settlement approved by a court of this state concerning an alleged violation
of this chapter, shall bie subject to a civil penalty of not more than one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000).
(8) Any person who is found to have willfully committed any of the acts enumerated in
section 542.19 or section 542.21 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable
as provided in section 775.082 or section 775.083, Florida Statutes.
(4) No civil penalty shall be imposed in connection with any violation for which any fine
or penalty has been imposed pursuant to the federal antitrust laws.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

93

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. XXV1

542.26. DAMAGES.
Any person, including the State of Florida, or any of its departments, subdivisions, or
agencies, injured in its business or property by reason of a violation of any provision of this
chapter shall recover treble the actual damages sustained, together with costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys fees.

542.27. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
(1) The attorney general, acting through the department of legal affairs, may institute
proceedings to prevent and restrain violations of the provisions of this chapter. In addition
to granting such temporary, interlocutory, or permanent relief as is necessary to prevent and
restrain a violation, the courts of this state may grant mandatory injunctions reasonably
necessary to restore and preserve competition in the trade or commerce affected by a violation of this chapter.
(2) A person, other than the State of Florida, or any of its departments, subdivisions, or
agencies, may institute proceedings for injunctive relief, temporary or permanent, against
threatened loss or damage to its business or property resulting from a violation of this
chapter. In the proceedings, the court shall follow the rules and principles governing the
granting of injunctive relief in other cases. If the court issues a permanent injunction, the
person obtaining the injunction shall be awarded costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys fees.
(3) In all instances in which injunctive relief is sought, application shall be made in accordance with court rules and in the manner prescribed by law.

542.28. FORFEITURE OF CHARTER RICHTS AND PRIVILEGES To Do BUSINESS.
(1) Upon the failure of any person to comply with the terms of a final judgment or decree
rendered by a court of this state issued for a violation of the provisions of this chapter, or to
comply with a consent settlement approved by a court of this state concerning an alleged
violation of this chapter, the attorney general may apply to the court:
(a) for the forfeiture of any charter rights, franchise privileges or powers of such corporation held by such person under the laws of this state;
(b) for dissolution, if the person is a corporation or limited partnership organized
under the laws of this state; or
(c) for the suspension of the privilege to conduct business within this state.
The court, after giving due consideration to the public interest and to relevant competitive
and economic circumstances, may grant so much of the requested relief as is deemed appropriate. A dissolution shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures specified by
law for either voluntary or judicial dissolution of the particular type of corporation, association, firm or partnership.
(2) If any corporation, association, partnership, or limited partnership shall be dissolved
or have its privilege to transact business in this state suspended or revoked as provided in
subsection (1) of this section, no assignee, transferee, or successor-in-interest of such corporation, association, partnership, or limited partnership shall be permitted to incorporate or to
transact business in this state without first applying to the court for and receiving an order
permitting incorporation or transaction of business. No order shall be granted unless the
applicant proves to the satisfaction of the court that it will conduct its affairs in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter

542.29. ACTs OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, REPRESENTATIVES, OR AGENTS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THEIR AUTHORITY.
(1) A corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership is liable for the
acts of its officers, directors, representatives, or agents acting within the scope of their
authority, whether they are acting on their own behalf and for their own benefit, or acting
for the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership in their representative capacity. Proof of the acts of any such officer, director, representative, or agent shall be
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received as prima facie proof of the acts of the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or
limited partnership itself.
(2) When a corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership violates this
chapter, such violation shall be deemed to be that of the individual directors, members, officers, managers, employees, or agents of the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or
limited partnership who knowingly authorized, ordered, aided, abetted, or advised in the acts
or omissions constituting in whole or in part the violation, whether the individuals acted on
their own behalf and for their own benefit, or for the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership and in their representative capacity. The individuals, in their
capacity as individuals, are subject to the provisions of this chapter and may be joined, if
subject to personal jurisdiction, as additional parties defendant in the proceedings against the
corporation, association, partnership, or limited partnership.
542.30. ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL.
(1) The attorney general shall investigate suspected violations of the provisions of this
chapter and, if he shall conclude that a violation is imminent, is occurring, or has occurred,
he shall institute on behalf of the State of Florida, or any of its departments, subdivisions, or
agencies, a court action seeking appropriate relief. The attorney general may direct the state
attorney of any judicial circuit in which such proceedings may be brought to aid and assist
him in the conduct of such investigations and enforcement proceedings.
(2) Prosecutions by the attorney general under this chapter may be commenced by cornshall have all of the powers and duties vested in the state attorneys with respect to criminal
prosecutions generally.
(3) The attorney general may bring an action in federal court on behalf of the State of
Florida, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, to recover the damages provided for
by the federal antitrust laws, and pursuant thereto, may undertake such measures as he
deems necessary to the successful conduct of such action; provided, however, the attorney
general shall notify in writing any such subdivision or agency of his intention to bring such
action on its behalf, and at any time within thirty (30) days thereafter, such subdivision or
agency may, by formal resolution of its governing body or as otherwise specifically provided
by applicable law, withdraw the authority of the attorney general to bring such action. In
any action brought by the attorney general on behalf of any political subdivision or agency,
the state shall retain for deposit in the general revenue fund of the state treasury, out of

the proceeds, if any, resulting from such action an amount equal to the expense incurred
by the state in the investigation and prosecution of such action. The attorney general may
bring any other action in federal court authorized by the federal antitrust laws.
(4) The attorney general may bring a civil action as parens patriae:
(a) of all citizens of this state, other than corporations, firms, associations, or partnerships, injured in their business or property by reason of a violation of section 542.21 of
this chapter; provided, however, the attorney general shall give to those citizens the best
notice of the pendency of such action as is practicable in the circumstances, and that at

any time within thirty (30) days thereafter, such citizens as may elect may notify the attorney general in writing of their intention to be excluded from such action. In any such
action, the attorney general may recover the aggregate damages sustained by those citizens

on whose behalf such action is brought, without separately proving the individual claims
of each such citizen. Proof of such damages may be based on statistical sampling methods,
the pro rata allocation of unlawful profits to sales occurring within the state, or such other

reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages as the court in which such action is
brought, in its discretion, may permit. The damages recovered, if any, shall be disbursed
in the manner and for the purpose or purposes best calculated to benefit such citizens as
determined by the court; provided, however, that any distribution procedure adopted first

afford each such citizen a reasonable opportunity to secure a pro rata portion of the damages attributable to his-respective claims, less litigation and administrative costs;
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(b) respecting injury to the general economy of this state and may recover those actual
damages sustained which are independent of or in addition to those recoverable by any
person pursuant to this chapter.
(5) The attorney general may cooperate with officials of the federal government and the
several states in the investigation and enforcement of violations to the end that implementation of this chapter will be accomplished in the most equitable and efficient manner possible.

542.31. INVFSTIGATIvE AUTHORITY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(1) Whenever it shall appear to the attorney general that a violation of any provision of
this chapter is imminent, is occurring, or has occurred, he may conduct an investigation into
the matter as he deems necessary. In connection with any such investigation, and prior to
the commencement of any civil or criminal action as provided for in this chapter, the attorney general shall have the authority to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, and
examine them under oath, or require the production of any documentary material, as heretofore defined, which he deems relevant or material to his investigation, for inspection, reproducing, or copying, under such terms and conditions as hereinafter prescribed. Such
power of subpoena and examination shall not abate or terminate by reason of any action or
proceeding brought by the attorney general under this chapter.
(2) Any subpoena issued by the attorney general shall contain the following information:
(a) the general subject matter of the investigation, including the nature of the suspected violation and the provisions of law applicable thereto;
(b) the date, which shall allow a reasonable time for compliance, and place at which
the person is required to appear or produce documentary material in his possession,
custody, or control; and
(c) where documentary material is required to be produced, a description of such
material by class so as to indicate clearly the material demanded.
(3) The attorney general is authorized, and may elect, to require the production of documentary material pursuant to this section prior to the taking of any testimony of the
person subpoenaed, in which event, said documentary material shall be made available for
inspection and copying during normal business hours at the principal place of business of
the person served, or at such other time and place as may be agreed upon by the person
served and the attorney general.
(4) When documentary material is demanded by subpoena, said subpoena shall not (a)
contain any requirement that would be unreasonable or improper if contained in a subpoena
duces tecum issued by a court of this state, or (b) require the disclosure of any documentary
material that would be privileged, or that for any other reason would not be required by
a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of this state.
(5) The examination of all witnesses under this section shall be conducted by the attorney
general, or by an assistant attorney general designated by him, before an officer authorized
to administer oaths in this state. The testimony shall be taken stenographically or by a
sound recording device and shall be transcribed. Upon the payment of reasonable charges
the person examined shall be furnished with a copy of the transcript.
(6) Service of a subpoena of the attorney general as provided herein may be made by
(a) delivery of a duly executed copy thereof to the person to be served, or if a person is not a
natural person, to the principal place of business of the person to be served, or (b) mailing
by certified mail, return receipt requested, a duly executed copy thereof addressed to the
person to be served at his principal place of business in this state, or, if said person has no
place of business in the state, to his principal office.
(7) All persons served with a subpoena by the attorney general under this chapter shall
be paid the same fees and mileage as paid witnesses in the courts of this state.
(8) In the event a witness served with a subpoena by the attorney general under this
chapter fails or refuses to obey such subpoena, or to produce documentary material as provided herein, or to give testimony relevant or material to the investigation being conducted, the attorney general may petition the circuit court in and for Leon County, or the
county wherein the witness resides, for compliance. The circuit court to which such petition
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is made may, upon notice to such person, issue an order requiring such compliance, which
shall be served upon such person. Thereafter, any failure or refusal on the part of the witness
to obey such order of the court may be punishable by the court as a contempt thereof.
(9) In any investigation brought by the attorney general pursuant to this chapter, no
individual shall be excused from attending, testifying, or producing documentary material in
obedience to a subpoena or under order of the court on the ground that the testimony or
evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty. No
individual shall be criminally prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty under this
chapter for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may,
pursuant to subpoena, testify or produce documentary material in any investigation brought
by the attorney general under this chapter, except from prosecution or punishment for
perjury committed while so testifying.
(10) Prior to commencement of an action for the violation under investigation, no testimony given or documentary material produced pursuant to a subpoena of the attorney
general as provided herein shall be disclosed to any person other than an authorized representative of the attorney general, without the consent of the person who testified or produced the documentary material, unless otherwise ordered by a court of this state for good
cause shown.

542.32. RULE

OF EvMENCE.
In prosecutions under this chapter, it shall be sufficient to prove that a conspiracy or
combination exists, and that the defendant or defendants belong to it or acted for or in
connection with it, without proving all members belonging to it, or providing or producing
any article or agreement or any written instrument on which it may be based, or that it
was evidenced by any written instrument at all. General reputation may be given in evidence
in all prosecutions of alleged conspiracies or combinations under the provisions of this
chapter.

542.33. JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF STATE AS PRIMA FACIE EvmENcE.
A final judgment or decree rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding under this
chapter brought by or on behalf of the State of Florida, any of its departments or agencies,
or any of its political subdivisions, to the effect that a defendant has violated this chapter
shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought
by any other party against such defendant under said chapter as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto; provided, however, this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before
any testimony has been taken.
542.34 NOTIFICATION OF CIVIL ACrION.
Upon commencement of any civil action by a person, other than the attorney general, for
violation of this chapter, the clerk of the court shall mail a copy of the complaint to the
attorney general.
542.35. STATUTE OF LIMrTATONS.
(1) An action under this chapter shall be forever barred unless commenced within four
(4) years of the date upon which the cause of action arose. No cause of action barred under
existing law on the effective date of this Act shall be revived by this chapter. For the purpose
of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to arise at any time
during the period of the violation.
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(2) If any proceeding is commenced under this chapter by the attorney general on behalf
of the State of Florida, its departments or agencies, or its political subdivisions, the running
of the statute of limitations in respect of every right of action arising under this chapter, and
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the aforementioned proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one (1) year thereafter. If the
running of the statute of limitations is suspended, the action shall be forever barred unless
commenced within the greater of either the period of suspension or four (4) years after the
date upon which the cause of action arose.
542.36. SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Personal service of any process in any action under this chapter may be made on any
person outside the state if such person has engaged in conduct in violation of this chapter
in this state. Such persons shall be deemed to have thereby submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state within the meaning of this section.
542.37. VENUE.
Actions or proceedings brought by the state or any private party for violations of the
provisions of this chapter may be brought in the circuit in and for the county where the
offense or any part thereof is committed, or where any of the defendants reside or are found,
or where any agent of any defendant resides or is found, or where any defendant, corporation,
association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership does business.
542.38. REMEDIES CUMULATIVE.
The remedies provided in this chapter are cumulative of each other and of existing
powers and remedies inherent in the courts.
542.39. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this chapter or applications thereof to any person or circumstances is
held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter
that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions of this chapter are severable.
Section 2. Sections 542.01, 542.02, 542.03, 542.04, 542.05, 542.06, 542.07, 542.08, 542.09, 542.10,
542.11, and 542.12, Florida Statutes, are repealed.
Section 3. This chapter shall take effect July 1, 197_.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO APPENDICES B AND CO
The raw data used for Appendix B was compiled from the three categories listed as
column headings in tables 1-5. A complete search of reported cases disclosed twenty-five
actions brought in the United States District Court in Florida claiming violations of section
1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or section 2 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§1, 2, 13). A similar
search was made for cases brought in state courts under chapter 542, Florida Statutes, and its
predecessors, excluding suits involving noncompetition agreements. Fifteen such cases were
found. In late December 1973 an extensive investigation was made of the files of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to discover cases not reported for
various reasons. The investigation was limited to 1970-1973 and uncovered 54 cases, many
still pending at the time of this writing.

*The material collected in these appendices represents the joint research and analysis of
Barbara A. Ropes and Eliot J. Safer, third-year students at the Holland Law Center. Their
efforts are gratefully acknowledged.
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The objective of this effort was not to classify specifically each case but rather to discover
general trends in past litigation. Nebulous factual descriptions and inconsistent wordings
have necessitated some interpretation of the data to allow for a cohesive and informative
presentation. Notes clarifying such interpretations are provided where appropriate.
In January 1974, 285 questionnaires were distributed to circuit court and district court
of appeal judges in the state. The questionnaire sought to determine the judges' experience
and view of antitrust considerations. By early March, 121 were returned. The results are
presented in Appendix C with pertinent comments from the judges and interpretation of
the responses.
APPENDIX B
Table 1
CIVIL ANTrIRUsT CASEs FILED IN UNrrED STATEs DIsRiar CouRTs

1961-1972

FYE June 30

U.S. Total

ND. Fla.

M.D. Fla.

S.D. Fla.

Fla. Total

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

399
20382
405
387
483
734
559
670
754
881
1063
1283

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
4
1
4
2
2

-1

-1
14
2
7
4
4
6
6
5
12
12

14
55
29
1
10
7
6
5
7
13
23
27

14
55
43
4
18
12
11
11
14
22
37
41

Source: Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.
1. Middle District established July 30, 1962.
2. 1739 cases attributed to electrical equipment industry.
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APPENDIX B
Table 2
PARTIES INVOLVED IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Federal
Cases
Individual vs:
Individual
Florida corporation2
Foreign corporation
Government3
Florida corporation vs:
Florida corporation (equal)4
Florida corporation (larger)I
Foreign corporation (equal)4
Foreign corporation (larger)4
U.S. government
Government3
Foreign corporation vs:
Foreign corporation

1

Southern
District

State Cases

3
6
1
0

3
7
4
0

3
5
0
3

5
12
0
7
19
8

1
4
0
18
2
0

5
6
0
2
0
2

0

5

0

1. Multiple parties in the same action resulted in multiple listings. Parties are included in
this table without regard to their position as plaintiff or defendant.
2. Includes unincorporated associations throughout this table.
3. Includes actions involving governmental officials, state agencies, and municipalities.
4. "Larger" and "equal" classifications made on the basis of economic power as apparently
revealed in the cases.
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Table 3
DIsPosrrION oF ANTrrRusr CAsEs

Verdict for plaintiff
Reversed on appeal
Affirmed on appeal
Judgment for defendant
Reversed on appeal
Affirmed on appeal
Summary judgment for defendant
Reversed on appeal
Affirmed on appeal
Injunction granted
Reversed on appeal
Affirmed on appeal
Dismissed by trial court
Reversed on appeal
Affirmed on appeal
Settlement
Other,

Federal
Cases

Southern
District

State Cases

2
1
1
2
2
0
4
1
2
0
0
0
7
5
2
5
5

0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
1
2
0
2
13
8

4
3
1
5
2
1
1
0
1
3
3
0
1
1
0
0
0

1. Includes transfers for venue, order to amend complaint, mandamus action, inspection of
grand jury proceedings.

APPENDIX B
Table 4
TYPE oF ANrsmusr IssuE RAisn

Plaintiff]
Monopoly
Restraint of trade
Price fixing
Illegal tying
Territorial agreement
Conspiracy to injure plaintiff's
business
Other
Unknown2
Defendant
Illegal contract
Counterclaim

Federal
Cases

Southern
District

State Cases

3
9
8
1
1

10
13
16
4
1

2
5
1
0
1

2
4
3

4
2
0

0
3
0

1
0

0
1

2
1

1. Complaint.may allege more than one violation.
2. Nature of claim not disclosed.
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APPENDIX B
Table 5
INDUSTRIES INVOLVED IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Federal
Cases

Southern
District

State Cases

1
0
1
1
0
0
1
3
3

0
1
0
0
1
2
0
7
4

0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
2
0
0
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
5

1
3
0
1
0
5
7
7
1
0
1
3
3
4

0
1
2
0
3
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0

Florida industries
Sponge
Fishing
Phosphate
Tours
Jai Alai
Hotels
Citrus
Construction/Land
Liquor and restaurant
Regulated industries
Securities
Insurance
Gas and electric
Telephone
Labor unions
Automotive
Recreation/Entertainment
Industrial goods
Agricultural
Advertising
Laundry
Drugs
Textile
Other

APPENDIX C
JUDICIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Within which federal judicial district is your court situated?
21 Northern District
42 Middle District
41 Southern District
18 No Response
2. In which judicial capacity do you presently serve?
I1I Circuit Court
10 District Court of Appeal
I No Response
3. How long have you served in this capacity?
average 6.6 years
4. What was the nature of your law-related experience prior to your elevation to the
bench?
97 General practice
14 Corporate
6 Commercial
15 Criminal prosecution
15 Criminal defense
22 Plaintiff personal injury
19 Defendant personal injury
31 Real estate
29 Estate and Probate
19 Other
5 No Response
5. How long did you engage in the foregoing practice?
average 12.2 years

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/1

102

Rubin: Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement
RETHINKING STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

1974)

. " 6. If your practice was in association with a law firm, approximately how- large was the
firm at the time of your departure (partners and associates)?
62 2-5
11 5-10
6 10-20
3 20-30
0 more than 30
39 No Response
Comment: Forty-three per cent of the total questionnaires distributed were returned. The
rate of return from circuit court judges and district court of appeal judges considered separately were approximately the same as the over-all percentage. Only the length of time
served in the present position was computed in the average years served, although many
judges had prior experience on lower courts. An error in the questionnaire form hindered
those judges who formerly were sole practitioners from so signifying. It is likely that many of
the "no responses" may be accounted for in this manner.
7. To what extent has your law practice or judicial experience, or both, encompassed
consideration of antitrust matters:

Practice

Judgeship

94
12

103
10

2

2

0

0

0

0

0
2
12

0
0
7

Experience
None
Infrequent consideration of antitrust as an ancillary issue in a
case or other legal matter
Infrequent consideration of antitrust as a primary issue in a case
or other legal matter
Frequent consideration of antitrust as an ancillary issue in a case
or other legal matter
Frequent consideration of antitrust as a primary issue in a case
or other legal matter
Consideration of antitrust in the context of class action litigation
Other
No response

8. If you have had experience with antitrust matters, is your experience based primarily
on federal or state antitrust law?
11 Federal
6 State
4 Both
101 No Response
Comment: Eighty-four per cent of the judges had no experience with antitrust matters as
a judge and 77% had none in practice. The judgeship experience clearly demonstrates the
limited use of the existing state act, as apparent from the few litigated cases shown in Ap-

pendix B supra.
Fifty-six per cent of those with some experience were primarily involved with the federal
law while the remainder had experience with either state law or both state and federal.
There was no apparent correlation between antitrust experience and the type of law ex-

perience prior to judicial service.
Judges' Comments: There was a wide diversity in the type of antitrust experience of the
judges. One served as a clerk to a federal judge, another was counsel in a lengthy federal
case, and another was involved with the federal law purely as a matter of personal interest.
9. Which category best describes the status of your court's docket?
86 Current
25 Slightly behind
6 Substantially behind
5 No Response
Judges' Comment: One judge conceded that his docket was substantially behind "although
many judges would say 'slightly.'" Another stressed that in his circuit a trial is ordinarily
scheduled for the month after the case is at issue.

10. What impact do you anticipate increased state antitrust litigation will have on the
workload of your court?
52 No discernible impact on workload
35 Same workload increase as would result from an increase in litigation generally
15 Proportionately greater increase in workload than would result from an increase
in litigation generally
20 No response
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11. If you anticipate a workload increase in answer to question 10, which of the following,
in order of importance, influenced your response?
9/3/3
25/2/1
10/5/4
2/2/1
2/0/0
3
81

Length and complexity of antitrust discovery
Length and complexity of antitrust trials
Complexity of legal issues raised
Complexity of economic issues raised
Difficulty in fashioning appropriate relief
Other
No response

Comment: Forty-three per cent of the judges foresee no impact on the workload of their
courts with an increase in state antitrust litigation. This may be explained by the judges'
viewing conditions in their jurisdiction as not being conducive to such suits.
The 1971 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts gives the weight factors used to analyze the federal court dockets. A heavier count is
given to cases known to be of a more difficult and time-consuming nature. Examples of
various types of criminal actions and their respective weights are: antitrust, 1.0; civil rights,
6.96; income tax fraud, 1.38; marijuana, 0.70; bank embezzlement, 0.46. Examples of civil
actions and their respective weights are: antitrust, 1.90; civil rights, 2.03; patent, 2.64; bankruptcy, 0.62; prisoner habeas corpus, 0.78. If the federal experience is duplicated in Florida
courts, then civil antitrust litigation would add a proportionately greater burden on the
court workload.
The responses to question 11 are tabulated and presented on a firstlsecondithird basis.
Half of those judges who saw an increase on their court's workload signified that the length
and complexity of antitrust trials influenced their response.
Judges' Comments: One judge said that antitrust would be relatively unimportant to the
majority of circuits in the state. Another added that his court is not reaching its maximum
capabilities, therefore there would be no difficulties in increasing the load. A third, although
anticipating a proportionately greater increase, said that from observation of federal courts,
the problems listed in the questionnaire were routine.
12. Do you believe patterning new state antitrust legislation after existing federal statutes
and incorporating pertinent federal judicial precedent would significantly reduce the interpretative and analytical difficulties that might otherwise be encountered by the Florida
judiciary?
58 Yes
7 No
57 No opinion
Comment: Forty-seven per cent believed patterning a new state statute after the federal
statutes would ease some difficulties, 6% said "No," while 56% had no opinion.
13. Do you believe antitrust enforcement regarding localized practices should be a federal
concern, or should states such as Florida undertake an active role?
27 Only federal enforcement
19 Only state enforcement
47 Concurrent federal and state enforcement
12 Other
17 No response
Comment: Thirty-nine per cent thought concurrent enforcement regarding localized
practices was appropriate, 15% preferred only state enforcement, and 22% favored only
federal enforcement. Of those responding, 64% wanted at least some degree of state involvement.
Judges' Comment: Some judges wanted federal enforcement but wanted the state to have
authority if federal enforcement was not executed. One judge desired only the state enforcement but realized that it was probably impractical. Others thought state enforcement
best in situations peculiarly appropriate to such actions. (See Appendix B, table 5, for a
list of peculiarly Florida industries that have been involved in past antitrust litigation.)
Several expressed the opinion that the state did not need any new legislation in this area.
14. If you believe there should be state antitrust enforcement, whom should the Florida
Legislature authorize to bring antitrust actions?
53 Attorney general
23 State attorney
17 Private litigants
6 Other
40 No response
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15. In your view, which of the following, in order of importance, present the most effective means of regulating business practices and securing consumer protection?
Business

Consumer

Enforcement authority

22/817
17/13/1
14/2/7
11/2/5
3/2/1
44

21/10/7
20/7/4
21/4/5
11/3/7
8/5/2
40

Civil suits by attorney general or state attorney
Criminal suits by attorney general or state attorney
Private civil litigation
State agency regulation
Consumer class actions
No response

Comment: Thirty-eight per cent favored authorizing the attorney general to bring antitrust
actions, 17% and 12% favored the state attorney or private litigants, respectively.
The responses to question 15 are presented as first/second/third choices. Civil and criminal suits by state officers were thought to be the most effective means of regulating business
practices. This correlates with the responses to the preceeding question. Private suits were
preferred as the best means of securing consumer protection. The results show that state
agency regulation and particularly consumer class actions were not believed to be effective in
achieving the results.
Judges' Comments: Several judges expressed the opinion that the right to bring an antitrust action should be broad-based so that no one body could refuse to bring suit. One judge
pleaded that no new arm of the state government be created. Another judge wanted civil
suits state subsidized to regulate business.
16. If new antitrust legislation is enacted in Florida, would you favor a judicial conference
to discuss aspects of antitrust litigation and enforcement?
75 Yes
13 No
34 No opinion
Judges' Comments: In favor of a conference, one judge said that it would be a necessity
to acquaint those like him who know little on the subject. Another was against such a conference, saying that too much time was already required away from the bench. A third said
that he would have to look over any new statute before knowing if such a conference would
be beneficial.
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